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FOREWORD BY JOHN MORELLI
If in 1970, an environmentally minded individual walked into an industrial 
manufacturing facility and asked the operations staff to reduce the company’s 
waste emissions to zero percent, there probably would have been a slight 
speechless pause followed by some muted laughter and then the company 
security ofﬁ cer would have been called to escort the individual to the exit. The 
request would have appeared ludicrous to the operations staff because a zero 
emissions outcome was well beyond their conceptual horizon. Today however, 
some companies have in fact set zero-emission targets; but it is not an easy 
goal to achieve. No one company stands alone. Each is a part of a larger net-
work of suppliers and consumers that eventually reach beyond the control of 
any single element of the economy. 
The decisions that we, as elements of a society, make and the consequential 
actions that we take are, in part, a result of the meanings and understandings 
that we hold in common. These understandings evolve with time, owing to a 
variety of inputs, and are seen to manifest themselves in the preparation and 
practice of our professions. Movement toward a more sustainable future is evi-
denced by the development over the last half century of new sub-professions 
including ‘environmental’ economist, ‘environmental’ engineer, ‘environmen-
tal’ scientist, etc. While these evolutionary developments are necessary and 
laudable, they are inadequate to meet the challenges we face. Each addresses 
issues inherent within their existing framework, but a broader horizon is neces-
sary to reach toward a truly sustainable future. A more ‘ecological’ world view 
is warranted; a view that holds our societies and economies to be subsystems 
of the ecosystems that support them.
In Sustainability, environmental economics, welfare the distinguished au-
thors reach toward this broader horizon. It is an advanced, thought-provoking 
and comprehensive treatise on sustainability, environmental science, envi-
ronmental economics, and environmental management, visiting and revisit-
ing historical, present and developing theories, policies, practices and under-
standings regarding natural capital, agriculture, human welfare, population, 
environment, pollution, wealth, life, happiness, competition, consumption, 
cooperation, carrying capacity, ecology, ecosystem services, economic valu-
ation, environmental externalities, risk, ecological footprint, economic growth, 
GDP and voluntary simplicity. 
This is an encyclopaedic resource that identiﬁ es and examines the envi-
ronmental aspects of sustainability, the problems with our current measures, 
the inappropriateness of our assumptions regarding the appropriateness of 
pollution, the ‘sin’ of dominant paradigms, and continues on to examine key 
socio-economic models of quality of life and human development, considering 
many ‘if’ statements regarding the extent and pace of development. It presents 
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visions for possible (sustainable) paths forward, suggesting alternative assess-
ments and principles to follow to keep the economy within the limits of Earth’s 
carrying capacity. It includes an excellent discussion on resilience, limits and 
ecological footprint and an outstanding description of total economic valua-
tion.
In the discussion of environmental problems, the authors claim that the ‘ba-
sic context will be deﬁ ned from the perspective of natural sciences in a highly 
concise manner, primarily for readers trained in social sciences’. Yet, in pre-
senting it in this way and including discussions regarding our responses to 
these problems, it identiﬁ es key concerns that even environmental scientists 
and engineers may have overlooked, owing to the narrow focus of their re-
spective specialities. I believe that no matter what a reader’s area of expertise 
may be, there will be something additional to be learned by reading this book.
This book reveals the enormous complexities of the problems we face and 
yet, I believe, is undergirded by the strength of the human spirit, including 
phrases like, ‘inexhaustible human creativity’, ‘human technological ingenuity’, 
and ‘the omnipotence of human knowledge’. It will serve as an indispensable 
resource for all concerned about our future on this planet.
John Morelli, PhD, PE
Professor Emeritus,
Environmental Management & Technology
Rochester Institute of Technology
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PREFACE
Since humans have been on Earth we have used ecosystem services, with-
out which we would have found it impossible to survive; however, we initially 
paid no heed to the limitations of using those services. We have considered 
natural ‘assets’ to be inexhaustible, and become accustomed to using them 
for our own purposes, caring little that the living creatures that inhabit the 
Earth comprise an extremely complex ecosystem, and senseless destruction 
risks the lives of all. In the beginning, the number of humans on Earth was so 
small and our tools so primitive that our impact on the biosphere was eclipsed 
by the latter’s ability to regenerate. Soon, our ancestors began to ‘play with 
ﬁ re’, burning up natural ecosystems either on purpose or by accident. In some 
cases, we sought to dominate territories that were suitable for agricultural cul-
tivation, while at other times we were led to destroy forests ‘simply’ because 
we needed timber to build vessels. The ﬁ rst defensive measures against such 
harmful effects were only taken when humankind had already populated the 
globe and had tools at its disposal with which the destruction of nature had 
become highly effective. Seeking to protect nature, or rather our own prop-
erty, wise sovereigns introduced regulations about the use of forests, making it 
mandatory to replace felled trees. They imposed restrictions on hunting, while 
ﬁ shing was also curbed and limits were set on mining. Once the concept of 
land ownership had emerged, the protection of property soon followed. This 
has not saved nature from being destroyed by humans. ‘Utilisation’ has be-
come the privilege of the wealthy, destruction continues, and is now being 
wrought on a disastrous scale.
From Rachel Carson to the Club of Rome 
Our profession, environmental protection, dates back approximately half a 
century. For a citizen of Central Europe, this half-century has been different 
from any other ﬁ fty-year period because it has largely passed in peace, and 
was at most disturbed by local wars. On the other hand, over these ﬁ fty years 
humankind has used more natural resources than in the entire preceding mil-
lennium. Radical changes have taken place in the biosphere: we are again 
at war – only this time it is not with one another, but with nature. All this has 
happened since we became heavily involved in protecting the environment. It 
is intriguing to see with our own eyes what humankind has done in its efforts 
to save the Earth from destruction. Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring, was 
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published more than ﬁ fty years ago. In 1962, Carson shocked the world by ar-
guing that the build-up of DDT in the food chain would leave humankind with-
out birds. Many of us were touched by that book, but it was taken with a pinch 
of salt by perhaps an even greater number of readers, including also those who 
have since been going on at length about the beneﬁ ts of scientiﬁ c advance-
ment. Obviously, there is a lot to go on about. The insecticidal effect of DDT 
was discovered in 1934 by Paul Hermann Müller, who in 1948 was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Medicine for his discovery. Since then, plenty of information has 
emerged about DDT, which is nevertheless still used in a number of countries 
given the difﬁ culty of choosing between malaria and DDT. As ‘replacement’ 
compounds decompose rapidly, especially at higher temperatures, they are 
not effective enough. Early warnings about environmental problems were also 
issued in Hungary. In 1971, the Hungarian publisher, KJK published Suicidal 
Civilisation, a book by Lajos Jócsik. It was a highly ‘balanced’ piece of work, 
but essentially pessimistic. Citations began with the Bible and concluded with 
a quote from a speech by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party. Brezhnev knew the solution to everything; how could 
he not identify the solution to environmental issues? A few years later, relying 
on reports to the Club of Rome, the latter also addressed the problem more 
comprehensively (In Defence of Our Environment. KJK, 1976). 
In 1972, the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, a report whose 
attempt to promote the concept of ‘zero growth’ met with extremely strong 
reactions. Warnings were given, but were taken rather lightly by political and 
economic actors. Nevertheless, a group of researchers was formed which 
started to address the problem in a systematic manner, and sought to provide 
increasingly accurate forecasts about the future using global models. Arguing 
for ‘organic growth’, in 1974 Mersarovic and Pestel published Mankind at the 
Turning Point, the second report to the Club of Rome. The second report was 
already available in Hungarian as well, but only to the lucky few, given that the 
Hungarian translation of the book was ‘published’ in the form of numbered 
copies. The models in the book had become somewhat more reﬁ ned, but the 
point remained the same, and the Mersarovic–Pestel model also presented a 
rather pessimistic view of the future.
Meanwhile, in the UK in 1973 Schumacher published his book, Small Is 
Beautiful, the success of which is demonstrated by the short time it took to be-
come a bestseller. Schumacher did not propose a model, but he did question 
the values inherent in the prevailing economic order. These were disquieting 
thoughts, and it was not by coincidence that the book remained untranslated 
in Hungary for a long time.
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Even the third report to the Club of Rome was no longer concerned with 
models. And this was despite the fact that its head of research, Jan Tinber-
gen, had earned worldwide renown through his achievements in the ﬁ eld of 
dynamic modelling. The work published under his name represented a real 
breakthrough in terms of research on global issues. The ﬁ ndings of the team 
headed by Jan Tinbergen were released in 1976 under the title Reshaping the 
International Order (RIO). In Hungary, the book was published with a three-
year lag (1979), but was legally made available to everyone. As Jan Tinbergen 
had already been awarded the Nobel Prize in 1969, the RIO Report that was 
completed in 1976 was awarded to a Nobel Prize laureate. Tinbergen and his 
team argued for the need to establish a new order for the world economy, and 
earned scientiﬁ c renown for how he addressed environmental problems.
The sinister reports of the Club of Rome were followed by publications that 
brought relief. It may not be erroneous to claim that a more optimistic posi-
tion concerning environmental issues was heralded by the Brundtland Report. 
Published in 1987, the Brundtland Report introduced the concept of sustain-
able development, which was brought into focus at the Rio Conference of 
1992, together with eco-efﬁ ciency.
Conversely, the deﬁ nition offered in the Brundtland Report concerns meet-
ing the needs of present and future generations; i.e., the welfare of present and 
future generations, which depends on both the stock of accumulated capital 
and the size of the population to be sustained. If it is assumed that the stock 
of natural capital does not diminish over time, welfare may also increase as 
population grows. Population growth may be offset by advances in technol-
ogy, which may be instrumental in ensuring that a unit of natural capital yields 
greater welfare. Published by the World Bank in 1992, the World Development 
Report demonstrates that at a certain level of economic growth, growth and 
pollution diverge. Above a per capita GDP of USD 10,000, clear improvements 
occur in environmental indicators such as SO2 emissions, the volume of un-
treated wastewater, the concentration of lead and other heavy metals in air, 
etc. In environmental economics, the curves describing such relationships are 
referred to as Kuznets curves. As Kuznets collected the Nobel Prize, the ﬁ rst 
report to the Club of Rome, Limits to Growth, was already being drafted by 
Meadows et al. and was published in 1972, questioning the sustainability of 
growth in the long term, and the proposition that the impact of growth is posi-
tive. A closer look at the above propositions reveals that the theory of growth 
of the former economist, who is now considered a ground-breaking thinker, 
has been the subject of criticism by numerous researchers over the past thirty-
ﬁ ve years. Namely, while considering technological and social innovation to be 
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the drivers of development – and also recognising the importance of social and 
cultural dimensions – in his Nobel Prize Lecture, Kuznets argued that ‘modern 
technology with its emphasis on labour-saving inventions may not be suited to 
countries with a plethora of labour but a scarcity of other factors, such as land 
and water; and modern institutions, with their emphasis on personal responsi-
bility and pursuit of economic interest, may not be suited to the more traditional 
life patterns of the agricultural communities that predominate in many less de-
veloped countries.’ For Kuznets GDP obviously did not represent an indicator 
of welfare; indeed, in the same lecture he clearly states that ‘the conventional 
measures of national product and its components do not reﬂ ect many costs of 
adjustment in the economic and social structures […] This shortcoming of the 
theory […] has led […] to attempts to expand the national accounting frame-
work to encompass the so far hidden but clearly important costs, for example, 
in education as capital investment, in the shift to urban life, or in the pollution 
and other negative results of mass production. These efforts will also uncover 
some so far unmeasured positive returns – in the way of greater health and lon-
gevity, greater mobility, more leisure, less income inequality, and the like.’ The 
reader is reminded that the Human Development Index (HDI) and Cobb and 
Daly’s Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) only attracted general 
interest much later, in the 1990s.
Initially published in 1995 in German, Factor 4 was perhaps the ﬁ rst wholly 
enthusiastic report to the Club of Rome. The report was also subsequently 
published in English in 1997, proving that there was hope. Ernst von Weizsäck-
er, Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins described the opportunities offered 
by science and technology (Weizsäcker, 1997). They found that a radical im-
provement in eco-efﬁ ciency would enable humankind to double its welfare 
while halving the environmental load it had previously generated per unit of 
growth. It was around this time that UNIDO’s Cleaner Production Centres were 
established, the US set up pollution prevention centres, and the end of the 
defensive era for environmental protection could happily be acknowledged. 
Prominent ﬁ gures in the world of business joined the ‘club’, such as Michael 
Porter, with his efforts to make the ‘business case’ for environmental protec-
tion, and also more recently (2006) corporate social responsibility an integral 
part of corporate strategy. Additionally, new Factor books such as Factor 5 
and Factor 10 have been and continue to be released almost on an annual ba-
sis, all calling for inexhaustible human creativity. Generally, they claim no less 
than the possibility of generating much greater welfare than humankind has 
ever achieved at the expense of much more limited consumption of materials 
and energy, and a much smaller environmental load; that is, that the Earth is 
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capable of supporting up to nine billion people, if … But yes, that ‘if’ at the 
end of the sentence reminds us that we cannot go on the way we have been 
doing so far. That ‘if’ reminds us that we must change our ideas and expecta-
tions about welfare, comfort, consumption, production and virtually everything 
we have grown accustomed to.  A stock society must be transformed into a 
ﬂ ow society. We can no longer possess goods; we must be content to use 
the services they provide. The cheapness and comfort of fossil fuels should 
be replaced by renewable energy sources that are more expensive and are of 
lower energy density.
The so-called hydrogen economy might solve energy issues, but even then 
access to raw materials will remain limited, and their price will certainly in-
crease. If… if there were a way for wages to converge to the EU level more 
slowly than with quality of life, and quality of life could be given an institutional 
deﬁ nition other than the one given to it by EU citizens. If policy did not promise 
rapid improvements in living conditions, and immediate existential betterment 
to each individual, and did not adopt measures driven (or coerced?) by such 
promises, but aimed for more moderate growth and slower convergence. If 
countries could be set on a path of development other than what the aver-
age European citizen expects in terms of quality, this would certainly generate 
returns in the future. Unfortunately, for the time being improvements in eco-
efﬁ ciency are being offset by increasing consumption. Due to the lower con-
sumption of materials and energy, products have become cheaper so individu-
als can buy more of them, leading to an overall increase in the use of natural 
resources as measured in non-ﬁ nancial terms such as kilograms and joules. 
There is in fact a need for more ‘economy’ (i.e., thrift) and recycling; nothing 
should be thrown away or dumped in a landﬁ ll, and so on and so forth. There 
is hardly anything we can go on doing in the old way.
We have gradually forgotten about the models, although in their 2004 book, 
Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update, Dennis and Donella Meadows and Jør-
gen Randers reminded us of the work they published in 1972, proving that the 
forecasts they had made were accurate for the most part. It seemed that in 
2004 we were already past caring.
Obviously, there are still pessimists who are not convinced of the omnipo-
tence of human knowledge. New theories have emerged; they tend to reiterate 
the ﬁ rst reports to the Club of Rome. To promote his theory of degrowth, the 
outstanding French professor Serge Latouche is touring the world and has 
written a book under the title Little Treatise on Serene Degrowth, and is giving 
lectures – mostly to ‘believers’, it must be admitted.
For an overview of the history of the problem, we should choose an earlier 
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point of reference. Revisiting the roots of the issue, the ‘father’ of theories 
about global issues is most probably Malthus. Malthus wrote his famous essay 
in 1798, proposing that the supply of food to a growing population could not 
be guaranteed because growth in food supply followed a mathematical pro-
gression, while that of population a geometric progression. In Malthus’ time, 
the Earth was populated by less than a billion people. The population stood at 
two billion in 1930, and had reached seven billion by 2010. Almost immediate-
ly, Malthus’ opponents declared his theory to be ﬂ awed, partly on the grounds 
of its failure to take into account the development of science and technology. 
Published in 1803 and creating a much greater stir than his ﬁ rst essay, a fol-
lowing book (Effects on Human Happiness) features a concept that is being 
rediscovered today. Malthus was not concerned with the ability of humans to 
defeat each other, but with the happiness of humankind as a whole. Deceased 
in 1900, the outstanding English scholar Ruskin discusses the same point: 
‘There is no wealth but life. Life, including all its powers of love, of joy, and of 
admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest numbers 
of noble and happy human beings; that man is richest, who, having perfected 
the functions of his own life to the utmost, has also the widest helpful inﬂ uence 
[…] over the lives of others.’ Humankind should at long last understand that 
more happiness can be created through cooperation than competition. This 
can also be demonstrated on the basis of game theory, relying on the logic of 
the prisoner’s dilemma. Despite this, the theorem tends to be forgotten, even 
by those who have respect for what Neumann and Morgenstern found. John 
von Neumann and his compatriots 70 years ago, Ruskin 120 years ago, and 
indeed Malthus still understood what purpose humans serve on Earth.
The dichotomy between optimism and pessimism is not easy to abandon, 
but it is equally difﬁ cult to move on. Revisiting the roots, one may argue that 
the ultimate purpose of all human activity, including economic activity, is to 
make people happy. Kahneman, also a Nobel Prize laureate, cites Easterlin 
(1974), who, after examining the relationship between economic growth and 
happiness, found that even a major improvement in the standard of living had 
no demonstrable effect on human satisfaction or happiness. Easterlin (1995) 
also found that in Japan the reported level of individual happiness failed to 
increase between 1958 and 1987, despite a ﬁ ve-fold multiplication in real in-
comes over the same period. To some degree, this appears to contradict our 
own intuition and, more strongly, the fundamental doctrines of economics. 
Yet, as Kahneman points out, in the long term welfare is not closely associated 
with individual circumstances or opportunities. One possible explanation for 
this proposed by Kahneman is that people regularly adjust their aspirations 
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to the utility that is achieved, thereby preventing them from reporting a higher 
level of satisfaction, even when the welfare they experience has signiﬁ cantly 
improved. The highest levels of satisfaction were recorded for the citizens of 
Northern European countries, no correlation was found between GDP and 
happiness in relatively wealthy countries, while inhabitants of the former So-
viet bloc are highly dissatisﬁ ed (a historical trend, of course), and, surprisingly, 
citizens of South America are satisﬁ ed.
In an article from 2000, Csíkszentmihályi questions the general theory put 
forward by Maslow that consumers make rational decisions concerning the 
satisfaction of their basic needs (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs). Csíkszent-
mihályi ﬁ nds that in a welfare economy, consumers are less concerned with 
‘existence’ itself, and are more focused on ‘experiential’ needs. That is, they 
need activities which serve to promote the enjoyment of real-life experiences. 
Curiously, consumers in the ‘developed world’ are no longer interested in what 
they buy, but more in the experience of buying. In terms of sustainable con-
sumption, this change may have both positive and negative consequences. 
Researchers of happiness (Ng, 2008) ﬁ nd that ‘Public policy should put more 
emphasis (than suggested by existing economic analysis) on factors more im-
portant for happiness than economic production and consumption, including 
employment, environmental quality, equality, health and safety.’ The Korean 
author adds, interestingly, that ‘scientiﬁ c advance in general and in brain stim-
ulation and genetic engineering in particular may offer the real breakthroughs 
against the biological or psychological limitations on happiness’.
Happiness researchers report that ‘despite a huge increase (several times 
instead of just several percentage points) in real income or consumption levels, 
the average happiness level of a country has typically remained largely un-
changed.’ (Easterlin, 1974, 2002; cited in Ng, 2008). ‘Cross-country compari-
son of average happiness levels shows lower happiness levels for low-income 
countries and high happiness levels for high-income countries but the positive 
correlation between income and happiness is not signiﬁcant after the income 
level of about US $7,500 per capita per annum.’ (Inglehart–Klingemann, 2000; 
cited in Ng, 2008). ‘Other social-economic factors like being married have 
higher correlation with happiness than income or consumption; interpersonal 
relationships are essential for happiness.’ (Bruni, 2006, cited in Ng, 2008).
Ng suggests that if these results are valid, a revolution in economic thinking 
is needed, as proposed by Layard (2005). At the social and global level, the 
pursuit of economic growth may be illusory as it does not really increase the 
value of the ultimate objective: happiness. In fact, ‘if account is taken of the 
environmental disruption effects, economic growth may well be welfare-reduc-
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ing, if not survival-threatening’ (Ng–Ng, 2001). Sustainability means the ability 
to ensure the existence of ‘something’ continuous. The meaning of develop-
ment is more intricate, given the possibility to interpret growth in quantitative 
and qualitative terms; e.g., as a steady increase in welfare or in terms of well-
being. Obviously, interpretation makes a difference. For example, GDP growth 
does not necessarily bring about an increase in welfare, and particularly not 
in well-being (Harangozó et al., 2018). Increased well-being comes from the 
development of education, an increase in the number of healthy lived years, 
improvements in life and social security, as well as in factors such as personal 
freedom, which are all components of quality of life. Without underestimat-
ing the unfavourable effects of perceivable economic development trends on 
the natural environment, we must objectively admit that dangerous effects are 
predominantly being felt in the social dimension. Income inequality is increas-
ing, while some channels of social mobility, such as education, are becoming 
blocked. Certain segments of society face multiple disadvantages and dis-
crimination. Owing to these problems, while still underlining the need to award 
priority to promoting the sufﬁ cient quality of natural and built environments in 
terms of both quality of human life and functioning of the economy, sustain-
able development strategy should not exclusively prioritise the sustainability 
of nature.
On these grounds, our book is subdivided into three main parts. Part I ad-
dresses the issue of environmental sustainability itself, including a chapter that 
throws light on the background to the problem from the perspective of natural 
sciences. Part II describes the analytical methods and language for interpret-
ing sustainability in terms of environmental economics, while also giving an 
account of tried and tested public policy recommendations that have been 
implemented extensively. Finally, Part III, in the spirit of the question ‘to what 
end the environmental load’, addresses the welfare issues involved in sustain-
ability, discussing subjects such as whether it is rational to install a sewage 
system in every village, and how to measure happiness.
As it should be clear from this Introduction, welfare is used and deﬁ ned in 
this book as ‘the health, happiness, and fortunes of a person or group’ (Oxford 
English Dictionary). However, this term refers mainly to the material and ﬁ nan-
cial means needed to achieve a broader fulﬁ lment of human being, namely the 
well-being of it. In Chapter 8, within the concept of the ‘quality of life’, the dif-
ferences of these concepts will be more thoroughly elaborated.
I. SUSTAINABILITY
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1. Sustainable development
Sustainable development is the twenty-ﬁ rst century’s great challenge to the 
human race. The term ﬁ rst appeared in the Brundtland report in 1987. Twenty 
years have since passed, and professionals are still arguing about the mean-
ing of this term: why we are supposed to differentiate between development 
and growth, and should we show solidarity towards future generations while 
we still have problems providing a living for generations presently co-existing? 
This chapter examines whether the relationship between the economy and the 
environment can be harmonious, and suggests what principles we ought to fol-
low to keep the economy within the limits of Earth’s carrying capacity.
1.1 Biosphere and economy 
The relationship of economy and nature has become controversial, a fact well 
recognisable in the schematic ﬁ gure (Figure 1-1.) that illustrates the corre-
lation between the biosphere, the social system and the economic system. 
The circles indicate the embeddedness of these systems within each other; 
the largest system, the biosphere, is located outside with the social system 
within; next, the even-smaller economic system with the industrial subsys-
tem inside (Tyteca, 2001). Some dispute whether the biosphere can indeed 
‘contain’ the social-economic system with its present – and even less with its 
future – size.
The most problematic issue from the conservation perspective is that, ac-
cording to conventional economic logic, the ecological system supplies free 
assets (according to the demand for raw materials and energy) which are 
then returned to the ecological system in the form of waste (throughput 
economy).
Throughput economy: the operation of traditional economies from an eco-
logical economic perspective. This says that the traditional economy re-
sembles a system (such as a digestive tract) that is fed with useful (low-en-
tropy) energy, raw materials, and natural resources. At the output end (and 
even during the process) are produced useless (high entropy) by-products 
and pollutants. In reality, useful end-products ﬁ t for human consump-
tion also become waste after use. One of the main efforts of ecological 
economics is to ‘stop’ energy and matter throughput, and turn economic 
activity into  – or come as close as possible to – a ‘circular’ process, as 
seen in nature. As a result, energy and material economies of scale will be 
realised, and the efﬁ ciency of the use of energy and other resources will 
signiﬁ cantly increase.
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The ‘value creation’ performed by the economic system is waste production 
from the ecological perspective, or expressed in scientiﬁ c terms, involves the 
transformation of low-entropy natural resources into high entropy waste. How-
ever, the economic system satisﬁ es human needs with products and services 
produced through the industrial subsystem. ‘Value creation’, however, involves 
loss of value, involving a deterioration from nature’s perspective. The speed at 
which this loss of value occurs is certainly not irrelevant; neither is it indifferent 
at what level the economic system satisﬁ es human needs during the process. 
These controversial issues are illustrated in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1. The mutual embeddedness of economic, social and ecological systems
(Daniel Tyteca CEMS block semenarium presentation, August 2002, Tata, Hungary).
A company that satisﬁ es human needs with only minor growth in entropy 
creates more value than one that causes major growth of entropy, the satisfac-
tion of needs being equal. The former company may be considered to be value 
creating, while the latter wastes nature’s assets. Methods recently developed 
in the environmental sciences such as life cycle analysis, or on a macro-scale 
the calculation of ecological footprints, largely attempt to answer the question 
to what extent a given product or service (or the economy of a given country) 
can be considered environmentally friendly.
Figure 1-1. also demonstrates another controversy that is elementary from 
the perspective of the functioning of society: the economic system strives to 
minimise the use of labour force as input, while on the output side maximum 
employment is desirable. The contradiction is irreconcilable, and the proffered 
solutions are none too convincing.
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The contradiction could be resolved by reducing average working hours or 
lowering retirement age. However, in developed countries policymakers pur-
sue the very opposite solution, and, unfortunately, individuals also tend to 
prefer a higher income over more leisure time. Shorter working hours would 
expose companies to challenges concerning the organisation of work, and re-
ductions (or only maintenance) of incomes for employees. The rapidly growing 
population of the Earth in itself provides adequate justiﬁ cation for reducing per 
capita weekly working hours, for example by making extensive use of 35-hour 
or even shorter working weeks. A cut in standard working hours would also 
be justiﬁ ed by the rapid spread of automation/robotisation, but such initiatives 
are rare in practice.
For the most part, social scientists are at odds in terms of the numbers. With 
reference to labour productivity, economists use value added at factor cost di-
vided by the number of employees (Labour productivity in EU-27 by sector and 
company size [2004–2005], n.d.). As regards the heart of the matter, this macro-
deﬁ nition makes little sense because for the same work USD 50 is paid to a 
worker in Norway, USD 8 to one in Hungary, and barely USD 2 to one in India. 
Examining the case of Bethlehem Steel, where he was responsible for handling 
pig iron, Taylor found that when workers used the right tools and methods they 
could handle 47.5 tons per day, whereas typical per capita performance was 12.5 
tons a day. According to Taylor’s calculations, with a precisely regulated loading 
procedure 140 workers would have sufﬁ ced instead of the regular headcount of 
500. Taylor developed a ﬁ nancial incentive system to compensate workers who 
were able to meet the new standard. Taylor’s methods of organising work led to 
a sharp increase in labour productivity at the factory, and the power of Taylorian 
organisation has since become phenomenal. Rather than making workers work 
more, Taylor’s objective was for them to work more reasonably, and earn more 
as a result (Frederick Taylor and Management, n.d.).
Data concerning the increase in the productivity of agricultural work are 
available to the public. In the past one hundred years, while the amount of 
cereal grown per hectare has increased 6-10 fold, the number of working hours 
and thus the number of employees per hectare has dropped to a 15-20th of 
earlier amounts. It is common knowledge that in developed countries 2-5% of 
the total workforce are capable of providing the whole population with food, 
and before long the proportion of industrial employees will drop below 5-7%. 
According to optimistic analysts, employment issues will be dealt with by the 
uptake in the service or tertiary sector. Others predict growth in free time be-
cause the same amount of work will be distributed among more people, which 
will result in a double beneﬁ t: more free time favours the development of the 
service sector and creates demand for services.
The situation appears to be more complex in the light of statistical data. In 
certain regions – e.g. South America – a third generation is growing up in which 
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no-one in the family has had a permanent job; this generates huge social ten-
sion and there is not much hope that children socialised in such families will 
become employed as adults.
The other no less surprising fact is that employees’ free time is not increas-
ing, even in developed countries; what is rather typical is that people work 
more than eight hours a day and cannot even take their vacations. Examination 
of the labour market shows that there are very few jobs involving 4-6 hours’ 
employment, which would be indispensable for the healthy functioning of fami-
lies. That is to say, changes in the labour market do not attest to the more op-
timistic predictions; a developed economy can only cope with a well-qualiﬁ ed 
labour force that is prepared to compete, and those who want nothing ‘but’ 
to make a living are useless in the current economy. Social services in welfare 
states attempt to handle these issues, which are usually easily manageable in 
an economic sense. The productive economy is capable of taking care of the 
physical needs of the unemployed. Maintaining the quality of life of the millions 
excluded from the economy, however, is a more complex problem than satis-
fying their physical needs. 
The issue of unemployment is not merely concerned with livelihoods, but the 
stability of society as a whole. It is worthwhile citing at some length the work 
of the outstanding Hungarian-born scientist Tibor Scitovsky: ‘I completely ig-
nored the idle poor, the long-term unemployed and the unemployables whose 
inadequate upbringing made them unﬁ t for work; in short all those who have 
more leisure than they know what to do with and suffer from uninterrupted 
chronic boredom, a deprivation as serious as starvation, with equally fatal con-
sequences. As hunger makes one look for food, so boredom makes one seek 
excitement; and just as people with no money for buying food stoop to thiev-
ing to avoid starvation, so those who lack the skills that can relieve boredom 
is a harmless way, will relieve it with violence or vandalism–the most exciting 
and so most enjoyable activities, and the only ones that require no skill, only 
strength or a weapon. Think of the mischief small children engage in when 
bored. Violence and vandalism are the adult equivalent. Education therefore 
not only adds interest and variety to people’s lives, it is also an essential and 
necessary condition of civilized society and the peaceful coexistence of its 
members’ (Bianchi, 2012).
The ‘second shift’ that is done in households creates economies that are 
used for accumulation, even in the middle class. If instead of accumulating 
the income saved by this second shift we paid employees to do most of the 
‘housework’ and provide a quality service, we would have more free time and 
the quality of our lives would improve. Social differences would be reduced 
with very beneﬁ cial social-environmental effects. Finally, we would live in a 
world capable of remaining in harmony with Earth’s limited carrying capacity. 
The economy could ﬁ nally use the resources that are available without limits: 
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the human labour force. One of the main obstacles to this is man’s possessive-
ness. If individuals did not desire to possess but rather satisfy their needs, they 
would not strive to accumulate assets but to maximise happiness.
Disregarding housework is a frequently noted error with GDP calculations. 
Providing that such activities are turned into paid services in the future, this 
would result in the growth of GDP and reduce environmental impact.
Greater division of labour could produce several positive effects. The degree 
to which the world is prepared for this is questionable, but interestingly, posi-
tive examples are found in two directions. In retrospect, a primitive communal 
society represented a world that exploited the opportunities and beneﬁ ts of-
fered by shared activities. From there, we have moved towards an individual-
istic society that places excessive emphasis on private property and makes 
consumption prestigious. We have now reached a point at which some part 
of developed society has had enough of the proliferation of private property, 
and the capitalism that it has created. In the spirit of voluntary simplicity, an 
increasing number of people are making attempts at switching to a model that 
questions the conventional values of consumer society (Chapter 8). The scar-
city of Earth’s resources (Chapter 4), problems resulting from pollution (Chap-
ter 2), and population growth in developing countries vs. population decline 
in developed countries across the world are problems that are so well known 
that they almost sound trivial. Not only has the demand for consumption been 
increasing in developed countries, it is also being driven by the new middle 
class emerging in developing countries, particularly India and China. This will 
lead to severe sustainability problems in both the long and short term.
Ehrlich’s model illustrates what components deﬁ ne total environmental impact. 
It hypothesises that: 
 I = P*A*T, where
 I - Environmental Impact
 P - Population
 A - GDP per capita 
 T - Impact per Unit of GDP (technology).
Total environmental impact is thus created by the product of population, per 
capita afﬂ uence and impact per unit of the economy.
The role of the population in the model needs no special explanation; the 
environmental impact is primarily deﬁ ned by the number of Earth’s inhabit-
ants. The model takes all goods that an individual consumes as aggregate 
consumption per capita. Such units of consumption may include kilometres 
driven by car, kilograms of beef that are eaten, or units of beer consumed 
as expressed in litres. Each service or product consumed by the population 
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creates some impact on the environment through the raw material used for 
production and the pollution emitted to the environment, but mainly through 
a combination of both. This fact is incorporated into the model as the size of 
environmental impact per unit of service – for example,the impact caused by 
one km that is driven (Meijkamp, 1998).
In a study published in 2000 (Mont, 2000), the Swedish Environmental Protec-
tion Agency drafted the following three optional solutions for addressing the 
ever more urgent issue of sustainability:
• reduce population
• reduce the level of consumption
• make consumption sustainable.
The ﬁ rst option is obviously impracticable in the short run, since all the indica-
tions are that even if the growth rate of the population does not accelerate but 
is maintained, global population could reach 8-10 billion by 2100 (Walker H. C.).
Sustaining such a huge population clearly makes the second option (cut-
ting down on consumption) impossible. The situation is made even graver by 
the fact that most of the population growth will happen in developing regions 
where living standards lag far behind those of the developed part of the world. 
In terms of improving economic performance, however, even the citizens of 
poor regions will want to have consumption patterns similar to those of the 
‘developed’ world. Moreover, inhabitants of countries emerging from poverty 
are liable to be much less be sensitive to the conservationist perspective and 
be inclined to exploit environmental resources disproportionately to enjoy mar-
ginal improvements in their living standards. Efforts aimed at reducing the rate 
of consumption could also evoke a major public uproar in countries where 
inhabitants already consume at a rate in excess of their needs. No national 
government would be ready to support such programmes.
As mentioned, one of the commonly observed ﬂ aws with the way GDP is 
calculated is that it fails to take into account work carried out in households 
(Chapter 3). If in the future such activities were to be converted into services 
rendered for money, this would both drive GDP growth and lead to reduced 
environmental loads. 
1.2 The concept of sustainable development
In response to the environmental crisis that is endangering the Earth, the Gen-
eral Assembly of the UN invited Mrs Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Prime Minis-
ter of Norway, to develop a comprehensive programme and make suggestions 
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about the necessary changes. The World Commission on Environment and 
Development1, led by Mrs Brundtland, prepared a report called Our Common 
Future in 1987 which laid down the principles and requirements through which 
the Earth may be preserved for future generations. These principles became 
globally known as the principles of sustainable development (Szlávik, 2013).
Fig. 1-2. The front cover of the book Our Common Future, published in 1987 with a portrait of 
the head of the committee Gro Harlem Brundtland.
The Brundtland Committee’s Our Common Future became the bible of con-
servationists for a number of years. The primary message of the committee’s 
report was that the pursuit of growth will lead to the collapse of the global 
biosphere; consequently, economic development must not be carried on as 
before. Many believe the way out is to pursue sustainable development. Con-
servationists found out relatively quickly that the concept of sustainable de-
velopment does not in fact require a change of paradigms since it ﬁ ts into 
traditional economic philosophy very well. Sustainable development does not 
demand that we limit our needs, but it only encourages us to satisfy them 
using less resources and energy, and to minimise the polluting effects of pro-
duction-related activity. It is no wonder that this proposal quickly found sup-
port in developed societies; partly because it moderates the bad conscience 
of individuals about their high per capita consumption, and in contrast, by 
making comparisons involving speciﬁ c levels of consumption it supports the 
idea that the real threat to environment is posed by developing countries. Im-
plementation of the concept involves a war over statistics and data. A com-
mon language is hard to identify, since researchers from developing countries 
argue on the basis of the principle of justice (such countries typically have low 
per capita energy and raw material consumption), while the developed world, 
pointing out the high level of consumption they obtain from one unit of GDP 
(i.e., a higher level of efﬁ ciency), accuses underdeveloped countries of wasting 
natural assets. Both parties are right, of course, as far as the authenticity of the 
statistics goes; moreover, it would be harmful if the inhabitants of developing 
countries wanted to reach the standard of consumption of developed coun-
1 Of the 22 members of the commission there was one Hungarian: István Láng.
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tries or a consumption structure that exists in any part of the world we consider 
developed. Examining the matter from the other side, we can of course im-
mediately see that the developed world should probably not be satisﬁ ed with 
achievements in saving energy and raw materials, or increasing emissions. 
If the developing world is not able to follow the path of development already 
pursued by more developed countries, they may justly be expected to make 
more effort to address per capita consumption rather than promote efﬁ ciency. 
This relatively simple ‘human right’ seems to be rather difﬁ cult to modify or 
force others to accept in practice (so much so that, despite the fact that the 
governments of advanced bourgeois democracies have developed numerous 
conservation-related programmes, none of them take into consideration that 
the level of satisfaction of needs must be decreased in their rather wasteful 
societies), and that it is thus not enough to rethink the rationale for consump-
tion. It is clearly not coincidental that societies built on the free market refuse to 
hold an inquiry into whether all human needs are of similar value and whether 
their satisfaction is justiﬁ able.
A signiﬁ cant number of alternative thinkers claim that environmental issues 
may only be rendered manageable using a new paradigm. There is no mature 
concept about this yet, but practical experiments are ongoing in small commu-
nities. These small communities usually strive to create an economy in which 
people produce and exchange products and services without the intermediary 
use of money. The use of money is limited to their connection with the real 
economy, while money practically takes no place in exchange relationships 
among each other. The point of this community philosophy is that by exclud-
ing money that generates real interest – thereby removing a major driver of 
economic growth – we can create an economy which creates full employment, 
and also a way of life signiﬁ cantly more economical and simple, not driven by 
material wealth and money. 
This model has special signiﬁ cance from the perspective of conservation-
ists so long as mutual exchange systems are always limited to subregions, 
which are also the units used in so-called bio-regional economic models. 
Long-distance transport induced by globalisation, the fetishisation of com-
parative advantage are among the major accelerators of the destruction of 
the environment. The bioregional model is not a ‘back to basics’ type of con-
cept but an economic philosophy in which economic participants focus on 
using local resources and satisfying local needs in a non-hierarchical society. 
In a society built on regions there is space for the development of multicul-
tural communities that accept the existence of a variety of values, and whose 
members of society are interdependent. This approach strongly counters the 
model prompted by the middle and top-level managers of today’s large and 
medium-sized companies (multinational ﬁ rms) who accept that their mission 
to increase the value of shares at any cost is an unquestionable truth. Milton 
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Friedman, the so-called spiritual father of economic liberalism, goes as far 
as to state that the socially responsible executive (one who spends more on 
environmental protection than prescribed by law) is unilaterally imposing costs 
on shareholders.
While Richard Welford’s bioregional model (Welford–Gouldson, 1992) con-
fronts globalisation and considers it a drawback rather than a blessing, the 
liberal approach believes in the ‘quasi’ omnipotence of market operations, and 
would prefer the existence of an economy without the intervention of the gov-
ernment or any kind of community. 
The development of the economy in the past one hundred years indicates 
that it is capable of developing more efﬁ ciently if not hindered by government 
or other regulations. It has also been proved that the market is unable to re-
solve issues like poverty or social inequality. The market generates irresolvable 
contradictions by attempting to minimise the use of labour as a production 
factor when a state of maximum employment is more desirable from the per-
spective of society. Rates of economic growth or consumption are deﬁ ned by 
the size of the human population, the complexity of ecosystems, as well as 
how much, what, and in what way an individual consumes.
The concept of sustainable development has undoubtedly had a major inﬂ u-
ence on the economy, for example by supporting the spread of environment 
friendly consumption habits, clean technologies, and an appreciation for the 
signiﬁ cance of renewable resources and deﬁ ning development as qualitative 
rather than quantitative growth.
1.3 The principles of sustainable development
The main message of the World Bank’s 1992 report entitled Development and 
the Environment (World Bank, 1992) according to the authors is that protecting 
the environment is a part of development. Development is impossible without 
this, and without development the investment necessary for environment pro-
tection cannot be made. 
The concept of sustainable development in the broader sense also includes 
sustainable economic, ecological and social development, but there is a nar-
rower interpretation that limits the content of the term to the environmental 
realm (i.e., to the optimal use of resources and environmental management).
According to this latter, narrower interpretation, to foster sustainable devel-
opment the services of natural resources (Chapter 4) and their quality must be 
preserved.
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From the perspective of sustainable development, natural resources are usu-
ally divided into three groups:
• renewable natural resources (water, biomass, etc.),
• non-renewable ones (e.g. minerals),
• semi-renewable ones (e.g. soil fertility, waste assimilation capacity).
The requirements for sustainable development can be summarised as fol-
lows:
• the consumption rate of renewable natural resources should be less than 
or equal to the rate of their natural or managed regeneration;
• the production of waste should be less than or equal to the environ-
ment’s capacity for assimilation;
• a reasonable pace of exploitation of now depleting resources should be 
encouraged, which is partly deﬁ ned by substituting depleting resources 
with renewable ones, and partly by technological progress.
Violation of the principles described above will lead to a paucity of resour-
ces, if:
• environmental services and assets are elementary to and indispensable 
for the existence and operation of the economic system;
• the opportunities for substituting reproducible capital and environmental 
functions are not satisfactory;
• environmental health is not increased by technological progress.
The three criteria above suggest a certain amount of caution. Economists 
have been wrong a number of times because they did not take the new op-
portunities created by technological progress into consideration. 
Human technological ingenuity, one of the two components of economic 
development, seems inexhaustible in terms of the exploitation of energy and 
other resources. The other component, the stocks of these resources which 
this ingenuity can make proﬁ table, seems, however, very much limited. Stocks 
are dwindling and their quality is becoming poorer. The situation is not disas-
trous, but the warning signs are clear. 
The concept and principles of sustainable development offer an alterna-
tive pathway, and may halt these unfavourable effects. However, sustainable 
development as a concept and a possible alternative is disputed by many. 
Everybody agrees on one point though: adhering to the basic principles of 
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sustainable development is useful for mankind. The nine basic principles are 
as follows (IUCN, 1991):
1. Attention and care for communities
2. Improvements in human quality of life
3. Conservation of Earth’s viability and diversity 
• conservation of life-supporting systems
• conservation of biodiversity
• guaranteeing the continuous usability of renewable resources 
4. Minimisation of the use of non-renewable resources
5. Keeping the development of economy and society within the limits de-
ﬁ ned by Earth’s carrying capacity 
6. Changing people’s attitudes and behaviour 
7. Enabling communities to take care of their own environments 
8. Creating national frameworks for integrated development and environ-
ment protection 
9. Establishing global cooperation
Between 2000 and 2030 the world’s population will grow by 2.5 billion, the 
demand for food will nearly double, industrial production and energy con-
sumption will triple, and in relation to this, the rate of developing countries is 
expected to quintuple. This growth suggests the risk of environmental disas-
ter, but also the opportunity to create a better environment and conditions 
for providing mankind with basic goods, clean air, and healthy water. Which 
of the alternatives will happen basically depends on political decisions and 
politics.
1.4 Strong and weak sustainability
The roots of sustainability (Hicks, 1939) are found in Hicks’ idea that ‘a man’s 
income is the maximum value which he can consume during a week and still 
expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning’. In 
1970, when the outlines of the environmental crisis were already visible, the 
same John Hicks claimed that a few grains of sand in the wheels of interna-
tional ﬁ nance would do the job of slowing down development. The so-called 
Tobin tax (which is basically a currency transaction tax) is just being re-invent-
ed by the EU bureaucracy and domestic politics for a similar purpose. It may 
seem strange that what was then expected to slow down development is now 
hopefully going to intensify the growth of the economy.
Ecological economics builds its concepts about sustainable development 
partly on Hicks’ Theory of Wages (Marshall–Toffel, 2005). The need for equality 
between generations that appears in the Brundtland deﬁ nition of SD is also 
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rooted in the history of a theory known as the Solow-Hartwick sustainability 
rule (Marshall–Toffel, 2005). This rule states that consumption is sustainable 
and may grow even if the rate of non-renewable resources drops, provided 
that the beneﬁ t generated by the use of these resources is invested into re-
producible capital. In 1920 Marshall wrote: ‘When capital ceases to increase, 
income likewise will stop growing. Hence seeking to keep capital intact should 
be seen as fundamental to income generation.’ (Marshall, 1947). Environmen-
tal economists keep repeating this when referring to natural capital, but their 
words fall on deaf ears. Natural capital is decreasing because hardly any effort 
is being made to replace what has been consumed.
The discipline of economics has attempted to create a quantitative description 
of the concept of sustainable development. Pearce and Atkinson (1992) dif-
ferentiate three types of capital:
• KM - man-made (or reproducible) capital (roads, factories, residential 
buildings, etc.), 
• KH - human capital (compiled knowledge and experience), and
• KN - natural capital, which is interpreted rather broadly, and includes 
natural resources (minerals, soil), but all other natural goods crucial for 
maintaining life like biodiversity, pollution assimilation capacity, etc. (see 
Chapter 4)
Considering these three capitals, Pearce and Atkinson (1992) establish the 
Hicks-Page-Hartwick-Solow rule, which is a formulaic description of the con-
cept of sustainability. The authors differentiate between so-called ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ sustainability. According to Pearce and Atkinson (1992) ‘weak sustain-
ability’ can be expressed using the following formula:
d(K   + K  + K  )
dt
dK
dt  =                               0
M  H N >
The formula is based on the assumption that capital goods are interchange-
able without limit. In the economic sense, a state of weak sustainability exists 
if the value of capital goods available to society does not decrease over time. 
The ‘weak’ sustainability criterion, according to Pearce and Atkinson, can be 
written using the following formula:
δ     * K
Y
S
Y Z =       –                –                  
M  M  δ   * K
Y
N  N  
where S – savings, Y – Gross Domestic Product, and δM and δN are the am-
ortisation rates of man-made and natural capital, respectively.
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Pearce-Atkinson also deﬁ nes criteria for strong sustainability. The condition of 
realising a state of strong sustainability is that, with positive Z, natural capital 
should not devaluate over time. In this case, interchangeability among capital 
elements is not allowed:
δ     * K
Y
N  N > 0
Ecologists (and scientists in general) for obvious reasons reject the idea that 
capitals are interchangeable and thus the concept of weak sustainability; moreo-
ver, they also have problems with strong sustainability since the latter also allows 
for compensation and interchangeability within the realm of natural capital. In 
terms of strong sustainability, most ecological economists claim that no irrevers-
ible changes (e.g. extinction of species) should be allowed to occur in nature. 
This condition is of course impractical and leaves ecological economists with a 
concept which barely allows for the development of practical ecological policy.
According to the reference literature on economics, there is a sustainable 
course of development which makes sure that ‘average (per capita) wealth’ 
does not decrease. The initial approach is for economists not to ‘bother’ to ap-
ply a clear-cut deﬁ nition of wealth, supposing that more (i.e., a growing) GDP 
is equivalent to higher quality of life. 
The graph below illustrates possible paths of economic development (Fi-
gure 1-3). 
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Figure 1-3. Sustainable (A,B,C) and non-sustainable (D) development paths2
2 Based on Meadows-Meadows-Randers (1992) where the autors are listing the pos-
sibilities of the population growth (pp. 27-28). The B path is the  author’s supplement.
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Path A in Figure 1-3. illustrates continuous growth in wealth. Path C, ac-
cording to the deﬁ nition, is sustainable, although it is questionable whether it 
involves ‘development’ at all. Path D is non-sustainable in the long term, while 
it may be temporarily sustainable. Path B seems to be non-sustainable in the 
short term and sustainable in the long run. As the ﬁ gure indicates, there is 
already enough trouble with interpreting sustainability without theoretical de-
bates about the interpretation of the difference between wealth and well-being, 
or trying to interpret the difference between weak and strong sustainability. 
Let us progress from the simple to the complex, and use the ﬁ gure to exam-
ine the four possible paths and any problems that they raise.
With Curve A we can characterise, for example, the incessant growth of man-
made capital on Earth. Road networks, accumulated scientiﬁ c knowledge, or 
technologies that we bequeath to future generations suggest our responsibil-
ity to future generations. Optimists say that future generations will not need 
as many natural resources, because they will be able to use the infrastructure 
created by present generations.
Infrastructure: This refers to society‘s facilities and structural elements 
which create the basis of economic and social development. The devel-
opment of infrastructure has a direct inﬂ uence on standard of living and 
the performance of the economy. Elements include trafﬁ c facilities (roads, 
railways, seaports and airports), public utilities (water, gas, oil pipes, sew-
age systems, waste management and treatment facilities), residential and 
public buildings, commercial and media networks, educational, health, 
sports and social facilities. Their effect on the environment may be posi-
tive or negative. We must consider the removal, controlled management 
and elimination of sewage and waste as positive, while the harmful effects 
brought about by the occupation of land and use of infrastructure (e.g. 
motorways) are clearly negative, with costs frequently borne by the imme-
diate environment as well as the whole of society (Láng, 2002).
Line C supposes that wealth is constant in time. This is conceivable if we 
suppose that the economy grows only at a rate equal to population. The paral-
lel line then only signiﬁ es constancy.
Curve D characterises a ‘non-sustainable’ path of development which is 
lamentably typical of developed countries and recently also developing coun-
tries. The excessive use of natural resources and a cheap labour force tem-
porarily support growth in wealth. Later, however, a heavy price will be paid 
for environmental degradation and impoverishment, which decreases wealth 
in the long run.
The literature usually disregards the viability of the typical development path 
represented by curve B (due to its lack of compliance with even weak sustainabil-
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ity criteria). This approach results in a temporary decrease in wealth before gener-
ating growth in the long run. Such a path results from investment into natural capi-
tal. Afforestation, for example, involves signiﬁ cant initial expenditure, and most of 
the economic beneﬁ ts of this will be realised only 50-80 years after planting.
Sustainable development can obviously be interpreted in a number of ways. It 
is worth, however, differentiating between three basic types:
1. Sustainability may be interpreted as constant consumption. This inter-
pretation ﬁ ts the criteria for weak sustainability, whereby natural and 
man-made capital are considered interchangeable. Levels of production 
and per capita consumption are sustainable as long as the proﬁ t gener-
ated by the use of natural resources is not consumed, but invested into 
material capital.
2. Sustainability may be interpreted as a stock of natural resources that is 
constant in time. This interpretation matches ideas about strong sustain-
ability, which supposes that natural and man-made capital may supple-
ment but not substitute each other in production.
3. Finally, sustainability may be interpreted as equality between genera-
tions. This approach differs from the previous two in that it makes no 
provision regarding the interchangeability of natural and man-made capi-
tal, but has a focus on a none-too-well deﬁ ned requirement of creating, 
some kind of equality among generations‘ instead.
As we have seen, the ﬁ rst two types of sustainability are clearly amenable to 
economic approaches. Furthermore, weak sustainability would be economi-
cally possible even within the framework of the dominant paradigm. Most of 
the EU’s environmental directives only help fulﬁ l weak sustainability criteria. 
The IPPC directive, for example, in terms of preferring ‘Best Available Techno-
logy’ (BAT) requires cost-beneﬁ t analysis so that the selected ‘best’ techno-
logy is also cost effective.
The second deﬁ nition, strong sustainability, is a category interpretable in 
economic terms, but the existing economy does not meet these criteria, and at 
most attempts can be made to approach them using a ‘safe minimum stand-
ard’. The building of a motorway or a power station, for example, is sure to 
decrease biodiversity no matter what, and cause an irreparable loss of natural 
capital.
The third deﬁ nition is not interpretable in an economic sense at all; this sug-
gests that the approach may provide grounds for argument but it is as yet 
impossible to build a practical environmental policy on it. It may not be a coin-
cidence that this least of all palpable concepts is also least well known to the 
public.
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2.  The background to environmental problems from
the perspective of natural sciences
2.1 Introduction
In the following section, various environmental problems will be classiﬁ ed and 
discussed in terms of environmental elements, thus we address issues invol-
ving the atmosphere, water and soil. In the discussion, the background to en-
vironmental problems and their basic context will be deﬁ ned from the perspec-
tive of natural sciences in a highly concise manner, primarily for readers trained 
in social sciences. In an effort to deﬁ ne basic contexts that are able to stand the 
test of time, this chapter dispenses with dealing with trends and charts that are 
subject to rapid change, and which therefore become rapidly obsolete.
2.2 Problems concerning the atmosphere
Normally (i.e., in the case of ,clean‘ air), the atmosphere consists of a number 
of components; the 85 km stratum adjacent to the surface of the planet thus 
contains 78% nitrogen, 21% oxygen, and 0.9% argon. These are constant 
percentages, and oddly enough, the much-talked-about major air pollution 
problems are restricted to the remaining 0.1% of atmospheric components. 
This also indicates how sensitive a system we are dealing with when we ad-
dress problems affecting the Earth‘s biosphere.
Yet, owing to the presence of a variety of material components, it is not that 
easy to tell at a glance what should be deﬁ ned as pollution. For instance, does 
pollution include atmospheric nitrogen, or the carbon dioxide emitted by humans 
and other living creatures that are not photosynthetic? To help resolve such prob-
lems, the following deﬁ nition is proposed by environmental economics: pollution 
is considered to include any emission that is introduced into the environment at a 
rate faster than the environment is capable of processing and assimilating it. That 
is, the natural environment has a certain waste processing capacity for most of 
our discharges which is a valuable renewable resource, although it may become 
overloaded. Obviously, this approach is also readily applicable to water and soil.
Air pollutants may be classiﬁ ed according to various criteria; for the purpose 
of this chapter, we mention only one of the most important of these: atmos-
pheric residence time. Based on this approach, a distinction is made between 
long-term air pollutants, which reside in the atmosphere for more than one 
year, and short-term air pollutants.
It appears logical that long-term pollutants remain in the atmosphere for sev-
eral decades, or even centuries, because they are stable (i.e., non-reactive). 
Such materials are not toxic, and work their harmful effects primarily by upset-
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ting the radiation balance of the atmosphere. These stable gases have time 
to spread all over the globe, leading to global problems. The two most widely 
known and most signiﬁ cant problems related to long-term pollutants are global 
warming (climate change) and ozone depletion.
2.2.1 Global warming (climate change)
The essence of global warming lies in the greenhouse effect, which is a useful 
process in itself, because in its absence the annual average temperature of the 
Earth would be 33 °C less than it is today. The problem arises when this ef-
fect is intensiﬁ ed. The phenomenon is attributable to molecules that consist of 
three or more atoms – water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane 
(CH4) – which comprise the most important greenhouse gases. These gases, 
trap‘ heat in earth‘s atmosphere that would normally escape into space, thus 
producing a ,greenhouse‘ effect. Given the fact that water vapour also has a 
cooling effect on the atmosphere, we limit our discussion to the latter two.
CO2 emissions are part of the carbon cycle of living nature (e.g. respiration), 
and as the quantity of CO2 emitted is absorbed by the natural environment, 
the atmospheric concentration of CO2 has been stable over the past millennia. 
However, since the industrial revolution, and in the aftermath of the discovery 
and industrial combustion of fossil fuels (carbon, mineral oil, and natural gas), 
CO2 has been released in quantities that have led to an unprecedented build-
up of this gas in the atmosphere. The build-up of methane is attributable to 
ruminants (cattle, sheep, etc.) farmed by humans in the millions, as well as to 
emissions from landﬁ lls and rice paddies. The concentration of atmospheric 
methane has doubled since the industrial revolution.
The combined result of these two main effects (and a number of others) is 
that the greenhouse effect appears to be intensifying. This claim has been 
corroborated by a recent series of record-high temperatures, accompanied 
by melting glaciers and changing precipitation patterns. Importantly, the ob-
served phenomenon should preferably be referred to as ‘climate change’ rath-
er than, global warming’ because although the global average temperature is 
indeed rising, this could in fact lead to the cooling of certain areas of the Earth.
Preventing the process would require humankind to make extremely costly sacri-
ﬁ ces, involving placing our entire energy management system on new foundations. 
The most obvious solution would be to curb consumption in the ‘developed’ coun-
tries which have primary responsibility for the phenomenon; however, they have 
not shown even the slightest willingness to do this. Technological development 
suggests either the production of atomic energy (another serious threat to life), or 
the production of renewable energy (wind, hydro-electric, solar, etc.). However, the 
latter has not yet reached (and it is questionable whether it ever will reach) the level 
at which it can produce the volume of energy required to meet demands. A chance 
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to switch to renewables only exists within a dispersed, less centralised economic 
structure that relies on local resources. Due to the high expense involved and the 
selﬁ shness of developed nations we have not been able, or only with great difﬁ cul-
ty, to even hammer out agreements that require only negligible reductions in CO2 
emissions. See, for example, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, compliance with which 
would only slightly mitigate the rate of warming by 2100. More radical changes are 
needed, but for the time being there is little hope of their implementation.
2.2.2 Ozone depletion
The ozone layer ﬁ lters out radiation that is harmful to life, and thus prevents it 
from reaching the surface of the Earth. The ﬁ rst observations of ozone deple-
tion were made in the early 1980s above the Antarctic; since then the impact of 
the phenomenon has been felt across the globe. Should the process intensify, 
the rays of the Sun could easily reduce all land-borne life to ashes.
Investigation of the cause of ozone depletion have found that halogens (ﬂ uo-
rine, bromine, and in particular chlorine) have been introduced to the strato-
sphere (i.e., atmospheric stratum at altitudes of 18–50 km) where the ozone 
layer also exists. The situation may appear contradictory at ﬁ rst: given that 
these elements are extremely aggressive and reactive (which would make 
them short-term air pollutants at most), they might be expected to transform 
and leave the atmosphere before leaving the stratosphere. The contradiction is 
resolved by knowledge of halogenated hydrocarbons (CFCs).
These compounds are entirely artiﬁ cial and thus are not found in nature. They 
were developed in the 1930s and, owing to their extreme stability, were subse-
quently used in a variety of industrial applications in vast quantities. They are 
speciﬁ cally suitable as coolants, plastic foaming agents, propellants, silicon-
chip cleaning agents, etc. Some types are so stable that they can reside in the 
atmosphere for centuries, which explains their extensive build-up in recent dec-
ades. When reaching a high (stratospheric) altitude and hit by high-energy sun-
rays, they become unstable, and the halogens contained in them are released. 
These elements (in particular, chlorine) are responsible for ozone depletion.
In view of the extremely long atmospheric residence times of these halogen-
ated hydrocarbons, the complete restoration of the ozone layer will take dec-
ades, even if prompt action is taken. That said, international conventions have 
made major achievements, whereby the artiﬁ cial gases causing the problems 
will be completely phased out in a few decades (ﬁ rst in ‘developed’ and then 
in ‘developing’ countries). Of course, the ban is rather due to the fact that the 
materials can now be replaced proﬁ tably than by the responsible and unselﬁ sh 
thinking of humankind. Using that rationale, today the ban on halogenated hy-
drocarbons is being championed by the very companies that originally devel-
oped them, since they already have replacements ready to be marketed, and 
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will gain a competitive advantage from the ban. While this sheds a negative 
light on international conventions from an ethical perspective, the existence 
of a ban or even a curb on the use of these chemicals is deﬁ nitely welcome.
The rest of this chapter addresses the problems caused by short-term air pollut-
ants which exit the atmosphere within a year and are toxic due to their reactivity.
2.2.3 Acid rain
Even in a normal case (i.e., when air is clean), precipitation is slightly acidic 
because of a large number of air pollutants of natural origin (e.g. volcanic erup-
tions). That acidity, however, does not cause any particular trouble to life on 
Earth, because life has become accustomed to it over millions of years. If, 
however, the concentration of such air pollutants increases as a result of hu-
man activity, acidiﬁ cation may reach harmful proportions.
The phenomenon of acid rain is in fact associated with the self-cleaning of 
the atmosphere, which is a highly beneﬁ cial process. Namely, air pollutants 
gradually exit the atmosphere; obviously, more reactive materials (short-term 
air pollutants) do so more quickly. Cleaning may take place either mechani-
cally, or in the form of chemical reactions. The most basic chemical reaction 
involving such ‘self-cleaning’ is oxidation, the primary products of which are 
acids. For example, the nitrogen oxides emitted by motor vehicles produce 
nitric acid, the sulphur dioxide emitted in the course of burning coal produces 
sulphurous acid, and burning PVC produces hydrochloric acid. These acids 
are then precipitated to the surface of the Earth through rainfall.
As the materials concerned are short-term pollutants, it appears logical that the 
problems caused by them should at most be local or regional in scale, and not 
global. For example, carbon incinerated on an industrial scale in Great Britain has 
caused severe damage to Scandinavian pine woods, but has little worldwide im-
pact. Damage from acid rain can be seen in both the built environment (e.g. in the 
rapid crumbling of historical monuments made from limestone) as well as in the nat-
ural environment. Due to higher levels of acidity, (1) nutrients are dissolved at ever-
greater depths; (2) heavy metals, which are hazardous toxins, become dissolved in 
water (mobilised) and are thereby introduced into the food chain; and (3) disruptions 
occur to the functioning of plant stomata, especially those of conifers. The most 
effective safeguard against acid rains is to decrease the emissions of short-term air 
pollutants, which may partly be done by means of technological development, and 
partly by reducing consumption (e.g. car use and energy generation).
2.2.4 SMOG
The term smog was coined from the words smoke and fog. The word ad-
equately captures the essence of the phenomenon it describes, characteri-
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sed by the permanent accumulation of solid and ﬂ uid pollutants (lasting up to 
several days), mostly in cities and their surroundings. Interestingly, however, 
the concentrated emission of a signiﬁ cant volume of pollutants is an essential 
but in itself insufﬁ cient prerequisite of the phenomenon. Smog also requires a 
completely natural meteorological phenomenon: thermal inversion.
Normally, in the lowest 10,000 metres of the atmosphere (the troposphere), air 
cools from the bottom up (i.e., the sun ﬁ rst warms up the surface of the Earth, 
which subsequently transfers its heat to the lowest atmospheric layer. When this 
warms up, it simultaneously also expands and rises (convection), carrying with 
it the air pollutants emitted at surface level). It is owing to this phenomenon that 
rising warm air is constantly replaced by an inﬂ ow of fresh (clean) cool air, mak-
ing life bearable even in large cities, as far as air pollution is concerned.
At times, however, sudden warming starts at altitudes of 800 to 1,500 m, creat-
ing a vertically stable layer that is cold at the bottom and warm at the top. Ulti-
mately, this thermal inversion acts like an invisible lid placed on top of a surface, 
under which pollutants rapidly accumulate if emitted in signiﬁ cant volumes (e.g. in 
large cities). This peculiar meteorological phenomenon can occur both in winter (a 
London-type smog, caused primarily by coal heating) and in summer (a Los Ange-
les-type smog, primarily a result of motor vehicles). When it does occur, the best 
hope is that wind will soon freshen and disperse the inversion layer, sweeping out 
the polluted air that has accumulated underneath. Calling a smog alert involves the 
highly expensive ex-post treatment of a symptom which does not improve the criti-
cal situation that has already arisen, but only reduces the chance of it worsening.
2.3 Problems affecting water
Most of the water on Earth is saline, which is unsuitable for direct human con-
sumption but an important part of ecosystems. Also, most freshwater is locked 
up in snow and ice, leaving an extremely small fraction in the form of easy 
accessible fresh surface water and groundwater. The latter are becoming in-
creasingly scarce resources, and as they are rather unevenly distributed on 
Earth, numerous future conﬂ icts are expected to arise over drinking water. For 
the time being, the desalination of saline water is an extremely costly process, 
which only a few ‘oil countries’ in the Middle East can afford.
The initial approach to the pollution of water is similar to the approach to air 
pollution described in Chapter 2.1. That said, as regards water it should be 
pointed out that aquatic ecosystems can suffer damage from both pollution (a 
qualitative problem) and drainage, irrigation and overuse (a quantitative prob-
lem involving the destruction of wetlands).
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One particular type of ‘water pollution’ involves the introduction (intentional 
or unintentional) of alien species, as exempliﬁ ed by the eel introduced into 
Lake Balaton, or the Nile perch into Lake Victoria in Equatorial Africa. The lat-
ter ﬁ sh had no natural enemy in the lake, and as a result of its extreme voracity 
virtually devoured 60% of the wildlife in the lake after which the remaining 40% 
were declared endangered.
Water pollution is deﬁ ned as any effect that changes the quality of surface 
water or groundwater by making such water less suitable or unsuitable for hu-
man use, or respectively, for the maintenance of the life processes accommo-
dated within it. While this regrettable outcome may have a number of causes, 
the essence of almost all types of pollution is captured adequately by address-
ing one of the most important issues: oxygen balance.
Aquatic life depends on oxygen, which is found in water in dissolved form. One 
source is the atmosphere itself (the oxygen which is dissolved through the air-
surface interface), and the other is photosynthesis, a process involving the release 
of oxygen. However, the organic matter in the water (e.g. the remains of dead 
animals and plants) must decompose in one way or another, which requires the 
presence of oxygen (aerobic decomposition). If the oxygen dissolved in the water 
is sufﬁ cient to provide the oxygen required for decomposition, no problems will 
arise; however, an excessive quantity of organic matter that decomposes can 
easily lead to a shortage of oxygen. This will trigger rotting (anaerobic decomposi-
tion), ﬁ rst leading to the destruction of higher-order species (ﬁ sh), and accelerating 
eutrophication. For that very reason, the quantity of organic matter introduced into 
living waters makes a difference because that matter will ultimately decompose.
Biological Oxygen Demand, BOD: the volume of oxygen needed for the 
microbiological decomposition of organic substances dissolved, colloidal 
and suspended in a volume of water, capable of decomposing. Regard-
ing the diversity, quality and availability of the substances and a number 
of external factors (temperature, light, the food and oxygen demand of 
the actual environment, the presence of toxic substances, etc.), the cir-
cumstances of decomposition are extremely variable. The measurements 
needed for the establishment of BOD are usually carried out at 20 °C, in 
total darkness, over a 5 or 20 day period of time. The establishment of 
the BOD of the water sample provides basic guidance regarding whether 
which technology is suitable for treating the polluted water.
Chemical oxygen demand, COD, oxygen consumption: a measurement of 
the reduction capacity of substances in water in the presence of an oxi-
dant (e.g. acidic potassium-dichromate, acidic potassium-permanganate, 
free chloride, iodide, iodine, etc.). The result is given in the equivalent of 
oxygen consumed by a volume of water. COD is proportionate to the vol-
ume of organic substances found in the water. (Láng, 2002)
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Using this proxy, the main types of water pollution can be clearly deﬁ ned. For 
example, when introduced into water, excessive quantities of (1) phosphorus 
(from detergents and excrement) or (2) nitrogen (from over-fertilisation) act as nu-
trients and stimulate the growth of plants, which will subsequently consume oxy-
gen when decomposing after their death. (3) Detergents foam on the surface of 
water, where they inhibit the dissolution of atmospheric oxygen into water while 
also ﬁ ltering sunlight, which decelerates the process of photosynthesis and the 
release of oxygen. (4) Pollution from oil spills causes similar problems, and water 
birds may become exhausted if their plumage becomes oily. (5) Thermal pollu-
tion occurs with industrial processes that require vast amounts of cooling water 
(e.g. nuclear power plants). Water returned at a higher temperature can contain a 
smaller quantity of dissolved gases (including oxygen), while metabolic processes 
are also accelerated in warmer water, producing more dead organic matter. When 
due care is not exercised, thermal pollution may also accelerate eutrophication. 
Finally, (6) toxic materials (such as heavy metals and pesticides) do not inﬂ ict 
damage by disrupting the oxygen balance, but are poisonous in themselves.
To prevent the above types of pollution, wastewater should be treated before 
its discharge into receiving waters. Wastewater treatment comprises the follow-
ing stages: (1) Mechanical treatment, involving the removal of solid pollutants 
prone to sedimentation, and the treatment of the sludge that is produced; (2) bi-
ological treatment, involving the use of decomposers (protozoa) to decompose 
the organic matter in wastewater through an aerobic process (in the presence 
of oxygen) or an anaerobic process (in the absence of oxygen), thereby preserv-
ing living waters; (3) chemical treatment, involving the use of chemicals for the 
removal of nutrients, phosphorus and nitrogen. Importantly, in the presence of 
toxic materials chemical treatment must precede biological treatment, otherwise 
the decomposers would be poisoned and thus prevented from being effective.
2.4 Problems affecting soil
Soil is the uppermost layer of the solid lithosphere, reaching approximately 5 
metres in depth, which, by virtue of its accommodation of living organisms, 
also constitutes a part of the biosphere. The life processes and physical phe-
nomena (e.g. weathering) that occur here collectively form soil, the fertility of 
which (within that 5m layer) is progressively reduced with depth. Consequent-
ly, the most fertile layer is the uppermost one, which is the most exposed to 
destructive erosion by environmental elements (wind and water). This is ex-
actly why one of the key tasks of environmental protection with regard to soil is 
conserving its original composition and structure. Similarly to the quantitative 
problems that affect water, this problem is also of a quantitative nature.
In the context of soil pollution the effects of industry, transport and urbanisa-
tion, although not negligible in themselves, will not be discussed for reasons 
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of space, so only the problems caused by agriculture will be highlighted. Dis-
regarding secondary salinization due to irrigation, the main cause of problems 
is the use of chemicals. Chemical use has become widespread for two main 
reasons: the need for (1) soil management, and (2) plant protection.
It has long been known that the fertility of soil becomes depleted over time, 
and that land must be left fallow and/or the nutrients lost in the course of 
harvesting must be replaced. Previously (and in some places even today, 
on a small scale) nutrient replacement involved spreading farmyard manure, 
which practice has largely been superseded by the use of fertilisers. The latter 
provides for the replacement of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium, which 
typically become scarce but are essential for plant growth. Fertilisation can 
easily be mechanised and will almost immediately produce higher crop yields. 
On the other hand, notable drawbacks of fertilisation include the depletion of 
microelements that are also essential for the development of plants, and the 
‘migration‘ of misused fertilisers which stimulate growth in living water in ex-
actly the same way as they do on land. The harmful effect of this is discussed 
in Chapter 2.3 in the context of water pollution. Moreover, when fertilisers are 
used, farmyard manure mostly remains unutilised, and will in the case of large-
scale animal farming pollute the environment in the form of slurry, creating a 
new task for environmental protection.
Chemical plant protection is also a product of modern large-scale agricul-
ture. In the beginning (the 1950s), the chemicals that were used (e.g. DDT) had 
permanent toxic and generally destructive effects, but the former were soon 
found to accumulate in the food chain and disrupt ecosystems by causing se-
vere poisoning, and ultimately returning to humans via food. Drawing a lesson 
from these ﬁ ndings, today‘s chemicals must be selective (destroy in a targeted 
manner), and decompose rapidly. This will obviously not eliminate all problems 
related to chemical use: the agents employed today may potentially cause a 
number of known and currently unknown forms of harm. A meaningful goal 
would be to eliminate the use of chemicals completely.
Integrated plant protection aims to do just this in an effort by reducing the 
presence of pests to a reasonable level rather than by causing wholesale de-
struction. That end may be met by means of (1) relying on the natural hierarchi-
cal links within the food chain (e.g. aphids should be fed to ladybirds rather 
than sprayed); and (2) cultivating more resistant plant varieties. The latter de-
serves more detailed discussion.
The need to alter the properties of plants (and animals) has long existed, and 
can only be fulﬁ lled by improvements: desired properties can be produced by 
crossing two related species as a result of a long series of experiments, usu-
ally plagued by failure. Among other achievements, this is how crab apples the 
size of peanuts were improved into ,huge‘, red, durable tasty apples. At the 
same time, the hardiness of the improved plant is considerably reduced: while 
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a forest produces wild fruits each year with no help, a fruit orchard requires 
constant attention (weeding, pruning, spraying, etc.).
Today, new opportunities are created by genetic engineering (biotechnolo-
gy), allowing the genes responsible for the features of a species to be replaced 
with genes that transmit features that we consider to be more advantageous. 
Of course, these other genes can be transferred from any other species, al-
lowing tomatoes to be crossed with ﬂ atﬁ sh (for example, if there is a need for 
a frost-tolerant tomato). By doing this we may be shorting out nature‘s internal 
defence system (which we rely on for improvements), gradually shaping the 
entire ﬂ ora and fauna to our own demands. On the one hand, such technology 
is very alluring: it allows humankind to increase the vitamin content of fruit and 
to improve crop yields and hardiness, and even for certain bacterial strains to 
be, programmed‘ to produce speciﬁ c medicines.
On the other hand, the technology grants particularly dangerous powers to 
humankind. (1) The features of humans are determined in the DNA in exactly the 
same way as those of other animals and all plants, making it possible for hu-
mans to become the means (this has already happened) or the ends of any utili-
tarian genetic interventions, (2) Gene transfers may also transfer features which 
are unknown at the time, and are only discovered subsequently. For instance, a 
new plant could become carcinogenic or allergenic, and this might be realised 
only decades later, (3) When the pollen of such plants are released, it might 
cross with that of wild (non-manipulated) species, allowing the modiﬁ ed features 
to be transferred. From that point on the process is effectively irreversible as 
released pollen can never be ‘recalled’. Although humankind has indeed made 
plenty of errors to date (see also DDT accumulation in the food chain, and the 
emission of the halogenated hydrocarbons that cause ozone depletion, etc.), a 
timely response still leaves room for the reversal of the processes. By contrast, 
gene manipulation is irreversible, which is why various green movements have 
protested against it, and notwithstanding all its beneﬁ ts, Christians also reject it 
on the grounds that it involves humans aspiring to assume a divine role.
What is more urgently needed in agriculture is the transposition of old prac-
tices into contemporary circumstances: the restoration of closed material cy-
cles, and the production of healthy, residue-free food from local ingredients 
that relies on local resources. Indeed, a complex approach to agricultural pro-
duction is needed, whereby the essence of agriculture is not limited to the 
production of food but also incorporates social and environmental considera-
tions (multifunctional agriculture). This objective may be achieved by organic 
farming (not to be equated with biotechnology) which prohibits the use of any 
chemicals or genetically modiﬁ ed inputs, is much more labour-intensive than 
industrial agriculture, and as such is much more liable to sustain rural popula-
tions, foster cultural landscapes and help maintain biodiversity.
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3. Our planet’s limits: tipping points
3.1 Introduction
In 2009, Rockström et. al published a very important article about ‘planetary 
boundaries’. This report was as inﬂ uential on public thinking as the ﬁ rst re-
port by the Club of Rome, ‘The Limits to Growth’. The new ideas were again 
linked to the Swedish capital of Stockholm. Scientists deﬁ ned important 
planetary tipping points in ten dimensions, eight of which were deﬁ ned in 
2009. Continuing the research in 2015, the boundaries were redeﬁ ned and 
the authors broadened the zone of uncertainty. The very important category 
‘resilience’ was introduced and has been widely discussed by experts in all 
ﬁ elds of science. In this chapter we discuss the ecological footprint, which 
is a single-indicator system, but which employs the so-called ‘global hec-
tare’, a dimension of measure with a signiﬁ cant relative value and absolute 
volume. The ecological footprint is not an indicator of welfare but of sus-
tainability, which certainly also indicates the state of our welfare. Generally, 
if we have a large ecological footprint, we obviously feel that our needs are 
being satisﬁ ed at a higher level. However, the indicator clearly warns us that 
a high standard of living is ‘enjoyed’ at other people‘s cost. A large ecologi-
cal footprint is not sustainable. GDP is a macro-indicator which, despite its 
many ﬂ aws, is commonly used and accepted, because in spite of all its er-
rors it is relatively easy to calculate and gives a fair preliminary overview of 
the state of the economy.
3.2 Main dimensions and their tipping points
Following the climate conference held in Copenhagen, the scientiﬁ c team 
organised by the Stockholm Resilience Centre in Sweden published a study 
in Nature magazine which affected professionals‘ thinking at least as much 
as The Limits to Growth did when published in 1972. The authors claim that 
in three out of 8+2 dimensions3 humanity has already overstepped the lim-
its of a safe existence. The main limits that have been crossed involve the 
emissions of the greenhouse gases that cause climate change, increases in 
nitrogen ﬂ ows due to fertilisation and concentrated animal farming, and the 
radical decrease in biodiversity.
3 1. climatic change, acidiﬁ cation of the oceans, 3. the thinning of stratospheric ozone, 
4. the nitrogen cycle, 5. the phosphorus cycle, 6. global fresh water consumption, 7. 
changes in land use, 8. changes in biodiversity, 9. changes in the aerosol content of 
the atmosphere, 10. chemical pollution
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Figure 3-1. Planetary Boundaries (Rockström, 2009)
Fig. 3-2. Planetary Boundaries II (Steffen et al., 2015)
The authors of the study felt certain enough in eight areas to be able to deﬁ ne 
critical limits and state how far mankind is from the so-called tipping points. 
Regarding chemicals and atmospheric particles, the analysis was postponed.
As far as the climate goes, we know that the carbon dioxide concentration 
in the air was 280 ppm in the Holocene, which created ideal conditions for hu-
man evolution over the past fourteen thousand years. The ‘critical concentra-
tion’ is somewhat higher than this; some professionals suggest it lies around 
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400 ppm. As indicated by the ﬁ gure below, scientists think that until the criti-
cal point is reached, changes can be prevented, and Earth will be capable of 
compensating by ﬂ exibly adapting. Beyond the limits, effects are irreversible.
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Figure 3-3. Planetary boundaries III (Rockström, 2009)
GEO-5, the latest global assessment report of the UN‘s Environmental Pro-
gramme, also mentions the limits of planet Earth. Of course, scientists only agree 
that such limits exist, but opinions as to where these limits are tend to be very di-
verse. Our knowledge is insufﬁ cient, the context is extremely complex, and thresh-
olds will probably only allow more precise deﬁ nitions to be created later on. Some 
limits have been overstepped with no spectacular results, while changes at the 
global scale may occur without ever overstepping a single threshold. Spectacular 
changes like the melting of the polar ice caps or the retreat of glaciers can occur, 
while there are less spectacular ones like decreases in biodiversity. Overstepping 
the thresholds occasionally results in global effects such as damage to the ozone 
layer; other cases only have local effects such as pollution caused by nitrogen 
compounds. However, sudden changes (‘tipping over’) are well known in ecology. 
Conditions that cause rapid ﬁ sh mortality may arise overnight, or even on a shorter 
timescale as the combined impact of a number of ecological factors. This can be 
true of larger systems, which is what is really dangerous. The mixing of local and 
global dimensions of issues may also cause problems. Nitrogen overdoses may 
cause local problems in China, while Africa may welcome the increased use of 
fertilisers for ﬁ ghting famine. Many scientists claim that human interventions into 
the functioning of Earth have by now become so signiﬁ cant that the Holocene is 
already over and has been replaced by the so-called Anthropocene – a time when 
the future of the planet is fundamentally inﬂ uenced by human activity.
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‘The history of life on Earth – as Rachel Carson says – has been a history 
of interaction between living things and their surroundings. To a large extent, 
the physical form and the habits of earth‘s vegetation and animal life has been 
molded by the environment. Considering the whole span of earthly time, the 
opposite effect, in which life actually modiﬁ es its surroundings, has been rela-
tively slight. Only within the moment of time represented by the present cen-
tury has one species – man – acquired signiﬁ cant power to alter the nature of 
his world.’ (Carson, 1962, Chapter 2)
In ecology, the ‘carrying capacity’ of a given territory is considered to be 
the largest possible population with a long-term survival ability that does not 
cause harm to the given territory. We may raise the theoretical question how 
many people the Earth can accommodate at an acceptable or preferred level.
The calculation is complex because we have no knowledge about:
• the resources future generations will use, or,
• the course of development developing countries will take.
The best possible and the worst possible scenario may be very different. 
Historical experience proves that optimists may have grounds for their beliefs: 
they claim that individuals make discoveries, so if enough individuals think 
about the solution to a problem they will be able to ﬁ nd one (Julian Simon). The 
recent change in the dimensions of the problems, however, counters the more 
optimistic perspectives. So far the economy has been dwarfed by the size of 
the biosphere, but it is now becoming dominant.
Supporters of the optimistic approach claim that today‘s generation may leave 
less natural resources for generations to come, but that our successors will have a 
higher standard of technology and a larger amount of capital (Vorosmarty, 1991) .
Regarding the future of the Earth, it is crucial how limited the planet‘s carrying 
capacity is, and how much the limits of carrying capacity are resistant to erosion.
Carrying capacity, ~ of a landscape, ~ of environment: 1. The possible rate 
of complex exploitation (living, production, recreation) of the landscape in 
a given territory that expresses the largest possible number of population it 
is able to accommodate for the purpose of living and manifold social activ-
ity. The ~ of a landscape may be examined separately by the basic forms 
of activities with the consideration of how ~ is limited or intensiﬁ ed by the 
rest of the activities. – 2. Ecological strategies. – 3. A central category of 
ecological economy. Its meaning is identical to sustainability, only it refers 
directly to ecosystems (unlike the previous term which is an indicator of 
human activity. (Láng, 2002)
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3.3 Carrying capacity and Meadows’ models
Possible interactions between Earth‘s carrying capacity and economy are 
summarised in the following models by Meadows and colleagues (1992):
1.) According to one model, the physical limits of certain resources may 
increase together with the economy, as illustrated in the models presented 
in Figures 3-4. Such resources include the fertility of the land, which can be 
intensiﬁ ed by bringing unproductive lands into productive use, amelioration of 
existing land through use of chemicals and irrigation, active selection of seeds, 
and the improvement of agro-technology in general.
The pollution assimilation capacity of the Earth can also be increased through 
technological intervention. The self-purifying ability of surface waters or soils 
can be improved through a process of aeration, the decomposition of waste 
can be accelerated by increasing its surface area, etc. There are a number of 
well-known examples of technologies that reduce the exhaustion of raw ma-
terials; it enough to think of the results of solid-state physics or energy-saving 
lights or the uptake of the use of ﬁ bre optic cables in micro-electronics, etc.
Although there is a long list of arguments that support the aforementioned model, it 
is obvious that there are areas where expanding such limits has not been successful 
yet. Think of the development of the ozone hole, the dangers of global warming, etc.
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Figure 3-4. Models of the potential interrelations between carrying capacity and the economy 
(Meadows et al., 1992)
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2.) Model b. in Figure 3-4. provides an example of logarithmic expansion; it sug-
gests that the economy and population exponentially grow for some time, then 
growth stops and a state of permanency is established. This model supposes 
that feedback communicated by the physical limits of the carrying capacity of the 
environment will trigger an immediate economic response, or that the population 
size and economic growth are self-controlling and do not require external inter-
vention. This growth model is supported by a lot of practical experience. Think of 
the observation that at over a certain level of development, the size of population, 
speciﬁ c raw material and energy consumption, etc. explicitly decrease, thereby 
stopping total consumption from growing, even with rising GDP.
3.) According to Model c. in Figure 3-4., the physical dimension of the econo-
my exceed carrying capacity because feedback and interventions are delayed, 
yet limits are not eroded, or quickly regenerate. In this case, economy and carry-
ing capacity reach a state of balance with ﬂ uctuations of shortening amplitude. 
Examples include when ﬁ sh stocks decline due to overﬁ shing, but restrictions 
help stocks recover within a few years or decades. A similar situation can occur 
in the case of oil pollution or excessive detergent load in a river After pollution 
ceases, the wildlife in the river will regenerate sooner or later. Luckily, this is what 
we observed in the years following the cyanide pollution of the River Tisza.
4.) Model d. in Figure 3-4. is the ,disaster model‘. Here, due to delays in 
feedback and interventions, processes cause such damage to carrying capac-
ity that it cannot regenerate through natural processes; the system degrades 
and carrying capacity also decreases. A local example is drought, which may 
be the result of overgrazing. Other disasters like Chernobyl with century-long 
consequences can be mentioned. Disasters involve irreversible changes in the 
biosphere involving the extinction of speciﬁ c animal or plant species, etc.
Civilisation disaster: the possibility of the partial or total collapse of civilisation 
as a result of environmental changes wrought by man. Mankind is capable of 
destroying its own civilisation in several ways: 1. technology and knowledge, 
the purposeful or accidental use of which (e.g. nuclear stocks and equipment) 
may bring about the total destruction of humanity. 2. Over-pollution of the 
environment may change ecological conditions even on a global level, which 
may lead to ~ (e.g. global climate change, desertiﬁ cation etc.). 3. The use of 
natural resources above carrying capacity, unless any substitute resource is 
found in time, may lead to the collapse of human civilisation. (Láng, 2002)
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3.4 Natural and social resilience
Scientists consider a system that is operating within the safe zone of opera-
tion to be ﬂ exibly adaptive. The phenomenon of resilience (‘elastic deﬂ ection’) 
is well known in mechanics, but is also applicable to the biosphere and so-
cial phenomena. Related research commenced in English-speaking countries 
when C. S. Holling established in the 1970s that resilience includes a system‘s 
load-bearing capacity, performance, and adaptivity–that is, its efﬁ cient opera-
tion, as well as its permanence, conservation capacity, and persistence.
Resilience, generally speaking, means ﬂ exible capacity for resistance; i.e., a 
system‘s creative ability (the system being either an individual, an organisation, 
an ecosystem or a type of material) to successfully adapt to powerful, renew-
ing, or even shock-like external effects.
Resilience in psychological terms means the quality, or rather ability, to re-
gain one‘s original healthy state after physical or mental suffering or after hav-
ing lived through critical life situations.
3-5. Figure Elastic / reversible deformation (https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&c
cid=WT3IVHd9&id=9BB9A88C0672C6D0C8A99DEC81FABB84E8491066&thid=OIP.WT3IVHd9VPL
qnKqi7Ca86wEgDY&q=elastic+deformation&simid=608009552505078228&selectedindex=3&mode
=overlay&ﬁ rst=1 - accessed on 16/04/2018)
Figure 3-6. Tensile strength diagram, resilience of metals
(http://pediaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Difference-Between-Stress-and-Strain-Stress_vs_
Strain_Curve_for_a_ductile_material.jpg - accessed on 16/04/2018)
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Resilience: External force causes deﬂ ection in bodies. If, once the effect has 
ceased, the body fully regains its original form, the deﬂ ection is called elastic. 
The difference between elastic and permanent deﬂ ection appears in reversibi-
lity: in the stage of elastic deﬂ ection a body will regain its initial size and form 
once the strain has ended, while in the permanent deﬂ ection stage it will not; 
this means plastic deformation is typically irreversible.
A nice example of resilience is described in the following way by the out-
standing Hungarian ecologist Juhász-Nagy Pál: ‘Well, let us take Lake Balaton 
as a sort of ‘reactive person’ who says things like: ‘So you‘ve taken away the 
Little Balaton and the forest groves? No problem, I‘ll build myself my ‘New Litt-
le Balaton’ in Keszthely harbour. You‘ve stolen my natural lakesides? Trouble‘s 
trouble, but I‘ll build myself a more or less unbroken stripe of reeds to take care 
of my cleaning needs–better than nothing… You make me swallow all kinds of 
poison, faeces, and slurry? Rather unpleasant; what is more, disgusting. But 
I‘ll try to compensate for all this by re-organising the coenological relations, the 
trophic network, I mean for as long as I can’ (Juhász-Nagy, 1984).
Resilience suggests a decentralised or regionalised ‘planned economy’ as op-
posed to the type of centrally planned economy that we experienced in this region 
before the political changes, and one which we may rediscover thanks to an EU 
bureaucracy plagued by management difﬁ culties. But what does resilience mean 
for the social sciences and ecology? Obviously something different than for a me-
chanical engineer. Walker, Holling, Carpenter and Kinzig (Walker, 2004) discuss 
the three concepts of ‘Resilience, adaptability and transformability’ together, the 
interactions between which they think determine the resistance capability and 
stability of systems against external shock. ‘While the technological ﬂ exibility ap-
proach focuses on the steady state and deﬁ nes the amount of disturbances need-
ed to move the system from one stability domain to another, ‘ecological ﬂ exibility’ 
is characterised by the amount of changing circumstances, which the system is 
able to absorb before its structure transforms due to the modiﬁ cation of variables, 
processes and the nature of management’ (Walker, 2005).
The sustainable relationship between nature and man requires that attention is 
directed to ecological ﬂ exibility because its central concern is the space between 
stabilisation and destabilisation: present-day development, global environmental 
change, the decrease in biodiversity, the degradation of ecosystems, and sustain-
able development. The term technological ﬂ exibility, however, gives the dangerous 
impression that natural systems may be efﬁ ciently managed, that consequences 
are predictable, and that sustainability goals are achievable (Walker, 2005).
A ﬂ exible, adaptable and thus sustainable social-ecological system is charac-
terised by the following characteristics:
• maintenance of diversity and support for its preservation (biological, 
landscape, economic and social),
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• limitation of ,human control‘ of ecological diversity,
• respect for modularity (combined systems withstand shock better),
• recognition and emphasis of the importance of education, social net-
works and locally developed rules.
For sustaining the operability of a ﬂ exible and adaptable social-ecological sys-
tem it is necessary to:
• ensure prompt feedback (e.g. in the case of a drought, immediate irriga-
tion is needed, with no time to wait for EU support policy to change). 
If there is no demand for selectively collected waste paper, its energy 
content must be exploited by burning it before it is otherwise destroyed. 
There may be no time for month- or year-long discussions;
• direct the attention of politics to slow variables and accumulations, despite 
the fact that politicians are disinterested in them: they are not newsworthy. 
In the case of a ﬂ ood or a ﬁ re, funds are always made available for making 
good the damage, while nobody really cares about the slow demolition of 
dams. A slow increase in nitrogen or the accumulation of heavy metals in 
the soil is a graver problem than the occasional foaming of the River Rába. 
The latter, luckily, attracts attention, while the former does not;
• appropriately divide private and public property, and overlapping rights 
of access. The state appears to be a bad proprietor, which is why pro-
ponents of a liberal economy want to privatise everything. The state may 
be a bad proprietor in an economic sense, but it is good in the ecological 
sense, such as in the case of public assets (e.g. drinking water). Moreover, 
it may also be good with non-public assets (energy supplies) where private 
owners may be able to cut prices but are unable to ensure safe supply;
• strictly punish and increase social disdain for fraud. The health of the 
environment and society will only be ensured through an appropriate 
system of moral values;
• create an overlapping institutional system (that functions at different lev-
els of decision-making). The principle of subsidiarity not only means that 
decisions should be taken at levels where the information is available, but 
also that higher (hierarchical) levels should support lower levels with prob-
lem handling. Expertise, material resources and perhaps coercive meas-
ures are required if, for example, a local government driven by economic 
interests destroys the living conditions of local inhabitants. Some settle-
ments in the metropolitan agglomeration have engaged in such conduct;
• incorporate non-priced ecosystem services into development proposals. The 
construction of a motorway, a wind farm, a landﬁ ll or a sewage system involves 
environmental destruction, the rate of which may be decreased only if impact 
assessments are prepared and alternative proposals are also examined;
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• maintain openness to change: an atmosphere supportive of innovation 
and experiments presupposes trust in the institutional system. It is worth 
trying everything at a small scale before scaling it up. Smaller shocks are 
best met through the ﬂ exible reactions of ecosystems and society;
• strongly commit to avoiding major shocks and quick responses
• feedbacks to large volume effects.
3.5 The ecological footprint
The past two decades since 2000 have witnessed a number of initiatives 
aimed at the quantiﬁ cation of the effects of the economy on the environment. 
The most comprehensive and most successful attempt of all has deﬁ nitely 
been the measurement of ecological footprints. The ecological footprint is not 
a welfare but a sustainability indicator, and it is due to the method of calcula-
tion involved that it is discussed in this chapter.
The ecological footprint expresses the annual renewability of the biosphere 
in hectares, either in terms of land or sea surface (i.e., what size of area is 
necessary for reproducing a given population‘s resource needs in a given year, 
considering widespread technologies and resource management practices). 
The use of area as a measure of life-supporting natural capital is based on the 
fact that the part of our planet‘s surface where photosynthesis takes place is 
the fundamental ‘unit‘ of services provided by ecosystems.
The total national ecological footprint measures the biologically productive 
area which provides the full range of resources consumed by a population and 
absorbs/assimilates all the waste produced by a population, considering exist-
ing technologies and management systems. The present methodology that is 
considered to be up-to-date uses four thousand pieces of data per country per 
year to calculate the ecological footprint (Wackernagel et al., 2005).
The measurement of the ecological footprint dates back around ﬁ fteen 
years. Two basic methodological approaches are recognised.
1. The original approach constructs the ecological footprint from the ele-
ments (components) of the population‘s resource consumption and waste pro-
duction. To do this, the consumption element ﬁ rst has to be deﬁ ned (i.e., how 
much and what the population consumes). Then, lifecycle analysis is applied 
to explore using a ,cradle-to-grave‘ approach the environmental consequenc-
es of this consumption, considering both resource use and the effects on the 
environment‘s pollution assimilation capability. The reliability of the method 
depends on the level of detail the components of consumption are explored 
with. Considering the effects of environmental impact, how the boundaries of 
the lifecycle analysis are deﬁ ned may result in inaccuracy/variability.
Results are signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced by how complex supply chains are. In 
the case of more complex supply chains, double-counting often occurs. The 
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differences between production technologies may also signiﬁ cantly affect the 
ecological footprint, of course, provided the same product or service can be 
produced at different levels of eco-efﬁ ciency.
The economic footprint, built up from a number of elements, in spite of its 
doubtless advantages is associated with a number of ﬂ aws. The most serious 
of all is the immense complexity and quantify of information that is required, 
which makes it rather expensive to calculate, while for most uses per-item-
level detail is superﬂ uous. Environmental policies work with aggregate data in 
any case, and detailed information is often wasted.
2. Considering these ﬂ aws, the new methodology calculates the ecological foot-
print using aggregate data provided by national statistics. The prerequisite is that 
the environmental impacts of the components/elements of consumption are known, 
allowing the calibration of the footprint from the aggregate data. The calculation 
of national footprints does not take into account the impact caused by, for exam-
ple, different kinds of paper (wrapping paper, newspaper, printing paper, etc.); it is 
enough to examine the ‘aggregate’ environmental consequences of the production 
or consumption of a kilogram of ‘statistical paper’ (Wackernagel et al., 2005).
Dr. William Rees is a bioecologist by training, and 
former Director of the University of British Colum-
bia’s School of Community and Regional Planning 
(1994-1999), Dr. Rees is best known for his work 
on the ‘ecological footprint’ – an analytical tool for 
measuring how many hectares of land are capable 
of providing a community with energy and raw ma-
terial at a speciﬁ ed given level.
‘Throughout university I was constantly in search 
of what I thought should have been obvious, some-
thing called human ecology: the study of human 
beings as species of organism. I couldn’t ﬁ nd it an-
ywhere. It astonished me that academic ecologists and professional ecology 
had no focus at all on humans; it was all oriented to non-human species. I 
failed miserably to ﬁ nd any course that treated human beings as species. We 
were just beginning to think of environmental studies and that sort of thing, 
but that’s not human ecology, that’s really impact ecology.
In the seventies I began to develop at the planning school this notion of 
ecological footprint analysis. It’s grown since, and we’ve now got the book 
out for the last ﬁ ve years. It’s in six languages and selling all over the world 
and it’s having, I am gratiﬁ ed to say, quite an impact on the way people 
think about sustainability, human carrying capacity, and so on’.
Gismondi, M. (2000). Dr. William Rees interviewed By Dr. Michael Gis-
mondi. (aurora.icaap.org).
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The calculation of the ecological footprint is based on the following six presup-
positions (Wackernagel et al., 2005):
1. National resource consumption and waste production is recorded by 
national and international organisations. Annual values are measured in 
physical units (tonnes, joules, cubic metres, etc.).
2. The volume of biological resources suitable for human consumption is 
directly correlated to the biologically productive area needed for regen-
eration and the assimilation of waste.
3. Provided the size of individual areas is evaluated in terms of their us-
able biomass productivity, different types of land can be expressed as 
standard, average bioproductive areas. These standard values are called 
global hectares, the fertility of which is equal to the expected annual 
average value of one hectare (averaged across the whole planet). This 
standard calculation is valid both for the ecological footprint and existing 
biocapacity.
4. All lands are expressible in global hectares, and their size is calculable 
by summing up the area needed for resource supply and waste assimi-
lation. This means that no pieces of land are accounted for twice; one 
separate piece is needed for the production of resources, and another 
for the assimilation of waste. This certainly does not mean that a piece 
of land cannot perform two functions at a time. A forest, while providing 
timber, is also capable of protecting against ﬂ oods. When calculating the 
ecological footprint, however, land units are counted only once accord-
ing to their primary function.
5. Aggregate human needs and the supply of services provided by nature 
can be directly compared since both are measured in hectare equivalents.
6. The area of demand may exceed the area of supply. If the ecological 
footprint is larger than ecological capacity, it means the renewal capac-
ity needed for subsistence exceeds the capacity of the natural capital. 
Overuse is considered to be ‘ecological deﬁ cit’, and can be compen-
sated for in two ways. One option is through imports that take place 
through foreign trade involving the use of another country‘s natural capi-
tal. The other option – only temporarily, of course – is to overuse natural 
resources, although this involves the devaluation of natural capital.
3.6 Calculating the ecological footprint
Calculation of the ecological footprint occurs in two phases. The ﬁ rst involves 
the deﬁ nition of the ecological supply (or bioproductive area). Next comes the 
calculation of the demand for nature (the ecological footprint). A total 11.2 
billion hectares of biologically productive area is incorporated into the calcula-
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tion; this is the area that can be taken into account from the perspective of 
resources that can renew. The distribution of the presently existing area can be 
seen in the table below (Table 3-1.).
Distribution of biologically productive area
Sea and lake 2.3 billion hectares
Land 8.8 billion hectares
• cropland 1.5 billion hectares
• grazing land 3.5 billion hectares
• forest 3.6 billion hectares
• built-up area 0.2 billion hectares
Table 3-1. Distribution of biologically productive area on Earth (Global Footprint Network)
The area deﬁ ned above can be considered determinant from the perspective 
of the planet’s carrying capacity. It is very likely that at least 80-90% of total 
global biomass is produced in this area. 
To calculate the ecological footprint, we need to know the average produc-
tivity of the 11.2 billion hectares (i.e., average productivity per global hectare). 
Productivity in this case does not refer to actual biomass production but the 
maximum ‘yield potential’ with the current agricultural input. A biologically pro-
ductive area with favourable circumstances may substitute for several hec-
tares of lower fertility. To take the different potential of areas into account, two 
types of conversion factors are employed. One is the equivalence factor, which 
applies to every country in the given year; the other is the yield factor, which is 
speciﬁ c to every country and given year. The latter helps convert every biologi-
cally productive area into global hectares.
An example of the equivalence factors used in practice are shown in Table 
3-2., which indicates that 1 ha of biologically productive land was equal to 4.56 
ha of grazing land in 2001 (2.19/0.48=4.56).
While the equivalence factor facilitates the conversion between different 
methods of utilisation, the ‘yield factor’ helps when considering the differences 
between individual countries and the global average. The yield factor is dif-
ferent for each country each year. The yield factor takes into account not only 
differences in natural fertility, but also the dominant technological and organi-
sational arrangements in the given location. In 2001, the biocapacity and eco-
logical footprint of Peru was calculated using an equivalence factor (globally 
valid data) and a yield factor (data reﬂ ecting speciﬁ c Peruvian potential) as 
illustrated in Table 3-2. The marginal biologically productive land yield factor is 
extremely high, due to the outstanding Peruvian olive plantations.
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Bioproductive land Equivalence Factor 
[gha/ha]
Yield factor
[-]
Primary cropland 2.19 0.98
Marginal cropland 1.80 2.57
Forest land 1.37 0.82
Grazing land 0.48 1.81
Sea 0.36 3.39
Lake, river 0.36 2.96
Built-up area 2.19 0.98
Table 3-2. Equivalence factor and yield factor (2001, Peru) (Wackernagel et al., 2005)
The major components of the ecological footprint are shown graphically in Fig. 3-7:
Figure 3-7. Major components of the ecological footprint (graphic by Imola Kocsis, ©2018)
The ecological footprint works by multiplying the size of areas (in ha) used for 
different purposes – cropland, grazing land, etc.  – by the equivalence factor:
Ecological footprint (global hectare) = Area (ha)* equivalence factor (gha/ha)
Since the ecological footprint is intended to illustrate the consumption of the 
given country, its calculation should also take international trade (import-export) 
into account. Imports obviously increase the footprint, while exports decrease it. 
The issue of tourism poses an interesting problem. Tourist consumption is record-
ed where it takes place, and so is the fuelling of airplanes, not the location where 
 SUSTAINABILITY  59
airlines are established. This clearly inﬂ uences the ecological footprint of some 
‘touring nations’ and makes the footprint of, for example, Mediterranean coun-
tries, larger than would be suggested by the demands of the inhabitants alone. 
The contribution to footprint caused by the use of fossil fuels and nuclear 
power cannot be measured as directly as in the case of consumed food of 
animal or plant origin. There are two options for the indirect calculation of the 
former. In the ﬁ rst case, the starting point is the area needed for the assimila-
tion of the emitted waste (e.g. carbon dioxide). The other method focuses on 
the size of the area needed to produce the ﬁ rewood equivalent of the fossil or 
nuclear power in terms of energy. The calculations arrive at different results, 
which fact must be taken into account during their interpretation.
3.7 Calculating biocapacity
The ecological footprint characterises the demand for the services of nature in 
a given country, while biocapacity captures the other side of the equation: sup-
ly of environmental services. The total biocapacity of a country is expressed in 
the volume of biologically productive area measured in global hectares. All of 
the bio-productive lands of different types are converted into hectares with the 
help of an equivalence factor and a nation-speciﬁ c yield factor, which permit the 
calculation of the biocapacity of the given country for the given year.
Biocapacity (gha)= Area (ha) * Equivalence factor (gha/ha) * Yield factor (-)
Biocapacity expresses the theoretically available maximum resource supply of a 
given country which can be produced sustainably with widespread technologies and 
management systems. Biocapacity is a theoretical value which may not be max-
imised at any given time. For example, a country may have hard-to-access or pro-
tected areas which cannot be involved in the production of resource supply. This is 
why some calculations take the biocapacity of only accessible areas into account.
3.7.1 Ecological defi cit and overshoot
Based on a comparison between ecological footprint and biocapacity we can 
decide if a country’s natural capital is enough to sustain its consumption and 
production. If the ecological footprint calculated for consumption (gha) ex-
ceeds biocapacity (gha), we talk about an ‘ecological deﬁ cit’.
Ecological deﬁ cit (gha) = Ecological footprint consumption (gha) – Biocapacity (gha)
In some countries, the ecological deﬁ cit is covered by imports; i.e., other coun-
tries’ natural capital is used to satisfy needs. This category typically includes coun-
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tries with high population density like The Netherlands, or ones with unfavourable 
natural conditions like Ethiopia. Other countries such as Canada or Brazil have a 
biocapacity surplus, part of which they export. If the ecological deﬁ cit is impossible 
to cover through imports, which is usually the case in poor and geographically un-
favourably situated countries, this will result in the overuse and depletion of natural 
resources. A typical example of the overuse of natural resources is the emission of 
greenhouse gases. The aggregate carbon dioxide emissions of the countries of the 
world are higher than the biosphere is able to absorb, leading to climate change.
The extent of ‘overshoot’ can be calculated for an individual country by com-
paring the ecological footprint caused by production with biocapacity. 
Ecological overshoot (gha) = Ecological footprint production (gha) – Biocapacity (gha)
It is theoretically conceivable and common in practice that a country exports 
part of its biocapacity even when in a state of overshoot, thus using up its 
natural capital to promote the survival of its export activities. This often hap-
pens to countries that become caught in a debt trap.
The whole of the Earth has been in a state of overshoot since 1987. In 1987 
the day when mankind had used up its resource supply for the given year fell on 
19 December (World Overshoot Day). By 1995 this day had shifted to a month 
earlier (21 November), and by 2006 to 9 October. This suggests that mankind 
is consuming 30% more resources than the biosphere is able to produce in a 
year. The ecological deﬁ cit that we are leaving behind for future generations 
is thus accumulating in the form of climate change, decreases in biodiversity, 
decreases in the security of energy supply, water shortages, and other threats.
As shown in Figure 3-8., since 1967 Earth has been ‘too small’ for humankind, 
which is thus putting its own future at huge risk by overusing resources. The growth 
in the footprint is decisively caused by an increase in carbon dioxide emissions.
Figure 3-8. Change in the ecological footprint of humankind
(https://www.footprintnetwork.org/our-work/climate-change - accessed on 16/04/2018 )
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Calculation of the ecological footprint not only highlights the fact that the con-
sumption of the whole of humankind has exceeded the carrying capacity of the 
Earth’s biosphere, but also indicates the disparity that exists between so-called 
developed and developing regions in terms of resource consumption. 
Figure 3-9. Population and the ecological footprint of individual regions of the world in 2006. (WWF)
As Figure 3-9. shows, one third of all the inhabitants of the Earth have a 
larger ecological footprint than they would be entitled to in the case that bio-
capacity were equally shared. Theoretically speaking, the footprint should be 
reduced to below 1.5 ha. Differences are sizeable even among OECD coun-
tries. The per capita ecological footprint of North America is nearly twice the of 
that of the average of the twenty-ﬁ ve European countries.4 Although Hungary 
improves (i.e., decreases) the EU average, the Hungarian footprint still exceeds 
existing biocapacity, which means that we are also suffering from a chronic 
deﬁ cit of resources (Figure 3-10.).
Growth in forest land in Hungary has favourably inﬂ uenced the development 
of the footprint in the past two decades, but this has been compensated for by 
carbon dioxide emissions related to passenger transport (Figure 3-11.).
4 For a comprehensive analysis of ecological footprint and population density using 
the Intenscope analytical tool, see Kocsis (2014). For a historical perspective see 
Tóth–Szigeti (2016)
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Figure 3-10. Development of average demand for resources (ecological footprint) and resource 
supply (biocapacity) in Hungary since 1961. Biocapacity changes annually, depending on the method 
of calculation applied, use of chemicals, weather, etc (based on Global Footprint Network data).
Figure 3-11. Change in Hungary’s ecological footprint by components over forty-three years 
(based on Global Footprint Network data).
On the whole, Hungary’s ecological footprint has not decreased to the extent 
that it could have as a result of structural changes in the economy. 
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3.8 Reliability of the calculation of ecological footprint
There are a number of methods of calculating the ecological footprint, but the re-
sults vary over a relatively broad range. This arouses distrust in the method itself, 
while it is a fact that the past few years have witnessed remarkable improvement 
in the methods and the reliability of the data. The literature distinguishes six ma-
jor types of potential methodological errors (Wackernagel et al., 2005):
1. Some theoretical and methodological errors originate from the fact that 
certain needs such as drinking water, soil erosion and the emission of 
certain toxic substances are not included in the footprint, which leads 
to underestimation of the deﬁ cit. The other group of errors are allocation 
errors which inaccurately distribute the environmental impacts caused 
by tourism and commerce between the supplying countries and the con-
suming countries. The latter, however, do not inﬂ uence the validity of 
calculations on a whole-Earth basis.
2. Structural and data input errors. Techniques that test for the consistency 
of the data ﬁ lter out major errors, but do not pick up smaller data errors 
which, taken together, may be signiﬁ cant.
3. The errors involved in estimates that replace missing data.
4. Statistical data for individual years are sometimes erratic. Attempts are 
made to ﬁ lter these out using trend analyses, but they do not always work.
5. In United Nations statistics, some countries falsify data. A typical example is 
planned economies which, often supplying inﬂ ated production data, reduce 
actual logging rates, and inaccurately present the activities of the black and 
grey economy, making precise calculation impossible. Although inaccura-
cies in the data may be detectable, there is no way to correct them.
6. Certain data are lacking from UN statistics (concerning, for example, 
water shortages, or the biological effects of pollution, or the impact of 
waste on bio-productivity). If such data existed, they would increase the 
ecological footprint.
3.9 Economic macro indicators (GDP, GNP) and their fl aws
Simon Kuznets, who invented the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicator, 
called attention to the fact that GDP is not a welfare indicator, and is ﬂ awed 
in a number of ways: ‘The welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from 
a measure of national income ... Goals for more growth should specify more 
growth of what and for what’ (Kuznets 1934). Since then, many individuals–
politicians, ﬁ rst of all–have forgotten about the scholar’s warning. The reason 
for this is that GDP proved to be easy to calculate and interpret, and although 
it is burdened with a number of problems as far as absolute ﬁ gures are con-
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cerned, relative changes can be monitored with its help–with the necessary 
caution.
Gross Domestic Product: The total of goods produced domestically by home 
and foreign-owned companies. On the production side, this equals the sum 
of gross added value (i.e., the difference between outputs and intermediate 
consumption) created by economic units. On the consumption side, the gross 
domestic product equals the sum of products and services processed for 
ﬁ nal consumption, stock and export, having subtracted the value of products 
and services originating from imports (according to Hungarian Central Statis-
tical Ofﬁ ce).
International organisations such as the UN Human Development Programme 
have deﬁ ned ﬁ ve exceedingly harmful types of GDP growth, adding that such 
growth ‘is not sustainable or worth sustaining’:
Jobless growth which does not expand opportunities for employment
Voiceless growth which has not been accompanied by the extension of democracy or empowerment 
Rootless growth which causes people’s cultural identity to wither
Futureless growth where the present generation squanders resources needed by future generations
Ruthless growth where the fruits of economic growth mostly beneﬁ t the rich
As reported earlier, growth in GDP in itself does not necessarily mean growth 
in welfare. Current alternative economic literature deals a lot with the ﬂ aws with 
GDP and GNP, describing the arguments against their use; however, these 
barely differ from those known about by researchers during the early period 
of the expansion of the use of the indicators. The most signiﬁ cant and com-
monly referenced counter-arguments are identiﬁ ed in Stiglitz, et al. (2010). This 
includes the following claims:
1. GDP does not incorporate the value of non-market activities of house-
holds and society–while this is where a signiﬁ cant share of products and 
services are created. The level of households and communities is where 
the activity most important for society takes place (raising children, 
cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, house maintenance and voluntary 
community jobs). These activities do not increase GDP because they do 
not involve cash ﬂ ow.
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2. GDP does not measure or indicate how incomes are distributed among 
members of society. Growth in GDP does not necessarily mean that 
everybody’s income grows; the income of the poor may not increase 
even when GDP does. The GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator) on the other 
hand, increases when the poor partake more of domestic product and 
decreases when their share falls. 
3. GDP does not fully capture changes in the value of stocks in terms of 
built or natural capital. Sustenance of an adequate level of consump-
tion requires the maintenance of the productivity of capital goods (capital 
stocks can be divided into several groups; two of which are built and 
natural capital. GDP conﬂ ates the value obtained by major technology 
acquisitions, investments into buildings and infrastructure – built capital 
–  with the amount of money spent on them). GDP does not incorporate 
elements of natural capital such as minerals, fossil fuels and soil. 
4. The use of GDP results in incorrect evaluations of preventative expen-
ditures. The cost of equipment used to prevent environmental pollution 
(such as water ﬁ lters) is incorporated in GDP as ‘growth’ (i.e., as being 
beneﬁ cial), while GPI considers such items as expenditure. 
5. GDP ignores other components of the standard of life – like personal 
safety, the quality of the physical environment, and national identity.
6. GDP incorporates spending on crime, divorce and natural disasters as 
if they contributed to the economy. Any decay in society (in the form of 
legal costs, medical costs, and damages related to property) represent 
signiﬁ cant economic cost to individuals and society alike, but GDP incor-
porates these costs which are then perceived of as positive ‘growth’.
In addition, the most signiﬁ cant problem may be the one ex-World Bank 
president Barber Conable bemoaned back in 1989; namely, that ‘Unfortunate-
ly, GDP ﬁ gures are generally used without the caveat that they represent an 
income that cannot be sustained. Current calculations ignore the degradation 
of the natural resource base and view the sale of non-renewable resources 
entirely as income. A better way must be found to measure the prosperity and 
progress of mankind.’
Despite all these well-known ﬂ aws, or perhaps exactly because of them, 
GDP and GNP are commonly used today. Present generations are loath to 
face the fact that the level of consumption reached in OECD countries is not 
sustainable. Moreover, politicians are expected to promise further growth in 
consumption. GDP is helpful for this purpose because it hides the fact that 
such growth is only possible at the cost of nature and future generations. 
There is, of course, a pragmatic methodological explanation for using GDP. 
Efforts that have thus far been made to create alternative development in-
dicators to replace GDP/GNP have had limited success mostly because the 
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calculation of such indices –  including GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator, 1995; 
Clifford Cobb, Ted Halstead and Jonathan Rowe) ISEW (Cobb and Daly), and 
HDI (UNDP), to mention only the most important ones – is laborious and often 
encumbered with subjective (weighting) considerations. 
The issues with using GDP have long been known, and statistics offers us 
a number of solutions that present more realistic pictures about development 
and welfare, but not in the form of a single indicator. Although GDP increases 
in consequence of, for example, ﬂ ood prevention activities (but national assets 
decrease), this is also indicated in annual surveys, and of course statistics 
also help us keep track of any decreases in cultivation areas, or changes in 
the state of forests. The problem is that obtaining this information requires 
combining a huge set of data. Accordingly, GDP is a single ﬁ gure that should 
only be used as a ‘thermometer’. Fever is only a sign of  illness, and additional 
tests must be performed to determine the type of illness. GDP should similarly 
be treated as a warning indicator, and what it signals should be decided on 
the basis of detailed analyses. GDP does not express inequalities in income 
distribution, but this problem is easy to solve by using, for example, the Gini 
index, as illustrated below. 
3.10 The effect of economic growth on environment 
            pollution
Simon Kuznets, considered to be the pope of growth theory, was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in 1971. It may be natural that Kuznets viewed growth in 
an optimistic way. In a speech given at the former award ceremony, while 
acknowledging the negative effects of growth, he afﬁ rmed quite clearly that 
‘Two points are relevant here. First, the negative effects of growth have never 
been viewed as so far outweighing its positive contribution as to lead to its 
renunciation – no matter how crude the underlying calculus may have been. 
Second, one may assume that once an unexpected negative result of growth 
emerges, the potential of material and social technology is aimed at its re-
duction or removal. In many cases these negative results were allowed to ac-
cumulate and to become serious technological or social problems because 
it was so difﬁ cult to foresee them early enough in the process to take effec-
tive preventive or ameliorative action. Even when such action was initiated, 
there may have been delay in the effective technological or policy solution. 
Still, one may justiﬁ ably argue, in the light of the history of economic growth, 
in which a succession of such unexpected negative results has been over-
come, that any speciﬁ c problem so generated will be temporary – although 
we shall never be free of them, no matter what economic development is 
attained’ (Kuznets, 1971).
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According to Grossman (1995), economic growth affects the quality of environ-
ment in three ways.
1. The so-called scale-effect, according to which larger (larger-scale) eco-
nomic growth naturally generates larger-scale environmental degrada-
tion by raising demand for inputs including natural resources, thus ne-
cessarily leading to increased outputs in the form of waste.
2. The so-called structural effect, which may be favourable in the future. 
The ﬁ rst structural effects that hit economic activity – urbanisation, the 
shift from agricultural production to industrial production, etc. – had en-
vironmentally harmful effects. The present structural changes such as in-
creases in energy efﬁ ciency, higher added value sectors and the spread 
of services can help reduce environmental impact per unit of GDP. 
3. The technical-technological component of growth: this is a favourable ef-
fect because richer countries spend more on research and development, 
enabling them to replace polluting technologies with cleaner ones, thus 
decreasing environmental impact. 
Back in 1979, Kuznets claimed that no-one had questioned the proposition 
that growth results in more good than bad, and that growth offers a means 
of offsetting the negative effects of technologies. After careful deliberation, 
Kuznets mentions six basic characteristics of modern economic growth:
1. Signiﬁ cantly faster growth of national product per capita and population 
in developed countries compared to earlier periods,
2. Signiﬁ cantly greater increase in work productivity compared to earlier 
periods,
3. High speed structural changes in the economy, agriculture taking a back 
seat and the developing dominance of industry ﬁ rst, and the service 
sector later. Companies take the lead from private enterprises, which 
changes employment circumstances,
4. Rapid changes in social structure and associated ideologies,
5. Transport and telecommunication technologies enable developed coun-
tries to easily access the rest of the world, leading to global convergence,
6. Despite economic growth, three-quarters of the world’s population lives 
far below the standards which could be supported through the applica-
tion of modern technology (Kuznets, 1971).
Kuznets’s ideas signiﬁ cantly predate the emergence of the theory of sustain-
able development. While Kuznets was awarded the Nobel Prize, the writing of 
the ﬁ rst report of the Club of Rome entitled The Limits to Growth was already 
underway. Meadows’s book was published in 1972, and expressed doubts 
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about the long-term sustainability of growth as it considered the effects of 
growth to be rather positive than negative.
The Club of Rome: international group founded in Rome on the initia-
tive of A. Peccei and A. King in 1968 with the goal of revealing to the 
world the dangers threatening mankind, so-called global issues. The ~ 
is an independent organisation created from funds contributed to by re-
searchers, scientists, scholars, outstanding personalities from every kind 
of cultural circle from around the world. Its primary mission is to discuss 
issues important for our planet and publish reports about them. Its general 
principles: 1. Take a global view, knowing that independent nations  are 
unable to solve global problems; 2. holistic thinking and getting to know 
the complexity of (political, social, economic, technological, environmen-
tal, psychological and cultural) problems; and 3. an interdisciplinary and 
long-term perspective on policies and decisions determining the destinies 
of future generations. The body published its ﬁ rst report entitled The Lim-
its to Growth in 1972. There are 12 topics in the focus of the ~’s reports 
and discussions: economic development, employment, public education, 
food, health, water supply, environment, raw materials, energy, popula-
tion, homes, urban life circumstances. The ~ selected two Hungarian sci-
entists as members; ﬁ rst, József Bognár, then János Szentágothai. From 
among Hungarian scientists living abroad, Ervin László and Dénes Gábor 
were authors of one report each. After A. Peccei’s death, A. King, next 
Ricardo Diez Hochleitner, and later Prince El Hassan bin Talal became the 
~’s new president. (Láng, 2002)
The authors of the Club of Rome certainly did not argue with Kuznets. Tak-
ing a close look at Kuznets’s statements (above), it is obvious that the theory 
of growth of this economist, now considered a classic, encompasses all that 
researchers have criticised over the past thirty-ﬁ ve years. Kuznets views tech-
nological and social innovations as the basis of development, but also deems 
natural, social and cultural dimensions to be important by saying ‘Thus, modern 
technology with its emphasis on labor-saving inventions may not be suited to 
countries with a plethora of labor but a scarcity of other factors, such as land 
and water; and modern institutions, with their emphasis on personal respon-
sibility and pursuit of economic interest, may not be suited to the more tradi-
tional life patterns of the agricultural communities that predominate in many 
less developed countries’ (Kuznets, 1971).
Kuznets certainly does not interpret GDP as an indicator of welfare; more-
over, in the earlier-referenced paper he clearly states that ‘the conventional 
measures of national product and its components do not reﬂ ect many costs 
of adjustment in the economic and social structures to the channeling of ma-
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jor technological innovations; and, indeed, also omit some positive returns. ... 
This shortcoming of the theory in confrontation with the new ﬁ ndings, has led 
to a lively discussion in the ﬁ eld in recent years, and to attempts to expand 
the national accounting framework to encompass the so far hidden but clearly 
important costs, for example, in education as capital investment, in the shift 
to urban life, or in the pollution and other negative results of mass production. 
These efforts will also uncover some so far unmeasured positive returns – in 
the way of greater health and longevity, greater mobility, more leisure, less 
income inequality, and the like..’ 
3.11 The Theory of Environmental Kuznets curves
A publication by the World Bank in 1992 (World Bank, 1992) claims that at a 
certain level of economic growth, growth and environment pollution decouple. 
This correlation is illustrated in Figure 3-12., which clearly shows that, after a 
certain point, while the number of cars, energy consumption, the population, 
etc. increase, pollution decreases on the whole. Economic growth and envi-
ronment pollution thus become decoupled. 
Dematerialisation, decoupling from material use: absolute or relative de-
creases in the volume of material used for and/or emitted waste per unit of 
economic output. According to the approach of ~ , the key to solving most 
ecological issues is provided by the quality and quantity of the material and 
energy ﬂ ow between the technosphere and the biosphere. In compliance 
with the principle theorem of thermodynamics, all resources acquired from 
nature (inputs) sooner or later return to the same place in the form of pol-
luting emissions or waste. Consequently, according to the strategy of ~, 
reductions in the inputs of the technosphere (material use) will lead to reduc-
tions in harmful impacts on the biosphere. Different indicators of the ~ are 
known: these include Total Material Requirement – TMR, Material Intensity 
per Service Unit – MIPS, etc. (Láng, 2002)
At more than ten thousand dollars per capita of GDP, environmental indica-
tors such as sulphur dioxide emissions, the volume of untreated waste water, 
the lead and other heavy metal content of the air etc. clearly improve. Curves 
demonstrating such correlations are called Kuznets curves in environmental 
economics (Figure 3-13.).
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Figure 3-12. Comparison of measures of growth and emissions (1980-2006) (USA) 
Source: Latest ﬁ nding on national air quality 
(http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/2007/report/sixprincipalpollutants.pdf)
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environmental impact 
Figure 3-13. The inverted-parabola-shaped environmental Kuznets curve
(quadratic approximation) (Borghesi, 1999)
It is not easy to verify this neat theory of environmental Kuznets curves using 
empirical data. This is partly because there are no appropriate data series at 
hand about environmental impact, and especially not for use in within-country 
analyses. Making international comparisons, however, is not convincing due 
to the different natural and social conditions and different environmental regu-
lations of respective countries. The empirical evidence is convincing enough 
for certain air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen 
oxides and dust, especially in terms of urban or local air quality. In other cases, 
like carbon dioxide emissions, the data do not support the existence of an 
inverted U-shaped curve (for example, carbon dioxide emissions increase with 
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GDP, meaning the effect of the increase in the volume of the economy out-
weighs any favourable effects of structure or technology). It poses a problem 
that the points at which various pollutants start to decrease differ according to 
differing levels of  GDP. For example, the emission of nitrogen oxides starts to 
fall at a far higher GDP than the emission of sulphur dioxide or solid particles. 
It is not necessarily true, either, that the shape of the curve is symmetrical. The 
downslope is understandably often steeper.
Table 3-3. Selected pollutants and income (based on Cole–Rayner–Bates, 1997)
Expert estimates suggest that the peak of the inverted parabola, the so-
called turning point, is situated at very different per capita GDPs for various 
pollutants. For carbon monoxide, as mentioned above, decreases start to oc-
cur at only $35-57000 GDP per capita, while the GDP per capita of the USA is 
still far below this level. For sulphur dioxide the amount is $9400-11300; above 
this range improvements are already noticeable. 
The situation is even more complex with water pollutants, although there 
is solid data-based evidence concerning changes in biological and chemical 
oxygen demand and the potable water supply and connectivity of homes to 
a wastewater treatment system (see Figure 3-14. – Langeweg et. al., 2000).
In Figure 3-14. it can be seen that at more than $10000-15000 / GDP per 
capita the problem of potable water and wastewater treatment system connec-
tivity can usually be considered solved. This is what Grosmann and Kruger’s 
graph also indicates. As a general statement, it is obvious that for the riskiest 
pollutants (Arsenic, Cadmium, and Coliform) the turning points occur at rela-
tively low values of GDP. 
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Legend: 1* =  Proportion of homes connected to wastewater treatment 
system (%)
2* =  Proportion of homes with potable water (%)
3* =  Log. (proportion of homes connected to wastewater treatment 
system (%)
4* =  Log. (proportion of homes with potable water (%)
Figure 3-14. Changes in proportions of population supplied with safe potable water and 
connectivity to wastewater treatment system by GDP per capita (Langeweg, 2000). 
Water Pollutants EKC Turning Point
1985 USD 2001 USD (approximate)
Air pollution 
(USD from 
different years) 
Arsenic 4900 8000
Biological oxygen 
demand 7600 12500
Cadmium 5000 8200
Chemical oxygen 
demand 7900 13000
Faecal coliform 8000 13100
Nitrates 2000 3300
Lead 10500 17200
Total coliform 3000 4900
SO2 (emissions) 8691
NOx (emissions) 14810
SPM (emissions) 9811
Table 3-4. Pollution and income; EKC turning points
(Grossman–Krueger, 1995, Van Alstine–Neumayer, 2010)
1*
2*
3*
4*
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Heavy metal pollution or drug residue content, etc. in waters make the situa-
tion more complex. Some researchers speak about the existence of N-shaped 
(cubic exponent) environmental Kuznets curves (Grossman and Krueger 1994, 
Shaﬁ k 1994, Grossman 1995).
environmental impact 
GDP per capita 
Figure 3-15. N-shaped environmental Kuznets curve 
approximated with cubic polynomial) (Borghesi, 1999)
Especially in the case of some water pollution indicators, pollution begins 
to fall at above a certain level of GDP, then starts to rise again at an extremely 
high standard of living (see Figures 3-16.). The latter is exempliﬁ ed with the 
case of garbage disposal. Richer households allow most kitchen waste to 
leave via waste water systems (through in-sink garbage disposal units) instead 
of bothering with collecting this solid waste selectively, which dramatically 
raises the biological oxygen demand of the waste water5.
Experience of the post-1970s development of advanced countries gives 
grounds for some optimism. As Figure 3-16. indicates, GDP and pollution in-
crease together until a certain level of development, even if a society starts to 
make efforts to protect the environment.
However, later in time and at above a certain level of development, GDP does 
not grow in relation to level of pollution; on the contrary, the level of pollution 
may dramatically fall. The theory is well supported with emission data from the 
USA which indicate that (with the exception of nitrogen oxides), the emissions 
of  usually very harmful pollutants (lead, sulphur dioxide, dust, etc.) decrease.
5 BOD is the volume of oxygen lost through the aerobic biochemical decomposition of 
organic substances in water over a given period of time (usually 5 days). BOI5 = mg 
O2/L.
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Figure 3-16. Decoupling of the link between GDP and pollution as a result of growth
(based on Presentation by David Pearce in Budapest, 1994 and Shaﬁk–Bandyopadhyay, 1992)
In the two ﬁ gures below, the emissions of some air pollutants in the USA 
are plotted for the time between 1900 and 1998, in addition to 1970 and 2012. 
Disregarding PM10, it is clear that they take the shape of an inverted U-shaped 
curve. Figure 3-17. still shows a phase of growth, but sometime in the 1970s 
the trend changes: due to the level of development, (welfare) society starts 
spending more on environment protection, and pollution levels begin to fall. 
For dust pollution we see a cubic parabola. Partly due to the spread of diesel 
engines, the PM 10/2.5 concentration in the atmosphere temporarily rises. In 
urban areas, PM 2.5 is primarily composed of sulphates, nitrates, organic car-
bon (OC), and, to a lesser degree, elemental carbon (EC) and crustal material.
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Figure 3-17. Trends in National Emissions (1900-1998) in USA Source:
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/trends98/trends98.pdf
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Figure 3-18. Emission of air pollutants in USA, thousands of tons (1970-2013)
(Source: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/ downloaded 26 Aug 2014 )6
Concerning environmental Kuznets curves, we thus summarize (Borghesi, 1999):
1. Not all changes in indicators can be described using Kuznets curves
2. Changes in the indicators showing environmental impact which more 
closely correlate to the health of a population and their standard of life 
are more likely to follow the Kuznets curve than those whose effect is 
more difﬁ cult to perceive. Waste production or carbon-dioxide emis-
sions, for example, do not follow the downslope of the Kuznets curve 
because such effects can be externalised (see data in Figure 3-18.).
3. Regarding the empirical observations that are used to describe the 
changes in the indicators plotted on the Kuznets curve, the opinions of 
researchers are divided as to what level of GDP can initiate a change in 
the indicators, and whether the pollution emitted during any phase of 
growth is irreversible (i.e., how high the peak of the bell curve will go). 
The latter is called in the literature the ‘shade effect’ (Figure 3-19.).
Either no or insufﬁ cient information exists about the shaded area in Figure 
3-19., and whether emissions at that level or above cause irreversible changes. 
It would obviously be ideal to move from point A to point C without touch-
6 Notes to Figure 3-18.: Particulate Matter 2.5 Micrometers in Diameter and Smaller 
(PM2.5) National Totals with Condensibles from 1999 – 2003 (thousands of tons) made 
up of several different chemical components. Particulate Matter 10 Micrometers in 
Diameter and Smaller (PM10) National Totals with Condensibles from 1999 – 2006 
(thousands of tons) SO2, NOx, VOC National Emissions Totals (thousands of tons)
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ing point B. This necessitates employing environmental protection measures 
which would reduce the emissions of the risky substance to signiﬁ cantly below 
the ‘business as usual’ level. 
O 
„SHADE ZONE” 
(unknown and/or irreversible 
environmental degradation) 
A C 
D 
B 
environmental impact 
ecological threshold 
per capita GDP 
Figure 3-19. Inverted parabola-shaped environmental Kuznets curve, where values near
the maximum environmental impact may have irreversible or unknown consequences.
This area is indicated by shading. (Munasinghe et al., 2006)
In an article, Munasinghe (1999) suggests that it is not always effective to 
wait to reach the downslope of the Kuznets curve, but the risky zone should, 
by way of some intervention, be avoided. A state similar to the ‘shade’ zone of 
the Kuznets curve may very often occur in reality. In Munashinge’s ﬁ gu-re (Fi-
gure 3-20.), Point C indicates the environment impact of a ‘developed country’, 
which, as should be clear, is already over the limit considered to be risky. Point 
B represents the environmental impact of an economy which has just started 
growing. Munashinge suggests that instead of waiting to arrive at Point E with 
the ‘help’ of economic development, it would be more effective to ﬁ nd a ‘tun-
nel’ to prevent environmental impact from even entering the high-risk zone. 
According to the authors, there is a fair chance that such tunnels can be found, 
because 
• some initiatives can be equally efﬁ cient from an economic and ecological 
perspective (double-dividend solutions),
• through different ex-ante tests, signiﬁ cant environmental risks may be 
prevented and avoided, ﬁ rst of all through the preparation and develop-
ment of a system of institutions,
• economic growth (involving the whole economy) may be ﬁ ne-tuned to 
avoid overshoot. 
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Figure 3-20. ‘Tunneling’ beneath the Kuznets curve (Munasinghe et al., 2006)
Such searching for tunnel is well exempliﬁ ed by the international efforts that 
have helped – hopefully still in time – to stop the disastrous depletion of the 
ozone layer, the expansion of deforestation caused by acid rains, the increase in 
low atmospheric concentrations of lead, and the accumulation of volatile organic 
contaminants in the atmosphere. In the past, the ozone layer started to deplete 
due to the use of halogenated volatile organic compounds, but in the Montreal 
Protocol the states of the world banned the use of freons, creating hope that the 
ozone layer will regenerate in the coming decades. Sulphur dioxide emissions 
are also regulated by international agreements which may have been made early 
enough to eliminate the threat of deforestation. Twenty years ago, tetraethyl-lead 
was commonly used for improving the compression tolerance of fuels, but later 
it turned out that lead released into the atmosphere damages brain function. 
Today the use of lead compounds is also regulated by international agreements; 
the issue of their replacement may be considered satisfactorily solved. 
A tunnel could also have been found regarding the emission of greenhouse 
gases, but science and politics have been in dispute about the issue and re-
lated warning signs for so long that tunnelling through is now too late. Devel-
oped countries have far exceeded the safe zone, and although many of them 
are now making signiﬁ cant efforts to cut down on the emission of greenhouse 
gases, due to the nature of the problem a climate disaster will be hard to avoid. 
For a few countries that have started on a steep path of growth – such as China and 
India – the problem is that the development trajectory ahead of them is still unknown, 
and while we know that the absolute concentration of greenhouse gases should be 
reduced in the atmosphere, there is no realistic prospect of this; all we can do is to 
slow the rate of growth. It is already certain that we are over the ‘safe limit’; the ques-
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tion is when (and whether) we will ever be able to reverse the trend to growth.
The correlation between development and the quality of the environment is 
contradictory. Quality characteristics such as potable water supply, sewage 
systems, etc. clearly improve with growth of per capita GDP. Easily externalis-
able environmental impacts such as per capita carbon dioxide emissions and 
volume of municipal waste grow together with GDP. While economic growth 
deﬁ nitely helps solve problems related to pollutants that damage human health 
and ecosystem in the short term, it seems that in spite of these partial solu-
tions, a deepening of the crisis with carbon dioxide and waste issues that 
cause global environmental impact is occurring.
Based on knowledge of the environmental Kuznets curves, politicians fre-
quently think that economic growth will also solve environmental problems. It is 
clear now that in the case of easily externalisable pollution whose provenance 
cannot be easily established (i.e., when it is hard to assign liability, such as with 
greenhouse gases, and many forms of waste), or contamination that causes irre-
versible degradation (e.g. the accumulation of heavy metals, stable organic con-
taminants, etc. due to the shade effect) further economic growth will not help. 
Political optimism about the omnipotence of economic growth is overshad-
owed by yet another contradiction regarding development. As can be seen in 
Figure 3-21., most of the world will not, even by 2030, reach the level of per 
capita GDP whereby the quality of environment should start improving. Accord-
ing to prognoses, the most developed countries in the world will reach and ex-
ceed a per capita rate of $50,000, while the world average may produce only 
$12,000 per person and Asia7 around $8000. Even if the future deepening of the 
North-South divide were socially and politically tolerable (although obviously it 
is not), the situation is certainly intolerable in an ecological-environmental sense. 
The ﬁ gures show that without a radical change in the conditions of distribution, 
squalor will remain permanent in the developing countries to such an extent 
that it will pose an obstacle to positive demographic and environmental change. 
Taking the delay caused by feedback into consideration, should this prediction 
come true we will most probably have to count on the occurrence of a disaster.
Unfortunately, for many politicians and mainstream economists sustainable 
development is typically perceived of as economic growth. There is some truth 
in the idea because GDP usually contains a decisive proportion of services (i.e., 
a decreasing proportion of GDP is generated by material assets). However, in 
the physical sense this decreasing proportion usually creates signiﬁ cant growth 
in pollution even with improvements in material and energy consumption and 
pollution emission indicators. In terms of humanity’s wasteful consumption hab-
7 In support of the reliability of these estimates, we note that a World Bank study in 
1990 forecast the per capita GDP of Asia for 2030 at only $1,000. A more recent 
estimate (2005) put the value at eight times this amount. The present data are values 
calculated at purchasing power parity.
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its, a habitable future Earth requires a break in consumption trends in developed
Figure 3-21. Estimated changes of per capita GDP between 2000 and 2030 in certain regions of
the world (USD) (author’s own compilaton based on Worldbank data)
countries above all. Unfortunately, little trace of willingness to make steps to-
wards this goal can be seen. Since the 1970s the world appears to have been 
making efforts to cut down on carbon dioxide emissions, but in reality per capita 
energy consumption has signiﬁ cantly grown (at different rates from country to 
country, but expressed in absolute ﬁ gures the growth of the per capita con-
sumption of developed countries is dominant). According to ‘normal’ ideas 
about development trends, energy consumption should at least have stabilised 
in these countries; moreover, due to improvements in the efﬁ ciency of energy 
use and having overcome the stage of extensive growth (infrastructure in such 
countries is now well developed) per capita energy consumption should have 
fallen. Regarding the average of the past twenty years, only Denmark, Canada, 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have approached this situation; and 
mainly only because their energy consumption was rather wasteful in the 1970s.
Figure 3-22. Development of per capita CO2 emissions in tonnes (y-axis) and per capita GDP in 
selected countries between 1995 and 2014 (author’s own compilaton based on Worldbank data)
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Figure 3-22. shows the development of per capita CO2 and per capita GDP 
in selected countries between 1995 and 2014. 
The ﬁ gures show clearly that per capita GDP has doubled, while per capita 
CO2 emissions have grown at a rate over the global average in the past twenty 
years in developing countries. The above illustration contains those countries 
in which per capita GDP was less than 10,000 USD in 1995, and no more than 
20,000 USD in 2014. The lengths of the arrows are nearly proportional to the 
growth of GDP. Some countries witnessed relatively large GDP growth while 
– unfortunately – CO2 emissions also rose. The economic growth of China, 
Mongolia, Malaysia and Kazakhstan is extremely energy intensive. Among the 
relatively favourable examples are Romania, Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland. These countries were able to grow their per capita GDP while 
their CO2 emissions signiﬁ cantly decreased. Chile, Turkey – and perhaps Brazil 
– also saw signiﬁ cant economic growth with limited CO2 emissions. However, 
the general picture is not encouraging because even those countries in which 
CO2 decreased, the phenomenon is new and the starting level of emissions 
was extremely high. Even today they have a far higher level of emissions than 
is desirable for their state of development.
3.12 Jevons Paradox and the rebound effect
According to the Jevons Paradox, improvements in energy efﬁ ciency should – 
using a historical example  – have resulted in a decrease in the demand for and 
use of coal, but did not. In his book (The Coal Question, 1865), William Stanley 
Jevons stated that, in contrast to expectations, an increase in the efﬁ ciency 
of the use of coal did not cause a drop but an increase in consumption (York, 
2006). The ﬁ rst steam engine (constructed by Thomas Newcomen and Thomas 
Saverey in 1712) worked at an energy efﬁ ciency rate of 1-2%, while the ﬁ rst 
versions of James Watt’s steam engines reached ﬁ ve times this level, or even 
more, and these improvements took as long as sixty years. If a steam engine 
works at an efﬁ ciency rate of 15% instead of 5%, this should decrease the con-
sumption of coal by one-third. However, the historical consumption of coal kept 
growing because the operation of high-efﬁ ciency steam engines was cheaper. 
The ﬁ rst steam engines were used in the vicinity of coal mines because they 
required such a signiﬁ cant amount of coal that their use elsewhere was unproﬁ -
table. The new steam engines, however, were installed in an increasing number 
of places. Steam boats and steam mills were built, and the use of steam en-
gines gained ground everywhere. This triggered the ﬁ rst Industrial Revolution. 
‘Consumption of the most common type of ofﬁ ce paper (uncoated free-
sheet) increased by 14.7% in the U.S. between the years 1995 and 2000 (Sel-
len and Harper 2003), embarrassing those who predicted the emergence of 
the paperless ofﬁ ce (Brundtland, 1987).’ Sellen and Harper (2002, p. 13) also 
 SUSTAINABILITY  81
point to research indicating that ‘the introduction of e-mail into an organization 
caused, on average, a 40% increase in paper consumption.’ This observation 
suggests that there may be a direct causal link between the rise of electronic 
data storage media and paper consumption, although further research is nec-
essary to ﬁ rmly establish the validity of this possible causal link. 
There is no need for further research to know that we are facing a paradox, but 
this is not hidden in the world of computers but rather in the world of printers and 
photocopiers, and increasing levels of mistrust. There has been dramatic growth in 
business transactions and forgeries, and since printing and copying are now com-
monplace, politics has taken another wrong turn by increasing administrative bu-
reaucracy. Causality has not been established between the use of e-mails and the 
increase in paper consumption. Moreover, another important reason for the increase 
in paper use in ofﬁ ces is the information explosion. We a rather facing what Keynes 
(Keynes, 1963) once called ‘the painfulness of readjustment between one economic 
period and another’. Due to the information explosion, electronic data-storage me-
dia begin to replace paper in ofﬁ ces, but only after at least a forty-year delay. Today 
it is no longer typical that everything is printed out. Should trust in economic admin-
istration improve, paper consumption would probably begin to scale down.
Back then, the coal mining industry considered improvements in the efﬁ -
ciency of steam engines a threat as it feared industrial competition. Today, 
improvements in eco-efﬁ ciency are partly the result of price competition. Eve-
rybody tries to sell their products more cheaply. This creates demand for new 
branches and services, and in this sense, plays an important role in economic 
growth. In some sense, this is also a paradox, because due to improvements 
in eco-efﬁ ciency the increase in GDP should slow, but it seems to be gain-
ing speed rather than slowing down. In environmental studies, the term re-
bound effect is used to describe the phenomenon that any savings made by 
an increase in eco-efﬁ ciency lead to an increase in consumption because the 
money that is saved is recycled to make purchases in other ﬁ elds. Increases 
in eco-efﬁ ciency could have a favourable impact on GDP growth if the savings 
made therefrom were spent on structural development.
In his study on the Steady State Economy, Herman Daly (Daly, 1974) points 
out that unlimited economic growth is impossible on a limited Earth. In the past 
century, economic growth has been realised at a rate that, regarding Earth’s 
limited resources, cannot be continued. Another path is available, however 
(see also Grossman and Krueger’s /1995/ argument earlier in the Chapter 
about ‘the effect of economic growth on environment pollution’). Structural 
economic growth could help create opportunities for those who are currently 
excluded from income-generation activity (the unemployed) and provide them 
with purchasing power on the market. This proposal is in close harmony with 
the ideas of Grossmann, and what Weizsäcker and Lovins (Hawken, Lovins, & 
Lovins, 1999) call the shift from a ‘stock’ economy to a ‘ﬂ ow’ economy. 
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Countries with low raw material consumption per capita have signiﬁ cantly di-
minished their good environmental performance in the past two decades (this 
list also includes fairly opulent countries). Countries that have achieved fast eco-
nomic growth (like Finland and Singapore) have done so through the large-scale 
consumption of raw materials and resources. There are, however, developed 
countries, which have managed to generate wealth at a relatively low level of 
per capita resource consumption. Finland, supposedly an environmental ‘role-
model’, has a per capita resource consumption more than double that of Italy, 
which is considered to be lagging behind in environmental matters. 
Regarding these ﬁ gures, and accepting the premises of macro-economics that 
economic growth is a necessary condition for the accumulation of wealth, a ma-
jor question arises: what type of economic growth causes the least damage to 
the natural environment, or rather serves the goals of sustainable development? 
Ecological economists and scientists (Vida, 2012) deny the existence of such a 
positive outcome of economic growth. However, there is a concept of economic 
growth that supports sustainable development that we may call ‘structural eco-
nomic growth’. Eco-efﬁ ciency may be increased in a way that supports the divi-
sion of labour within society. Supported by such an increase, the consumption 
of services in the economy would signiﬁ cantly develop at the expense of mate-
rial consumption, which would mean the replacement of a stock economy with 
a ﬂ ow economy. Instead of buying washing machines, refrigerators, and kitchen 
equipment, individuals would buy clean clothes from the laundry and eat out in 
restaurants. We would hire specialists, rather than do it ourselves at home. Spe-
cialists equipped with professional tools would clean our homes. This approach 
would create economic growth because due to the division of labour we would 
pay for these services, but instead of spending our money on buying washing 
machines, we would only need to settle our laundry bills. These days, television 
sets replicate the feeling of being at the movies, but we could just go to the 
movies and 400 of us could watch one ﬁ lm on one ‘set’. High-income individuals 
can afford home movies because the necessary technology has become cheap 
enough. A television set that meets nearly all needs, providing 3D-quality imag-
es, only costs three hundred thousand forints. The price of cinema tickets is now 
multiples of that of hiring a ﬁ lm on DVD. ‘Technology’ is cheaper, while the cost 
of services is growing, largely due to wage increases. However, such up-to-date 
technology (a modern TV, for example) may consume 150 watts of energy ‘in the 
background’. According to careful estimates, this means that while we watch 
TV, at least two strapping ‘energy-slaves’ are required to provide us with power 
(How Many Energy Slaves Do We Employ?, 2012). Each energy-slave is capable 
of providing power for a 75 W light bulb. Thus if we leave a 75 W bulb on, one, 
and if we go to sleep in front of the TV, two slaves will be doing unnecessary 
work (Grossman & Krueger, 1995). It is easy to realise how the environmental 
impact of the change in our entertainment behaviours has changed just over 
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the past ﬁ ve years. The energy consumption per capita of a movie projector is 
nothing in comparison with the consumption of an individual watching TV alone.
3.13 The sustainability of public defi cits
Not only are developing countries indebted, but often developed ones too. Bor-
rowing often stimulates the economy, but when excessive may endanger a coun-
try’s budget. Poorly spent credit imposes a burden on the economy such that a 
state cannot fulﬁ l its basic functions. These basic functions are to provide public 
goods such as a clean environment, adequate education or good health care. In 
this chapter, therefore, we deal with the sustainability of budgetary public deﬁ cits.
The sustainability of ﬁ scal policy has already been addressed by the classic 
authors of economic texts. Their primary concern was investigating the role that 
public deﬁ cit plays in ﬁ nancing public expenditure. After examining the distribu-
tion of public deﬁ cit among generations, Ricardo proposed (but was not a be-
liever of) the invariance theorem of public deﬁ cit (Barro, 1988). Keynes argued for 
the need for a deﬁ cit to ensure full employment, and proposed that public deﬁ cit 
should be a burden on the shoulders of the generation that has created it. Ac-
cording to Keynes, the borrowing generation pays the opportunity cost incurred 
by ﬁ nancing a deﬁ cit, as the latter merely involves a transfer between taxpayers 
and asset holders, provided that the securities remain within the borders of the 
country concerned. This is expressed in the classic phrase, ‘we owe the public 
debt to ourselves’ (Krejdl–Banka, 2006). Today it is no longer the norm that in-
dividual countries ﬁ nance their expenditures internally; however, we also know 
that there are countries (such as Japan) where Keynesian conditions prevail, and 
there is also a welcome tendency in Hungary for domestic buyers of government 
securities to ﬁ nance an increasing share of the public deﬁ cit.
Others, including Barro (1979) and Neck–Sturm (2008, p. 7), have analysed 
the tax-smoothing effects of debt, and ﬁ nd that in certain circumstances public 
deﬁ cits can improve welfare. (Krejdl–Banka, 2006) 
Some researchers from the ﬁ eld of ﬁ nance and accounting perceive a funda-
mental conﬂ ict between international ﬁ nancial capitalism and sustainability. Gray 
writes the following: ‘At the core of accounting and ﬁ nance is a truly fundamen-
tal conﬂ ict between sustainability and modern international ﬁ nancial capitalism. 
Our choices between these are likely to be a great deal more than matters of 
methodological nicety or intellectual convenience. Social and environmental ac-
counting and ﬁ nance offer a way to recover a moral and productive accounting 
and ﬁ nance that places survival of the species at its very heart’ (Gray, 2002).
However, ﬁ nancial bureaucracy uses the term ‘sustainability’ to mean some-
thing completely different from what Gray refers to in the above passage con-
cerning the chances that species will survive. For economists, including ﬁ -
nancial professionals, sustainability means something similar to what Dolenc 
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deﬁ nes in the following: ‘It is broadly accepted that Maastricht ﬁ scal criterium 
[sic] is connected with long-term public ﬁ nance’s sustainability and that coun-
tries […] fulﬁ lling these criteria […] cannot get into public ﬁ nances difﬁ culties: 
their public ﬁ nances are therefore ‘healthy’. (Dolenc, 2006)
A general consensus exists in the profession that the funding of public ﬁ -
nances is sustainable as long as there are no major changes in the ratio of debt 
to budgetary revenues. Sustainability is not deﬁ ned simply as the capability of a 
country to maintain its solvency, but also its willingness to fulﬁ l its debt-servicing 
obligations. It is also generally agreed that it is better for a country to ﬁ nance 
its debt by borrowing than by relinquishing control of inﬂ ation, which is com-
monly done by means of printing money. Nevertheless, if a country allows the 
stable growth of public debt, it can get caught in a trap, which can sooner or 
later render it incapable of servicing its public debt obligations (Dolenc, 2006). It 
might be relevant to note that in the literature (e.g. Sorci, n.d.) this state of affairs 
is referred to as a Ponzi trap. The term dates back to 1920, when private inves-
tor Charles Ponzi gained notoriety for running what is called a pyramid scheme 
today. Ponzi deceived the market by offering an investment opportunity that 
promised a proﬁ t of 50% in 90 days when banks paid only 5% on deposits. He 
lured a large number of people to join his venture in the postage coupon trade. 
He paid high returns to the ﬁ rst few investors, which enticed them as well as 
others to purchase additional coupons. The cycle ended when he quit the ‘busi-
ness’, scooping up large proﬁ ts. Curiously, this style of investment keeps recur-
ring, and many modern  Ponzi traps are set up as projects associated with the 
environmental features of sustainable development. Today’s ‘cheats’ arrange for 
high-yield ‘investments’ into afforestation, goat farming, biofuel production, and 
other ventures.
In a paper published in 1984, McCallum makes an implicit attempt to deter-
mine the optimal level of indebtedness, and demonstrates that, to be sustain-
able, the long-term public debt-to-GDP ratio should not exceed the nominal 
interest rate paid on public debt (Dolenc, 2006).
Researchers have widely proposed that the optimal level of public debt is 
determined by using the following macroeconomic equation commonly re-
ferred to as the dynamic budget constraint of a country (Dolenc, 2006) (Blan-
chard–Chouraqui, Hagemann–Sartor, 1991).
dB
ds        = G + H – T + i  B,  
.
where
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G is the government’s purchases of goods and services at nominal value,
H is the value of transfers (stipends, social security, etc.),
T is the value of tax revenues collected, and
i . B is interest paid on public debt (Dolenc, 2006, p. 270)
The sum of government purchases and transfers less tax revenues is com-
monly referred to as primary deﬁ cit, and is denoted by D (Blanchard et al., 1991).
As the use of precise ﬁ gures would make the equation difﬁ cult to apply, in 
practice there is a preference for expressing government spending and revenues 
as proportions of GNP. Each of the terms in the equation may be expressed as a 
proportion of GNP, whereby the equation can be written as follows.
 (Blanchard et al., 1991, p. 10)
where
Θ is the real growth rate of GNP, and
r is the ex-post real rate of interest (i – π, where π is the inﬂ ation rate). 
The equation shows that the sustainability of the budget depends on two 
factors. The ﬁ rst, derived by combining the three terms reﬂ ecting rules for ex-
penditures, transfers and taxes applicable in the year concerned, is referred to 
as primary deﬁ cit. The second factor is determined by legacy issues such as 
the proportion of debt that has accumulated in the past to GNP, and the differ-
ence between the real interest rate and the real growth rate. If this difference 
is positive, a primary surplus is needed to maintain a constant ratio of debt to 
GNP. (Blanchard et al., 1991, p. 11)
Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1992) contains 
provisions on the coordination of economic policies, and Article 109j sets out 
the qualiﬁ cation criteria for participation in the euro zone. The two key qualiﬁ -
cation criteria are the following: (1) the ratio of government debt to GDP must 
not exceed 60%, and (2) the government deﬁ cit to GDP must not exceed 3%. 
The two criteria have attracted signiﬁ cant criticism since the very beginning. In 
effect, the 60% was equal to the average indebtedness of euro area Member 
States; i.e., the criterion was not met by all Member States. A number of theo-
retical critiques have demonstrated that the ﬁ rst criterion was unreasonable. 
The ﬁ rst criterion was therefore eased, and now it considered sufﬁ cient that 
the rate of indebtedness should not exceed the benchmark applicable to the 
country concerned. The most powerful argument against the original criteria 
was put forward by Italian economist Pasinetti (1998), who demonstrated that 
problems may arise from the dynamics of indebtedness rather than its actual 
rate. When the rate of indebtedness decreases or remains constant over time, 
this is considered to be a sustainable state of affairs:
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where
B is the country’s outstanding debt
Y is the country’s GDP,
S is the number of years,
0 is the reference year.
The concept of prospective sustainability is concerned with policies that should 
be implemented to eliminate the need for any additional future adjustments (Krejdl– 
Banka, 2006, p. 10). It is obvious that, apart from the rate of economic growth 
and interest rates, indebtedness today is also inﬂ uenced by other unexpected 
risk factors. This has made the sustainable rate of indebtedness extremely com-
plicated to determine. Whether directly or indirectly, the sustainability of the 
budget affects all three features (natural, social and economic) of sustainable de-
velopment. When a country is highly indebted, the debt trap prevents resources 
from being allocated either to addressing social issues or to the conservation of 
natural assets. When indebtedness is ﬁ nanced by foreign investors, there is little 
point in fostering economic growth as most the beneﬁ ts of this must be commit-
ted to making interest payments. The economy may be capable of producing 
the resources needed to service debt, but it will not necessarily be capable of 
producing the resources required to resolve social tension and to compensate 
for the amortisation of natural assets. There is a vast body of ﬁ nancial literature 
about ﬁ scal sustainability, covering virtually every aspect of the subject.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS
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4. The economics of natural resources
4.1 Introduction
A variety of ways of classifying natural resource are known about. In this chap-
ter, we do not follow the classiﬁ cation used in earth sciences but we classify 
natural resources on an economic basis. For an economist, the scarcity of nat-
ural resources does not depend on the concentration of element in the earth’s 
crust. We are more interested in knowledge of natural resource markets. As we 
will see, resource exhaustion and scarcity are not necessarily a problem. For 
us, the most interesting questions involve the cost of access or the security of 
access to natural resources. In the case of renewable resources, overuse is a 
market issue as well. Overﬁ shing of the seas or the sustainable use of a lake is 
one matter for scientists but a totally different one for economists. In this chap-
ter, we describe the theoretical underpinning of these issues.
4.2 The concept and signifi cance of biodiversity
‘A community of co-existing and largely interdependent living beings creates 
an ecosystem with the elements of the inanimate environment. Ecosystem 
takes its deﬁ nition within arbitrary limits. A particular part of space like a cer-
tain type of forest, its constituting species and the interacting inanimate phys-
ical-chemical environmental factors (e.g. air, soil, bedrock, the composition of 
solutions, sunlight, temperature, humidity, etc.) are analysed, and the effects 
arriving from outside an arbitrary limit are evaluated as external input and out-
put factors. The narrower the limits are drawn around the system, the more 
signiﬁ cant the role of the factors will be. Reversing this, i.e., maximum possible 
expansion of the system, we shall arrive at the great global ecosystem encom-
passing the whole planet. An interesting and important characteristic feature 
of this is that its energy input-output balance is nearly zero (the difference be-
tween the energy arriving from the Sun and the heat emanated to space), and 
its material movements create a close cycle.’ (Vida, 2012)
Biodiversity is the variety of wildlife. The term may be interpreted on several 
levels: it can mean the variety of habitats found on Earth, the totality of spe-
cies, or genetic diversity within a species, but it is also applicable to smaller 
areas (e.g. the biodiversity of the Carpathian basin, or even a garden pond).
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Biodiversity, biological variety: live nature’s inherent form of existence ex-
pressed at several levels of biological organisation. The ﬁ nal form of the im-
mense variety of living beings is the mutation of genes. The genetic diver-
sity of a species – be it a bacterium, alga, animal or ﬂ owery plant – shows 
itself in the variety of its individuals grouped into populations. Communities 
organised from populations of different species constitute the next level of 
~ . On every previous and further organisational level (thus within a com-
munity complex, a landscape, a biome and ﬁ nally the biosphere) we can 
deﬁ ne the elements the number of which numerically express ~ (diversity). 
Through its components, ~ is exposed to constant change: creation, mu-
tation, destruction. This is the dynamics of biodiversity. Fossils indicate 
that most species are evanescent and over 95% of all species that ever 
existed are now extinct (extinction). The average life span of a fossil spe-
cies (extinct mammals, marine invertebrates) is between 1 and 10 million 
years. There are a number of different mechanisms of the formation of new 
species. This process – speciation – has three typical phases: it may start 
with an existing species, involve genetic mutation, or be due to the strong 
inﬂ uence of ecological factors. Phylogeny shows that speciation does not 
progress at an even speed: at times rapid multiplication occurs in totally 
different taxonomic groups. Extinction is the opposite process. Its rate is 
accelerating these days; there are a variety of reasons, but ultimately it is 
due to growth in the human population. Extinction may refer to the species 
itself (that is, all of its populations) or only certain ranges (local extinction). 
The extinction of 2-24% of groups of butterﬂ ies, birds and mammals in the 
British Isles and the Netherlands have been documented. As for plants, 
those species are considered extinct that have not been seen in the past 50 
years. Plants re-discovered in the past ten years are called missing (extinct 
plant species). Vegetative units are not constant in space, either; they re-
versibly or irreversibly transform due to exposure to successive or deterio-
rative processes triggered by different effects. The basic components of all 
ecosystems are the species representing different trophic levels and which 
appear in great numbers (trophic structure in the ecosystem). The ecologi-
cal signiﬁ cance of ~ is indicated by the fact that any loss of species is to the 
detriment of the system. Decreases in genetic variability within populations 
reduces ﬂ exibility, which helps the given species adapt to changes in its 
environment. The loss of species (but also the appearance of new ones) 
may have a signiﬁ cant effect on the operation of the ecosystem. Each spe-
cies plays a deﬁ nite role in the operation of the ecosystem (ﬁ xing nitrogen, 
absorbing water, etc.); their disappearance therefore affects its functioning. 
There is evidence that there is a positive correlation between the regenera-
tive ability of an ecosystem – e.g. ability to withstand an extreme climatic 
event – and the number of species. The fragmentation and disturbance 
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of vegetation has a strong inﬂ uence on how it operates because, for ex-
ample, these effects may cause the balance of existing species to shift: 
large, long-living species will be replaced by smaller, shorter-living ones. 
This will have effects such as – for example – diminishing the system’s food 
storage capability. The simpliﬁ cations through which high-yield agricultural 
crop systems with few or single species (monocultures) are created leads 
to spectacular declines in the stability of the ecosystems, which can only 
be corrected with additional nutrient input and pesticides. In a more or less 
climatically, geologically integrated geographical space, the units of veg-
etation and communities appear repetitively (and sometimes in community 
complexes). A lowland landscape (e.g. the sandy region between the rivers 
Danube and Tisza) is a mosaic of wooded steppe-oak residues, dry scrubs, 
sandy grasslands, steppe meadow fragments, desiccating dunes of one-
day fens combined with occasional vineyards and orchards. The communi-
ties within the landscape are not independent: the relationship established 
among them is partly due to ~ , because stocks that frequently meet trigger 
species exchanges and propagulum ﬂ ow (or matter exchange and energy 
transfer among ecosystems). The total of related landscapes (practically 
vegetation landscapes) constitute biomes. As the elements of ~ are con-
stituted by species composed of different numbers of individuals, the veg-
etation landscape is constituted by communities that appear in different 
dimensions and weights. This is landscape-level biodiversity. (Láng, 2002)
Figure 4-1. Estimated biodiversity in different taxonomic classes of organisms (source: https://www.
slideshare.net/chemsant/biodiversity-16315413’ (accessed on 02/09/2018))
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As Figure 4-1. illustrates, insects and higher plants are of greatest diversity, 
but the ﬁ gure also indicates that only a minimal fraction of bacteria and viruses 
species are yet known.
Certain habitats – like wetlands – have very high biodiversity, while the diver-
sity of other habitats – like deserts – is typically very low. The biodiversity of an 
island is usually proportionate to the size of the island. Roads cut ecosystems 
into ‘islands’, decreasing total biodiversity. 
The signiﬁ cance of biodiversity is shown in Table 4-1., which classiﬁ es eco-
system services. 
Provisioning services Regulating Cultural services
Ecosystem Products
Beneﬁ ts generated by the 
regulation of processes 
going on in ecosystems
Nonmaterial beneﬁ ts of 
ecosystems
• Food
• Fresh water
• Fibres
• Biochemicals
• Genetic resources 
• Climate control
• Disease control
• Water control
• Water puriﬁ cation
• Pollination 
• Spiritual and religious
• Recreation and
eco-tourism
• Aesthetic
• Inspiration
• Educational
• Location detection
• Cultural heritage 
Supporting services
Services necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services
• Biological diversity 
maintenance • Nutrient recycling • Primary productivity
Table 4-1. The classiﬁ cation of ecosystem services (See also Table 4-11.)
The biomass produced by ecosystems provides us with food, while the con-
trol services of ecosystems are also indispensable. The micro climate that ex-
ists in a forest plays a role in creating rain. Bees are of immense beneﬁ t to 
humans through their honey-producing as well as pollination activities. Most 
of our medicines are also ‘produced’ by wildlife. No human life could exist 
without ecosystem services.
 ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS  93
4.3 The concept of natural resources
For the purposes of this chapter, a broad deﬁ nition of natural resources is 
used. The mineral resources and fossil fuels found in the Earth’s crust are natu-
ral resources that are of equal importance to the potential for development of 
new living creatures or the capability of the environment to receive, absorb and 
neutralise pollutants. 
Natural resources: resources available for a given community at a given 
time or in a given period which are either entirely independent of volun-
tary human activity, or their existence inseparably and decisively depends 
on natural factors. According to their physical qualities they fall into two 
categories: non-exhaustible and exhaustible. Solar and wind power be-
long to the ﬁ rst, while mineral resources and forests to the second cat-
egory. Exhaustible resources can also be classiﬁ ed into two groups: re-
newable and non-renewable, the former exempliﬁ ed by forests, and the 
latter by mineral oil stocks. An important difference from an economic 
perspective is that part of the non-reproducible ~ is of limited availability 
(soil), while another part has abundant availability (air). That is to say, in 
the ﬁ rst case ownership rights are well deﬁ nable and a fee may be paid 
for their use, while the latter fall into the category of public assets, which 
are traditionally to be considered as gratis gifts of nature. (Láng, 2002)
Natural resources may be classiﬁ ed in a number of ways. For the sake of 
simplicity, a distinction should essentially be made between two groups, as 
shown in Table 4-2., although in many cases the classiﬁ cation will not be un-
ambiguous. For instance, both water and air may be classiﬁ ed as either stock- 
or ﬂ ow-type resources.
Classiﬁ cation of natural resources
• Non-renewable (exhaustible) 
natural resources
• fossil fuels
• other mineral resources
• Renewable natural resources
– Stock type
• living biomass
     (ﬁ sh, forest, pasture, etc.)
• arable land
• water system and 
     atmosphere
– Flow type
• sunlight, wind, geothermal 
energy
Table 4-2. Classiﬁ cation of natural resources (author’s own compilation)
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A rather wide range of natural resources have no markets, and therefore no 
price can be attached to them. Such resources include, for example, clean air, 
stratospheric ozone, etc. For the purpose of economics, what matters is their 
signiﬁ cance in terms of production and consumption.
4.4 Overuse of public goods: ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’
In an economic sense, environmental problems arise when resources are allo-
cated inefﬁ ciently, i.e., when they are not used at the time and for the purpose 
they should be. In a neoclassical approach, and in terms of Pareto optimality, 
this means that resource use is efﬁ cient when it maximises the welfare func-
tion of society. However, efﬁ cient use is only one prerequisite for avoiding en-
vironmental problems, the other being that we should not bequeath to future 
generations worse conditions than those available to us now.
Generally, market economies meet efﬁ ciency criterion through the ex-
change of property. For this to work, efﬁ cient ownership structures are re-
quired. The requirements for an efﬁ cient structure of ownership are the fol-
lowing:
1. The ﬁ rst requirement is universality. Private ownership of resources exists 
when all rights are fully speciﬁ ed.
2. The second requirement is exclusivity, which assumes that all the beneﬁ ts 
and costs associated with the ownership and use of a resource exclu-
sively inﬂ uence the owner’s welfare (wealth).
3. The third requirement is transferability, i.e., that the owner should be 
granted the possibility to transfer title to property freely. 
4. Finally, efﬁ cient ownership structure requires enforceability, i.e., that title 
should be protected against forceful appropriation.
As long as the above criteria are met for property, the laws of the market 
will ensure that property works efﬁ ciently, because they will make the owner 
interested in selling property to a party that can derive greater beneﬁ t from it.
However, what happens if title to property is not speciﬁ ed; if, for example, a 
pasture or a ﬁ sh pond is part of the village commons, or, from a rather broad 
perspective, what about public goods such as oceans, the atmosphere of the 
Earth, etc.?
A highly illustrative answer to this question is provided by G. Hardin, whose 
arguments are accurately rendered by Elemér Hankiss. For the sake of simplic-
ity, the following is cited from Hankiss’ book, Social Traps:
In 1968, Science carried Garrett Hardin’s paper, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, which attracted plenty of attention. Hardin the biologist regarded the 
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apparently inevitable population explosion as one of the greatest ‘social dilem-
mas’ of our age, and used an example taken from a 19th century mathematician 
for his analysis of the mechanism he deemed fatal (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968).
Suppose the existence of a commons on which, according to the traditions 
established in the village, one cow is grazed by each of the ten resident farm-
ers. For the sake of simplicity, assume that each of the cows grazed here 
weighs 1,000 pounds, i.e., collectively they weigh 10,000 pounds. One day, 
one of the farmers is struck by the idea that in order to double his proﬁ ts, he 
might as well turn another cow out to grass. (For the moment, let us disregard 
the fact that in historical reality, this did not lead the community to abandon 
the institution of the commons.) At this point, then, eleven cows are grazed 
on the commons. However, since in the new arrangement each of the cows 
can graze slightly less grass, each will be reach up to 900 pounds in weight 
instead of 1,000. On balance, the farmer with two cows will gain 800 pounds 
(having two 900-pound cows instead of a single 1,000-pound cow), whereas 
the rest of the farmers will lose 100 pounds each. Collectively, they will lose 
100 pounds each, because eleven 900-pound cows weigh only 9,900 pounds 
instead of the original 10,000 pounds. That is still not a big deal. But what if 
another farmer, and yet another, and yet others, and ﬁ nally all of them are to 
reckon that they should each turn another cow out to grass to double their 
proﬁ ts. If each new cow were to reduce the weight of each of the other cows 
by 100 pounds, the process would be as shown in Table 4-3.
What conclusion can be read from this table, and what is suggested by the 
above example?
• As long as each farmer adheres to the established rules of coexistence, 
or using a technical term, each follows a cooperative strategy, the collec-
tive returns of the community will be the highest (10,000 pounds).
• The more of them violate the established rules of coexistence (i.e., the 
more of them follow a deserting strategy), the lower the collective returns 
of the community will be (decreasing from 10,000 pounds to 0 in the end).
• The more farmers desert, the lower the collective returns of the remain-
ing cooperative farmers with a single cow each (decreasing from 10,000 
pounds to 0).
• The more farmers desert, the lower the returns of each of the deserters 
(decreasing from 1,800 pounds to 0). Moreover, the decrease will be so 
fast that although it would still be worthwhile for four farmers to desert 
because each would then earn 1,200 pounds instead of 1,000, desertion 
would not be worth it for ﬁ ve farmers, because each would have two 
cows weighing only the same as the initial one (1,000 pounds).
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Number of 
cows
Weight of 
one cow
Collective 
weight of 
two cows 
owned by 
a single 
owner
Gains of 
each farmer 
turning out 
a second 
cow
Total weight 
of cows
Loss of total 
weight
10 1,000 0 - 10,000 0
11 900 1,800 800 9,900 100
12 800 1,600 600 9,600 400
13 700 1,400 400 9,100 900
14 600 1,200 200 8,400 1,600
15 500 1,000 0 7,500 2,500
16 400 800 -200 6,400 3,600
17 300 600 -400 5,100 4,900
18 200 400 -600 3,600 6,400
19 100 200 -800 1,900 8,100
20 0 0 -1,000 0 10,000
Table 4-3. The tragedy of the commons (described by Hankiss, 1983, p. 24) 
• However, once desertions have started, will they stop after the fourth 
farmer? They will not. And that is because although the ﬁ fth farmer may 
not gain anything compared to the original 1,000 pounds, he will deﬁ nitely 
be better off compared to his current state. Namely, once the ﬁ rst four 
farmers have deserted, the ﬁ fth farmer’s own cow can only reach 600 
pounds in weight, but if he also were to turn out another cow, he would 
have two 500-pound cows, i.e., 1,000 pounds in total. He will thus turn out 
a second cow. And the next farmer will follow suit, because he too may 
gain 500 pounds with one cow, and 800 pounds with two, and so on until 
the ninth farmer, who, as can be seen from the table, will gain nothing by 
turning out a second cow because, just like the rest of the deserters, he 
will have two 100-pound cows instead of a single 200-pound one.
• What happens then? One possibility is that the chain reaction of deser-
tions will run its full course and will lead to the destruction of the com-
mons, whereby twenty cows will all starve to death and the pursuit of 
individual gain will result in a 100% loss for each farmer.
And the other option? This involves creating a strategy of cooperation or 
enforcing it (e.g. through state intervention, or, as we have seen in the forego-
ing, the establishment of an efﬁ cient structure of ownership). In this case, the 
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market will ensure efﬁ cient resource use. Historically, with village commons 
the latter option was pursued: the commons were abandoned and transferred 
into private ownership, with the social consequence that some farmers were 
reduced to poverty.
4.5 Non-renewable (exhaustible) natural resources
4.5.1 Stocks of non-renewable (exhaustible) natural resources
With exhaustible resources such as coal, mineral oil or ores, the question aris-
es whether they should be used now, or they should be reserved for future 
use. More speciﬁ cally, the question is whether a particular exhaustible natural 
resource should be put to economic use at all, and if so, at what rate.
Figure 4-2. A categorization of resources
(U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1976, Wolfbauer, 1977, Tietenberg, 1992, p. 127)
As shown in Figure 4-2., not all mineral resources have been identiﬁ ed, and 
even the identiﬁ ed part comprises reserves only to the extent that they can 
be recovered and processed economically at a given level of development. In 
practice, this means that the volume of mineral resources may be estimated 
roughly from the frequency of speciﬁ c elements on Earth, i.e., that scientists 
can determine the types of rock in which, for example, mineral oil, mineral 
coal, iron ore or other economically important mineral resources may have 
been formed during the history of the Earth, and where such resources may 
be found today. However, whether a particular mineral resource is actually part 
of pre-existing reserves depends on the level of technological development, 
transport conditions, and in some cases even international diplomacy.
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For example, at the level of technological development at the turn of the 
twentieth century, copper ore needed to contain about 6% copper in order 
to be suitable for use. Today, ﬂ oatation technology enables the economical 
processing of ores with a copper content of less than 0.5%.
If prices on the world market are high, reserves will increase. With aluminium, 
for example, at above a certain price level thermal processes may also become 
economically viable, in addition to electrolytic reduction, making even bauxites 
with relatively low aluminium content economically suitable for processing (i.e., 
making them part of reserves).
Occasionally, armed conﬂ ict and political tension also inﬂ uence the acces-
sibility of raw materials, and therefore the size of the reserve. The reserve is the 
part of mineral resources which, given prevailing technological and economic 
conditions, is of positive in-situ value, i.e., the gains from its use are also suf-
ﬁ cient to cover mining royalties, as discussed earlier. With all the foregoing 
taken into account, it becomes clearer why forecasts are so inaccurate at pre-
dicting the scarcity of exhaustible natural resources.
In 1949, the geologist Dr. Marion King Hubbert produced an estimate for US min-
eral oil production (Fig. 4-3). The bell curve initially rises sharply to reach a distinct 
maximum, referred to as the Hubbert peak, with production subsequently declining. 
Figure 4-3. Hubbert’s Curves Describing World Oil Production under Two Assumptions about total 
world oil reserves (Hubbert, 1956)
The initial sharp rise is due to the fact that ﬁ elds are discovered rapidly, 
and initially production is concentrated in those areas where extraction is sim-
ple. When approximately one-half of the total reserve has been extracted, a 
progressively lower number of new ﬁ elds will be discovered, and extraction 
will become increasingly difﬁ cult. Production declines and its cost increases. 
Older wells will become depleted. The cycle that captures this initial exponen-
tial rise – the peak and the subsequent decline – is referred to as the Hubbert 
cycle. The size of the world’s mineral oil reserve was initially estimated at 1.35 
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trillion barrels. According to a more recent estimate, the size of the reserve is 
now about 2.1 trillion barrels. However, even with such a signiﬁ cant difference, 
the Hubbert peak has been postponed by a mere 10 years from 1990 to 2000. 
Since the mineral oil reserve is represented as the area under the curve, a rela-
tively minor change in the time axis near the peak will understandably lead to 
a major change in production. Based on the Hubbert curve, with reasonable 
approximation the oil era is deﬁ nitely expected to end around 2050.
As shown in Figure 4-4., production readings are closely aligned with the 
calculated Hubbert curve. Although as a result of the ﬁ rst oil price shock in 
1973 production dropped temporarily, after some years it returned to a course 
that is still considered to ﬁ t the curve.
Figure 4-4. Hubbert’s Curves for World liquids production (Clark, 2003)
Due to rising prices resulting from the enormous demand for mineral oil, in 
addition to conventional mineral oil the products of secondary extraction tech-
nologies and other products (shale oil, heavy oils, etc.) have also entered the 
market. However, not even the appearance of these non-conventional prod-
ucts will bring about a meaningful change in the situation, and in around 2050 
we will witness the end of the era of mineral oil.
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4.5.2 The optimal use of exhaustible natural resources
Exhaustible natural resources are different from ordinary assets in that they are 
available in limited quantities, and they cannot be reproduced. As a result, the 
production and use of a unit of a non-renewable resource is associated with 
an opportunity cost, which is equivalent to the value that could be obtained 
should the resource not be used now (only at a later point in time).
In determining the rate of use of an exhaustible natural resource, this oppor-
tunity cost must also be taken into account; that is, in order for the use of the 
exhaustible natural resource to be considered optimal, its price should cover 
both the marginal cost of production and the opportunity cost.
As seen in Figure 4-5., the conventional efﬁ ciency criterion that price = mar-
ginal cost of production will, for exhaustible natural resources, become price = 
marginal cost of production + opportunity cost. Figure 4-5. also shows that the 
use of an exhaustible resource is considered optimal if its current rate of produc-
tion is lower compared to what would be optimal for its reproducible equivalent.
In order to ensure that the resource is optimally distributed in time, rather 
than producing a volume of y**, the entrepreneur must incorporate a positive 
difference of AB between price and production costs, and limit the volume 
of production to y*. AB is commonly referred to as rent, marginal proﬁ t, roy-
alty, etc. In order to ensure that the use of an exhaustible resource is indeed 
optimal, the level of AB (royalty) must be constant over time. In practice, this 
means that the royalty must increase by some percentage corresponding to 
the interest on capital over time; i.e., it is the discounted royalty value that 
should remain constant.
Figure 4-5. Use of exhaustible natural resources (Fisher, 1981, p. 13)
 ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS  101
The change in an exhaustible natural resource over time can also be written as 
a formula. As stated above, the royalty will increase in alignment with the inter-
est rate if the marginal cost of production is assumed to be constant. In such 
a case, the royalty for the next period may be described as:
(P1 – MC) = (P0 – MC) * (1 + r)
from which the price for the next period is
P1 = MC + (P0 – MC) * (1 + r)
or generally for period t
Pt = MC + (P0 – MC) * (1 + r)t 
The formula might suggest that the price of a unit of an exhaustible resource 
will increase steadily over time. In fact, this is not so; ﬁ rst, as shown in Figure 
4-5., at a certain price demand is reduced to zero, and second, substitutes 
(other resources or technologies) often exist which are suitable for the same 
purpose, and may even be cheaper. In the case of mineral oil or natural gas, 
possible substitutes include coal, nuclear energy, and solar energy. That is, at 
a certain price level the economy will revert to a substitute (backstop) resource 
or technology.
Of course, in reality the situation is more complex, since each natural re-
source tends to be used for multiple purposes. As a result, a number of options 
for substitution may exist, each with their corresponding price. For example, 
apart from being used in energy production, mineral oil is also used in the 
chemical industry, and in the ﬁ eld of energy the substitution options are dif-
ferent than those for transport and for industrial heating. Obviously, its use 
in the chemical industry may come at a higher price than its use for energy 
purposes, etc.
The foregoing material has involved a relatively simpliﬁ ed discussion of the 
problem. The interested reader will ﬁ nd full details in the literature.
4.6 Renewable resources and their optimal use
It is rather difﬁ cult to deﬁ ne a clear borderline between renewable and ex-
haustible resources, or at least the conceptual limitations are hard to deﬁ ne. 
‘Renewable’ resources such as forests or the ﬁ sh population of a lake may in 
fact become exhausted, and in some cases ‘exhaustible’ natural resources 
may become renewable if technological development is taken into account. 
The situation is exempliﬁ ed by copper, of which a temporary surplus has now 
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accumulated due to the widespread use of glass ﬁ bre. There are also other 
examples where, as a combined result of waste recycling and technological 
development, solutions have emerged that virtually eliminate the need for ad-
ditional primary raw materials for supporting the functioning of the economy. 
We have approximated such a situation in the case of platinum and lead. With 
other raw materials, the latest technologies enable the processing of ores at 
a concentration that the rocks that contain them would previously have been 
considered ‘dead’ (i.e., without value).
While major progress has been made in decelerating the exhaustion of re-
sources that are conventionally considered exhaustible, in a peculiar way the 
renewability of resources otherwise considered renewable, such as rain forests 
and biological diversity, is now seen as compromised. This is more dangerous 
than, for example, a shortage of raw materials or energy, because any disas-
ters caused by the latter may be corrected within a few years or generations, 
whereas the elimination of damage to biodiversity or the genomes of living 
creatures will take millions of years.
Adopted at the 1992 UN ‘Earth Summit’, the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity was ratiﬁ ed by UN Member States relatively quickly, although the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) could not escape the conclusion in 
1995 that 2-25% of all species that inhabit rain forests could disappear over 
the next quarter of a century, which corresponds to 1,000 to 10,000 times the 
rate of natural extinction.
Biodiversity is of critical importance to humankind for the following rea-
sons:
• in ecosystems, biodiversity provides essential functions (services) that 
are indispensable for keeping Earth habitable (maintenance of the car-
bon cycle, hydrological cycle, soil conservation, control of surface tem-
perature and micro-climate, etc.);
• biodiversity serves aesthetic, scientiﬁ c, cultural and other universally rec-
ognised purposes which cannot be measured in monetary terms;
• biodiversity is the source of numerous products, including foodstuffs, 
textile components, medicines and chemicals. It also serves as a highly 
important information base for biotechnologies;
• biodiversity is the source of varietal diversity in plant and animal farming, 
and the creation of new varieties;
• the uniqueness and beauty of the variety of ecosystems represent a 
source of recreation and ecotourism.
Ratiﬁ ed by over 130 countries to date, the Convention requires all signato-
ries to protect biodiversity by providing that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall, 
as far as possible and as appropriate, adopt economically and socially sound 
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measures that act as incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of 
components of biological diversity’.
Ecologists are perhaps right to be sceptical about the above passage, due 
to past experience that any mention of ‘economically sound’ conservation 
generally implies the sacriﬁ ce of nature for short-term economic develop-
ment.
It is difﬁ cult to question the arguments of conservationists and ecologists, 
and in particular the facts underlying their scepticism. 
Economic growth in the twentieth century caused massive destruction in 
the natural environment in terms of both scale and method, and losses of 
biodiversity are undoubtedly the most regrettable because they are irrevers-
ible. Nevertheless, or precisely for that reason, more attention is being paid to 
economic growth and to some economic ﬁ ndings that have emerged recently, 
or have been neglected to date.
In normal circumstances (i.e., under conditions of ‘reasonable use’), re-
newable natural resources regenerate, such as ﬁ sh in seas and rivers, wood 
in forests, etc. Even with renewable natural resources, consideration should 
be given to the rate at which they may be used. Considering determination 
of the requirement for sustainable use, the scientiﬁ c answer appears to 
be relatively simple: renewable natural resources should be used at a rate 
that allows them to regenerate. In economic terms, the answer is some-
what more complex. Ideally, the ownership of a renewable natural resource 
is well established. For example, a ﬁ sh pond is operated by a farm, or a 
pasture is maintained by a cooperative. In this case, the amount of ﬁ sh 
that may be bred or harvested in the pond annually, or the amount of live-
stock that may be grazed on a pasture will be determined by the carrying 
capacity of the area concerned. Under the law of natural growth, growth 
is considered a function of a resource set. The law of density dependent 
growth assumes the existence of an optimally sized set (i.e., a number of 
individuals, or size of biomass) that provides for the maximum sustainable 
yield. The owner of a pasture or ﬁ sh pond will obviously seek to achieve 
and maintain that state.
With renewable resources (stock of ﬁ sh, woods, pastures, etc.), growth 
in the quantity of a particular resource will depend on both the initial size 
or population count of the natural resource and the carrying capacity of its 
environment. Initial size determines the number of individuals suitable for 
breeding, and carrying capacity the abundance of available food. Initially, 
the resource may grow at a rapid rate to the extent that the environment 
provides an abundant food supply to a relatively small population. As the 
population grows, each individual will ﬁ nd it increasingly difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd 
food due to reasons of scarcity, which will reduce the growth rate of bio-
mass.
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In Figure 4-6. the law of density dependent growth is illustrated through the 
example of a pond on a farm.
Figure 4-6. The law of density dependent growth (Milner-Gulland–Mace, 1998)
The horizontal axis on the chart represents the number of individuals in the 
ﬁ sh population, and the vertical axis the growth generated by the given number 
of individuals over a unit of time. In the present case, the maximum growth is 
observed for a ﬁ sh population of ten million, which corresponds to the optimum 
number of individuals in terms of sustainable use that maximises yield (sustain-
able number of individuals), at 12.5 million per unit of time on the chart. Ac-
cording to the chart, the carrying capacity of the pond is 20 million ﬁ sh, which 
indicates the maximum number of ﬁ sh that can live in the pond, and zero growth. 
The maximum yield is determined as ten million ﬁ sh. Supposing there are only 
three million ﬁ sh in the pond, only six million should be harvested to prevent the 
population from decreasing. Interestingly, a population of seventeen million ﬁ sh 
will only produce growth of three million; however, in the case of a larger harvest 
(e.g. of four million), the remaining sixteen million ﬁ sh will produce a larger yield 
the following year than the seventeen million ﬁ sh in the previous year. That is, 
a decrease in the number of individuals will improve the living conditions of the 
remaining population, and consequently economic results as well.
That said, there is a signiﬁ cant difference between the two situations in en-
vironmental terms. When the number of individuals drops below a sustainable 
amount, overﬁ shing risks destruction of the population, whereas excessive 
growth in the population will only reduce the annual yield of the pond without 
the risk of destroying the population as a whole. That is, in the ﬁ rst case some 
intervention to limit harvests is required to prevent the overuse of the natural 
resource in order to preserve the ﬁ sh population in the pond, whereas in the 
second case no such intervention is required, and the matter may be entrusted 
to nature’s care.
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With some addition to the ﬁ sh population chart, Figure 4-7. allows us to 
provide a relatively accurate deﬁ nition for the protection and conservation of a 
renewable natural resource in the economic sense. The value SMIN shows that 
below a certain number of individuals a population is no longer able to grow 
and is at risk of disappearance unless direct intervention is made to increase 
the number of individuals to above SMIN. Many species have been saved from 
extinction by artiﬁ cial breeding.
For centuries the supply of and demand for ﬁ sh in publicly owned seas and 
lakes was characterised by such equilibrium, without the need to raise the 
issue of conservation. However, the situation has changed recently (Figure 
4-8.), and due to the scarcity of resources an equilibrium of supply and de-
mand cannot be reached if the volume of ﬁ shing exceeds that of sustainable 
use. Without intervention, resources will rapidly become exhausted, a situation 
which calls for restrictive conservation measures on the grounds that individual 
producers (ﬁ shers) who control a mere fragment of the market do not care 
whether the ﬁ sh population declines in the future, but even if they do, they can 
so little to preserve it that their efforts qualify as impractical in economic terms. 
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Figure 4-7. Types of density dependent growth curves 
(Tietenberg, 1992, p. 306.)
Suppose that a large number of ﬁ sh pond owners sell ﬁ sh to a large number 
of consumers (that is, a perfect competitive market exists where the price is de-
termined by the market). However, for reproducible assets in such an arrange-
ment the supply curve would be derived as the aggregate of individual marginal 
cost (MC) curves, while for renewable natural resources such as ﬁ sh farms, for-
ests, etc., the correct supply curve would be above that derived from sellers’ MC 
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curves, because sellers are under pressure to incorporate costs incurred from any 
reductions in the next period’s yield due to what is harvested in the current period.
Figure 4-8. Supply, demand and sustainability of a renewable resource:
population is saved within the market (Fisher, 1981)
Figure 4-9. Supply, demand and sustainability of a renewable resource:
population cannot be saved within the market (Fisher, 1981)
Figure 4-10. Supply, demand and sustainability of a renewable resource:
derivation of aggregate supply (Fisher, 1981)
As shown in the left panel of Figure 4-10., for the individual producer the 
marginal cost curve (MC) has shifted to the left (MC*), as a result of which the 
equilibrium price will be Pe rather than P0. The establishment of the equilibrium 
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price is shown in the right-hand panel, where the supply curve of the market 
is derived as the aggregate of individual marginal cost curves (MC*) that also 
incorporates future costs. At quantity Q, the equilibrium price Pe will be de-
termined by the intersection of that supply curve and the aggregate demand 
curve of the market. Section EF on the left panel (i.e., the difference between 
the two supply curves) is commonly referred to as the individual producer’s 
reservation price, and the JK difference on the right simply as the reservation 
price. As shown on the left, due to the reservation price the individual pro-
ducer’s proﬁ t will be maximised at quantity Q*. The reservation price (i.e., the 
difference between Pe and P0), will compensate the individual producer for any 
losses resulting from reductions in future yields.
Naturally, the reservation price is inﬂ uenced by the bank interest rate8, and, 
curiously, will be reduced by a high bank rate and increased by a low bank 
rate. This situation is explained by the fact that a high interest rate provides an 
incentive for a producer to sell goods on the market promptly, and deposit the 
proceeds with a bank in order to earn interest. Obviously, expected develop-
ments in the price of the resource are also relevant. When a signiﬁ cant price in-
crease is expected, the reservation price may also be inﬂ ated. That, of course, 
will not reduce the inﬂ uence and importance of the interest rate. When the 
expected price increase exceeds the interest rate, it may be more worthwhile 
to keep the ﬁ sh in the pond for another year, otherwise there is no rationale 
for this, and the reservation price will be reduced. Expected developments in 
ﬁ shing costs may also be of interest. Obviously, if ﬁ shing costs are expected 
to increase (e.g. due to a rise in wage costs), it is reasonable to take goods to 
market promptly, which may also reduce the reservation price. Certainly, the 
reservation price will also be inﬂ uenced by the current size of the ﬁ sh popula-
tion relative to the carrying capacity of the pond, as well as to the population 
size that provides for the maximum sustainable yield. Clearly, the producer 
has no interest in maintaining an excessive ﬁ sh population, because, as shown 
above, that would reduce growth; therefore, the reservation price may be re-
duced to zero in cases where the population exceeds what is required for the 
maximum yield, and conversely, be inﬂ ated in cases near the optimum. 
The reservation price will certainly also be inﬂ uenced by the cost of activities 
which, in one way or another, affect carrying capacity, optimum population 
size, etc. Such activities may include the introduction of juvenile ﬁ sh into a 
pond, artiﬁ cial feeding, afforestation, fertilisation, etc. Such methods will of 
course enable the yield to be inﬂ uenced, and the economic viability of inter-
ventions of this kind may also be determined subject to the factors mentioned 
above.
8 More speciﬁ cally, the ratio of the interest rate to the natural growth rate of biomass. 
An interest rate exceeding the growth rate of biomass will provide an incentive for 
overuse of the natural resource.
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4.7 The theory of public and collective goods
Collective choices made in the political space are largely related to the man-
agement of public goods. A public good is ‘[a] commodity or service which 
if supplied to one person can be made available to others at no extra cost. 
[…] One person’s consumption of the good does not reduce its availability 
to others’. (Pearce, 1993) The two key attributes of a public good are non-
excludability and non-rival consumption. A typical such public good is air, the 
consumption of which must be granted to everyone, while no-one will have 
less air because others breathe. In addition to public goods, there are also 
collective goods, the consumption of which must be granted to everyone, but 
which are not available in unlimited quantities, and may be expensive to pro-
duce. Such collective goods include drinking water and waste disposal. The 
provision of collective goods is a matter of collective choice. Whether access 
to drinking water by users who do not pay for it is provided in their residence 
or only from a public fountain depends on decisions made by the community. 
Whether locally or nationally, access to collective goods is regulated by the 
community. The supply of public and collective goods is ﬁ nanced from the tax 
revenues collected by the state. In speciﬁ c cases, the production of collective 
goods may also be ﬁ nanced from user contributions.
The difﬁ culties of interpreting the situation with public goods will be illustrat-
ed below through some practical examples. Although the common beneﬁ t 
derived from paving a road leading up to a vineyard would far exceed the 
expenditure required, it is not certain that such a road will actually be paved. 
In most cases, seeing differences of opinion and willingness to make sacri-
ﬁ ces, the ‘organiser’ will give up organising the community for this purpose. 
Transaction costs can be determined both in principle and in practice, but 
may be excessive in the case of large groups where the phenomenon of free 
riders can become so dominant as to prevent the action from being taken 
even if the beneﬁ ts of the decision are likely to outweigh the expenditure of 
each individual.
For millennia, states have been successful in providing certain public or col-
lective goods, and have failed with the provision of others. States tend to 
tackle problems related to national security, protection against epidemics, 
and more recently, safeguarding against ozone depletion. In the ﬁ eld of envi-
ronmental protection, for the most part they have overcome problems posed 
by direct and particularly harmful forms of pollution. With highly visible inci-
dents of harmful natural pollution, the tendency towards free riding is less 
marked; however, public policy is not particularly effective in the cases when 
the existence of the ‘public good’ remains in the background, is not directly 
visible, and is difﬁ cult to understand for the public at large. This is clearly 
the case with biodiversity, and for the most part also with climate protec-
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tion. These are public goods just like clean urban air, but are less widely 
understood, and perceptions are that the degradation of such public goods 
is of little risk to human survival. This partly explains why governments do 
little to provide such public or collective goods to present and future gen-
erations in sufﬁ cient quantity and quality. In some very poor countries of 
the world, states are incapable of ensuring even the supply of public goods 
required to meet the most elementary needs. Extreme poverty is frequently 
accompanied by a lack of access to drinking water of adequate quality. In 
economics, free access to public goods is considered one of the causes of 
environmental damage. It was largely in accord with Hardin’s article that lit-
erature rediscovered the problems with the inevitable overuse of goods used 
collectively. (See the chapter earlier: Overuse of public goods: ‘The Tragedy 
of the Commons’)
Finally, Hardin concluded the following: ‘Individualism is cherished be-
cause it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more the popula-
tion exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment, the more freedoms 
must be given up. As cities grow, the freedom to park is restricted by the 
number of parking meters or fee-charging garages. […] On the global scale, 
nations are abandoning not only the freedom of the seas, but the freedom 
of the atmosphere, which acts as a common sink for aerial garbage. Yet to 
come are many other restrictions as the world’s population continues to grow 
[…but] the slightest attempt to limit this freedom is promptly denounced with 
cries of Elitism! Big-Brotherism! Despotism! Fascism! and the like. We are 
slow to mend our ways because ethicists and philosophers of the past gen-
erally did not see that numbers matter. In the language of 20th-century com-
mentators, traditional thinking was magniﬁ cently verbal and deplorably non-
numerate. One of today’s cardinal tasks is to marry the philosopher’s literate 
ethics with the scientist’s commitment to numerate analysis.’ (Hardin, 1998) 
Almost a decade has passed since Hardin shared these thoughts. Since 
then, the population of the Earth has grown by another billion, and in 2015 
the ﬁ rst great migrations of the twenty-ﬁ rst century started. Having respect 
for the numbers imposes a task of extreme urgency on social scientists and 
policymakers. Brooding over the past only makes sense if it helps to create 
a better vision of the future. The Earth is undoubtedly ‘packed’ with people, 
and the limits of carrying capacity have been breached on some continents, 
a fact which remains true even if the very people who should be racking their 
brains in an effort to ﬁ nd solutions are now failing to grasp the situation be-
cause they are busy exercising power.
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4.8 The trap of present value calculation
The second half of the twentieth century brought about increasing socie-
tal awareness that the capacities of our Earth were ﬁ nite, whereas earlier, 
public goods that had previously been considered inﬁ nite and free, such 
as clean air, healthy drinking water, waste disposal, and certain biosphere 
services, had been classiﬁ ed as being among the public goods to be pro-
vided by governments on a mandatory basis, as part of public services. 
One representative of neoclassical economics, Arthur Pigou (Pigou, 2013), 
proposed that externalities be taxed, then Ronald Coase (Coase, 1960), 
the founder of institutional economics, sought to internalise externalities by 
means of market bargaining. However, problems remain, since the market 
economy, relying on the calculation of present value for its functioning, is 
hardly capable of managing projects of more than 30 to 50 years, whereas 
respecting the limits of the Earth would require thinking using a time hori-
zon of several hundred years. The social discount rate desirable for sus-
tainable development would often be signiﬁ cantly lower than the market 
discount rate. 
Even relatively simple projects that would, for instance, create considerable 
energy savings, generally involve signiﬁ cant investment costs. Some projects 
are implemented over a period of 30 to 50 years, and the rules of present value 
calculation generally produce a negative net present value, where the social 
discount rate is deﬁ ned at 6 to 8% or above, and practitioners hardly ever ap-
ply lower rates. 
To illustrate the problem, let us consider a very simple and widely known 
example. Afforestation is regarded as a means of fighting climate change. 
Trees fix carbon dioxide, for which they only use solar energy through pho-
tosynthesis. Their growth is often a lengthy process, as a result of which 
they keep fixing carbon dioxide for extensive periods. Wood is an excellent 
raw material for a number of industries, and ultimately may also be used as 
a renewable source of energy. Moreover, forests play an important role in 
human recreation, and provide a great number of biosphere services. Let 
us consider it a given that wood is a valuable good: it is not by coincidence 
that the destruction of forests has been prohibited by law for centuries. 
This should obviously make it worthwhile to invest in afforestation. With 
any investment, the investor assesses the investment opportunities avail-
able and identifies the one that offers the highest return. This requires an 
assessment of the risks of the investment, as well as the expected returns 
and cash flows associated with it. Underlying those calculations is the 
answer to the simple question of which is better: purchasing government 
securities that offer relatively low returns but are virtually free of risk, or 
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taking part in an undertaking that involves slightly higher risk, but also 
offers higher annual returns compared to the government securities. The 
problem is well known, and specialist books on finance recommend using 
net present value calculations to answer the question (Brealey–Myers–Al-
len–Mohanty, 2012).
The net present value of any investment may be calculated using the following 
formula:
where
 t is the time of the cash ﬂ ow concerned (e.g. 3 represents year three);
 n is the entire term;
 r is the interest or discount rate;
 Ct is the net cash ﬂ ow at time t (positive for gains and negative for invest-
ments or expenses); 
 C0 is the amount of money invested at time 0.
Specialist books offer detailed arguments that demonstrate that when-
ever the above formula produces a positive net present value, a return will 
certainly be made on the investment provided that the presuppositions are 
valid. One such key presupposition is the estimate of the discount rate in-
cluded in the formula. The discount rate shows the investor’s expectations 
about the returns on the investment. Higher discount rates are applied to 
riskier investments (e.g. when the economic environment is uncertain, the 
area is exposed to extreme weather due to climate change, or the protec-
tion of property right cannot be fully guaranteed). A higher discount rate 
is warranted by these and similar circumstances. In a relatively stable and 
less risky economic environment, expected returns are lower, and so are 
the discount rates applied. On balance, it may be assumed that if NPV > 0 
the investment is viable.
Let us now consider the case of afforestation referred to earlier. With 
forests, the two extremes are represented by energy forests on the one 
hand, and forests comprising valuable native species on the other, which 
provide a variety of benefits but grow at a very slow rate. A good example 
of the first is a forest of locust trees, which are fast-growing trees but non-
native to Hungary, and of the second, an oak or beech forest. Reaching 
maturity takes 20 to 22 years in the former case, and 110 to 120 years in 
the latter. The table below shows details of the various utilisation param-
eters for the two forest types, taking into account the time that elapses 
after planting:
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Species Clearance Selection thinning
Increment 
thinning
Final 
harvest of 
plantations
Note
age m3 age m3 age m3 age m3
Oak 15 5
30
-
50
20
60
-
80
60 100 400
In normal cases, 
several rounds of 
thinning may be 
required, and a 
ﬁ nal harvest may 
also be made in the 
form of progressive 
regeneration cutting
Locust 8 5 15 20 22 30 30 140
The ﬁ nal harvest 
is mostly made by 
clear felling, and 
regeneration by 
sprouting 
Table 4-4. Harvesting methods (University of West Hungary:
Theoretical considerations of evaluating economics of continuous cover forestry, n.d.)
The Hungarian data show that in an oak forest, the ﬁ nal harvest will yield 
approximately 400 cubic meters of high-quality wood per hectare, with an-
other 85 cubic meters of ﬁ rewood produced by thinning. After 30 years, a 
locust forest will yield 140 cubic meters of wood that is also valuable, but 
of more limited use. In 100 years, a locust forest will yield approximately 
420 cubic meters of valuable wood, and an additional 165 cubic meters of 
less valuable material. 
There is an extensive body of literature about the problems with select-
ing the appropriate social discount rates. Using data from one such paper 
(with some adjustments), we have calculated the net present values for 
the two forest types. Given that the life span of an oak forest is very long, 
114 years in our example, whereas that of a locust forest is only 22 years, 
we assumed that the locust is clear-felled every 22 years and replanted 
immediately afterwards, which allowed us to obtain comparable data by 
calculating the net present value of both types for 114 years. As our nu-
merical example is fairly well aligned with the ﬁ ndings of professionals from 
the University of West Hungary (see the table above), we may be excused 
for dispensing with some of the details. Based on the English paper, the 
following tables present the expenditure related to plantation and the ex-
pected returns on sales of wood.
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Years Activities
Real expenses and 
returns (thousand HUF 
per hectare)
0 Preparation of area -20
0 Plantation -80
0 Road construction -30
0-60 Annual operating expenses -8
1 Weed control -20
4,7,10,13 Pruning and thinning before sale -6
8 Thinning (1) 80
12 Thinning (2) 140
16 Thinning (3) 200
22 Clear felling 1,600
Table 4-5. Plantation and maintenance costs of a locust forest at the time they are incurred
(based on Straka–Bullard, 1996; Davis–Johnson, 1987)
Years Activities
Real expenses and 
returns (thousand HUF 
per hectare)
0 Preparation of area -40
0 Plantation and protection -320
0-60 Annual administrative costs -8
1 Weed control -40
5 Pruning and thinning before sale -80
60 Thinning (1) 1,600
80 Thinning (2) 3,200
100 Thinning (3) 4,000
120 Clear felling 4,800
Table 4-6. Plantation and maintenance costs of an oak forest at the time they are incurred
(based on Straka–Bullard, 1996; Davis–Johnson, 1987)
In both cases, the present value is calculated over a period of 114 years. An-
nual cash ﬂ ows are summarised in Table 4-7. The net present value of each al-
ternative is shown in Table 4-8. The lowest discount rate that is applied is 1%; 
however, an investor who would accept an annual return of 1% is very unlikely to 
exist in reality. The examples provided in specialist books on ﬁ nance hardly ever 
assume discount rates of below 6%. Our highest discount rate is 15%. Such high 
discount rates are also rare in practice, but could actually occur in the case of 
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high-risk investments or high inﬂ ation; indeed, in developing world countries for-
eign investors use even higher discount rates in their present value calculations. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-130 -28 -8 -8 -14 -8 -8 -14 72 -8 -14 -8 132 -14 -8 -8 192 -8 -8 -8 -8
-360 -48 -8 -8 -8 -88 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 21
-8 1,592 -130 -28 -8 -8 -14 -8 -8 -14 72 -8 -14 -8 132 -14 -8 -8 192 -8 -8
-8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 41
-8 -8 -8 -8 1,592 -130 -28 -8 -8 -14 -8 -8 -14 72 -8 -14 -8 132 -14 -8 -8
-8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 1,592 -8
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
-8 -8 192 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 1,592 -130 -28 -8 -8 -14 -8 -8 -14 72 -8 -14 -8
1,592 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
132 -14 -8 -8 192 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 1,592 -130 -28 -8 -8 -14 -8 -8 -14 72 -8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,000 0
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114
-14 -8 132 -14 -8 -8 192 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 1,592
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,800
Table 4-7. Cash ﬂ ows for oak and locust trees between years 0 and 114 (author’s own compilation)
The results in Table 4-8. speak for themselves. In the case of oak, whenever 
the discount rate is higher than 3% all NPV is negative, indicating that the invest-
ment should not be made. Conversely, in the case of locust NPV enters negative 
territory only with discount rates above 12%, showing that locust forests could 
be planted on a market basis, whereas oak forests most probably could not.
Discount rates NPV (locust) t=114 NPV (oak) t=114 NPV (locust) t=22
1% 4,415 4,512 1,325
2% 2,571 1,449 1,048
3% 1,617 256 825
4% 1,074 -220 646
5% 739 -413 500
6% 517 -490 382
7% 363 -518 287
8% 251 -525 208
9% 168 -524 145
10% 104 -519 92
11% 54 -512 50
12% 15 -505 14
13% -16 -499 -15
14% -41 -493 -39
15% -61 -487 -59
Table 4-8. Net present value of locust and oak forests at various discount rates and terms
(author’s own compilation)
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Figure 4-11. Present value of locust and oak forests assuming a 114-year (and a 22-year) cycle and 
various discount rates (based on Table 4-8.) (author’s own compilation)
The above ﬁ gure shows clearly that planting oak trees appears to be more 
advantageous than locust trees only when a discount rate of a very low 1% 
is applied. With any discount rate above 1%, it would be better to plant a 
locust forest. That said, the ecosystem services of an oak forest are known 
to be much more valuable compared to those of a locust forest, although 
such intangible services are disregarded for the purposes of present value 
calculations.
With such long-term projects, it would be reasonable to use tiered discount 
rates. In Britain, the discounting practice of Her Majesty’s Treasury Department 
(Treasury, 2003) provides a good example of the discount rates which may be 
applied to long-term investments. The guidelines recommend the application 
of a discount rate of 3.5% for the ﬁ rst thirty years of a project, followed by 
discount rates of 3% to 1% (see Table 4-9.).
Term in 
years 0–30 31–75 76–125 126–200 201–300 301+
Discount 
rates 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0%
Table 4-9. Discount rates recommended in HM’s Treasury Green Book (2003)
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Naturally, tiered discount rates are not only suitable for the economic valu-
ation of forest plantations. Their use is desirable with utility services such as 
sewerage, ﬁ xed-track public transport, investments in nature conservation, 
etc. These investments require public participation since private investors 
cannot be expected to maintain public or even quasi-public goods. In our 
example, an energy forest (e.g. involving the locust species) which can be 
clear-felled after twenty years may also be planted on a commercial basis; 
however, the plantation of an oak forest with a desirable life span of 100 to 
120 years will require artiﬁ cially ‘mandated’ discount rates to show a positive 
net present value, but will, apart from its timber yield, also play an important 
role in preserving biodiversity and a healthy environment. In order to ensure 
the provision of such welfare-increasing services as public goods, it is appro-
priate that the state should intervene and grant subsidies to compensate pri-
vate investors for the lower returns on such investments. Fortunately, most 
states do provide such subsidies in order to maintain an adequate supply of 
public goods.
4.9 The economic valuation of environmental changes – 
          monetary evaluation
4.9.1 The relationship between total economic value and
            ecosystem services
Total economic value (TEV, Kerekes–Szlávik, 2001; Marjainé Szerényi, 
2005, 2011) is a core concept in the monetary evaluation of environmental 
change. From a human perspective, the concept aggregates the reasons 
and arguments which may explain our preferences for goods being val-
ued, which definitely lends a human dimension to the concept of valuation 
itself. The two key components are use values and non-use values, both 
of which may be further subdivided into more detailed components. Use 
values are comprised of the components of direct use, indirect use and 
option values, whereas non-use values may include, for example, bequest, 
altruistic or existence values. The related formula looks like this when writ-
ten down:
Total economic value (TEV) = use values (direct use, indirect use and 
option value) + non-use values (bequest, altruistic, existence, etc.).
Use values, as their name suggests, incorporate the preferences of in-
dividuals who either actually use an environmental good or would have an 
opportunity to use the good in the present (i.e. members of the present 
generation), whereas non-use values primarily represent the preferences of 
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future generations. Direct utility is derived from any change that affects our 
lives in apparent and perceivable ways, or is effectively taken advantage 
of. Although individuals are generally not aware of indirect values, they are 
fundamental determinants of our lives. Constituting the third component 
of this type, option value is associated with the possibility that value may 
be associated with a positive environmental change (or the avoidance of 
a negative change), even if the environmental resource concerned (or a 
speciﬁ c service provided by it) is not currently used, but there is a need 
to preserve it in the hope of future use. Non-use values represent the pos-
sibility that even if the present generation does not use a natural resource 
for any particular purpose, it attaches importance to its preservation and 
improvement, either for the sake of future generations, or to preserve its 
intrinsic value.
Total economic value
Components
direct indirect option Personal non-use 
values
Ex
am
pl
es
• A park serves 
for recreational 
purposes 
(walks, hikes) 
and provides 
sports facilities.
• Decreases in 
noise improve 
people’s 
quality of life 
(e.g. they may 
open  windows 
without making 
it impossible 
to talk, watch 
television, or 
listen to music).
• A small piece 
of wood on 
the outskirts 
of a town 
accommodates 
a variety of 
living creatures, 
which visitors 
may observe.
• A lake near a 
town is suitable 
for angling.
• A park 
contributes to 
cleaning the air 
of a town.
• The trees in 
a forest help 
retain soil, 
reducing 
erosion 
processes. As 
a habitat, it 
accommodates 
not only living 
creatures that 
are visible to the 
naked eye and 
are of primary 
importance to 
humans, but 
all forms of 
life, thereby 
stabilising 
symbiotic 
relationships.
• Reducing noise 
prevents short- 
and long-term 
deterioration in 
health.
• The 
conservation 
of an 
environmental 
good 
provides an 
opportunity 
for future 
use even to 
people who 
currently do 
not use its 
services, 
which may be 
a reason for 
them to value 
this option 
among their 
preferences.
• Even if 
representatives 
of the present 
generation do not 
want to use a speciﬁ c 
environmental 
resource either 
today or in the 
future, they may still 
consider it important 
and its existence/
preservation as being 
in the interest of 
future generations.
• An example is that of 
bustards, which we 
rarely see, and which 
do not directly affect 
our personal lives, 
yet their preservation 
enables members of 
future generations to 
come into contact 
with important native 
species.
Table 4-10. Examples of components of total economic value
(Kerekes–Marjainé Szerényi, 2015, with modiﬁ cations)
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Use values can be captured with great accuracy and with a variety of meth-
ods, whereas non-use values are more difﬁ cult to capture, and the range of 
available methods is limited. 
As the goods being valued frequently include ecosystem services, involv-
ing the role of such services may be highly instrumental in the determina-
tion of total economic value. The concept of ecosystem services may be 
given a valid interpretation in both the natural and social sciences (Kovács 
et al. 2011a, 2014). The relationship between ecosystems and socio-eco-
nomic systems is illustrated in Figure 4-12. Ecosystems have a variety of 
functions (ecological processes, networks of links among living creatures, 
genome diversity, etc.) that provide ecosystem services from which ben-
eﬁ ts to humans accrue which contribute to well-being. Their valuation will 
be inﬂ uenced by the extent to which such beneﬁ ts are perceived to humans 
(the ‘valuers’) (MAES, 2016). The chart also shows that people (through 
their activities, institutions, etc.) inﬂ uence the functions (state) of ecosys-
tems, allowing for (cyclical) changes in the network of relationships, which 
might if negative reduce the level of ecosystem services, and if positive, 
increase both the quality and quantity of services provided to humans. In 
recent years, policymaking has developed a tendency to apply the Com-
mon International Classiﬁ cation of Ecosystem Services (CICES), wherein 
apart from the cultural and provisioning services of MEA, regulating and 
maintenance services are recognised as a distinct category, comprising 
MEA regulating services and some supporting services (such as soil fer-
tility) (Haines-Young–Potschin, 2013). International and Hungarian policies 
about conservation and biodiversity increasingly rely on this conceptual 
framework (Kovács et al. 2011a, Kovács, 2014).
Figure 4-12. Relationships between ecosystems and socio-economic systems (MAES, 2016, p. 13.)
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Additional aspects are captured by the dimensions illustrated in Figure 
4-13. A prominent feature of this approach is that ecosystem services are 
located at the intersection of natural and social sciences: ecosystems repre-
sent the supply side (i.e., their provisioning function) by virtue of their place 
and functions in biodiversity, whereas the demand (social) side represents 
the contribution of such ecosystem services to human well-being. Values 
may be based on both cultural and economic considerations. The concept 
of total economic value, as explained earlier, and the methods of monetary 
evaluation reviewed brieﬂ y in this chapter are used to identify economic val-
ues, whereas cultural values are identiﬁ ed by means of socio-cultural evalu-
ation (see the end of this chapter for more detail). The integrated approach 
is reinforced by the fact that it also provides a spatial outlook that represents 
local, regional and global effects.
Figure 4-13. An integrated multi-dimensional approach to valuation (OpenNess, 2014, p. 5.)
The process of identifying the total economic value and ecosystem serv-
ices of the good being valued may also involve stakeholders, as in the 
case of a 2017 survey concerning the Old Drava Oxbow (Marjainé Szerényi, 
2017). This survey included two focus group discussions for experts and 
one for residents to identify the ecosystem services characteristic of the 
cut-off channel. The information that was collected is presented in Table 
4-11.
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Ecosystem service 
group Ecosystem service
Provisioning services
mushroom picking
plant harvesting (herbs, edible plants)
game products (e.g. meat)
ﬁ rewood
irrigation water
vacation resorts
ﬁ sh
honey
Cultural services
tourism, recreation, relaxation 
landscape signiﬁ cance
angling
environmental education
hunting 
scientiﬁ c research 
artistic inspiration
ancient trees 
fowling
information 
traditions
nature trail
Regulating
(and habitat) services
biodiversity in the cut-off channel
(habitat for plant and animal species)
self-sustenance, regeneration capacity
water retention 
water puriﬁ cation (water quality control)
riparian gallery forest
ground water supply and control
air puriﬁ cation
climate control
autumn feeding and resting place for migratory birds
breeding areas for amphibians and ﬁ sh
habitat (cut-off channel)
accretion
Supporting services
soil formation
nutrient cycle
primary production
Table 4-11. Ecosystem services provided by the Old Drava 
(based on focus group discussions) (Marjainé Szerényi, 2017)
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4.10 Monetary evaluation methods
4.10.1 Classifi cation of methods of evaluation
The literature on economics proposes a number of methods for the monetary 
valuation of environmental goods, of which those most frequently used are 
included in the overview below.
One possible taxonomy classiﬁ es the methods according to temporal 
(present or future preferences) and market characteristics (conventional, im-
plicit, and constructed) (Munasinghe, 1993). Methods based on conventional 
markets generally seek to establish links between environmental change and 
market goods, the value of which can be considered for economic evaluation. 
A market is described as implicit when valuation relies on past human actions 
in its attempt to identify behaviours that may be linked to the environmental 
good being valued. Finally, a constructed market involves the creation of hy-
pothetical situations (markets), through which people are requested to share 
their opinions about any changes. The system of classiﬁ cation and methods is 
shown in Table 4-12.
Conventional market Implicit market Constructed market
Based on actual 
behaviour
Effect on production
Defensive/recovery costs
Travel cost
Hedonic price method
Based on future 
behaviour Replacement cost
Contingent valuation
Contingent ranking
Contingent selection
Table 4-12. A possible classiﬁ cation of valuation methods
(based on Munasinghe (1993), p. 25, with modiﬁ cations)
Methods based on implicit and constructed markets may be subdivided fur-
ther according to whether they employ direct or indirect valuation (Mitchell–
Carson, 1989). Direct methods include those based on a conventional market, 
as well as contingent valuation for constructed markets, and indirect methods 
include those which rely on implicit markets, while contingent selection can 
be classiﬁ ed under constructed markets. Another important consideration is 
whether the methods measure real changes in welfare; i.e., if they rely on a 
demand curve for their valuation, or a demand curve cannot be derived thus 
they do not qualify as economically sound methods, despite which they can 
still provide decision makers with useful information (Turner–Pearce–Bateman, 
1993). The former group includes methods classiﬁ ed under implicit and con-
structed markets, and the latter those based on conventional markets. Men-
tion must also be made of the beneﬁ t transfer method, which cannot be in-
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corporated into the above classiﬁ cation due to one of its essential features 
–  it uses the appraisals produced using one of the methods in the table, and 
adapts them to a different situation. 
The relationships between total economic value, ecosystem services and 
the methods discussed are clearly illustrated in Figure 4-14.
Figure 4-14. Relationships between ecosystem services, total economic value,
and monetary evaluation methods (Marjainé Szerényi, 2015)
4.10.2 Methods involving estimates based on conventional markets
Methods that rely on conventional markets primarily seek to identify the costs 
that are incurred by repairing damage to the environment and ecosystems, or 
the costs that may be avoided by preventing such changes (Markandya et al., 
2002). This requires identiﬁ cation of the market goods with which the change 
concerned may be most closely connected. For example, if the self-cleaning 
capacity of a lake changes negatively, that change may be corrected either by 
improving the lake’s capacity or by using the lake more sparingly. A possible 
example of the former approach is to increase the oxygen concentration in the 
lake water (thereby improving its self-cleaning capacity), and of the latter to 
avoid discharging even treated wastewater into the lake. The introduction of 
oxygen requires sufﬁ cient technical equipment, energy and labour, the costs 
of which can be estimated, whereas the introduction of treated wastewater 
may also be avoided through the implementation of certain technical solutions 
involving costs of the same nature as in the previous example. In such cases, 
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therefore, the price of equipment, maintenance and labour can be used in the 
evaluation process. The examples show that instead of directly assessing the 
preferences of the individuals who are concerned (as we do not know the value 
they attach to a positive environmental change), the measurement concerns 
the minimum cost of achieving positive changes. The following brief overview 
describes three evaluation methods based on conventional markets: effect on 
production, defensive cost, and replacement cost.
Effect on production is primarily used to assess the environment as an input 
through the changes (quantitative and/or qualitative) observed in agricultural 
products (as outputs) (Markandya et al., 2002). Reduced water supply to the 
soil, for example, could result in a decrease in wheat crop yield, but may also 
impair the qualitative characteristics of the wheat. In its simplest application, 
the method is used to calculate lost revenue due to reduced crop yields or 
quality (as a product of the market price of wheat and the change in yield), 
which is considered to be the value of the reduction in groundwater level. In 
this case, the effect is assumed not to inﬂ uence market equilibrium; i.e., not to 
cause a price change in the market product (wheat)9. In Hungary, for example, 
the consequences of diverting the course of the Danube in connection with 
the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dams (GND) were assessed through the resulting 
changes in wheat and corn crop yields in the Middle Szigetköz (Kerekes et al., 
1998).
As its name suggests, the defensive cost (and the very similar ‘recovery 
cost’) method captures the costs that may arise in the course of preventing or 
avoiding a negative environmental change. Let us take the example of noise. 
When a municipal government adopts the position that the construction of 
noise barriers could signiﬁ cantly improve the quality of life of residents who live 
alongside busy roads, it may undertake the costs of such an investment and 
have barriers constructed. In this case, the investment and maintenance costs 
of the noise barriers can be used to represent the value of reducing noise lev-
els, or more precisely, the beneﬁ ts to residents living in the vicinity of the roads 
(a similar issue is addressed in Harangozó–Marjainé Szerényi, 2014).
The replacement cost method can be used in cases when it is possible to 
replace the functions and services provided by an environmental (non-market) 
good with those provided by a market good. When the self-cleaning capacity 
of a river is reduced, it may be supplemented by the installation of a wastewa-
ter treatment plant (this method is very similar to the defensive cost method). 
In this case, an estimate is made of the cost incurred by society relating to 
the construction and operation of the plant. When this method is applied, it 
is important to ensure that the replacement market product (in this example, 
9 Of course, the valuation may also take into account changes in market equilibrium; 
however, this will make the analysis (i.e. the model) much more complex.
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the wastewater treatment plant) provides the same service as the environ-
mental (non-market) good  –  in this case, self-cleaning capacity (Markandya 
et al., 2002). In Hungary, and also in connection with GND, calculations have 
been made to estimate the performance (and cost) of the puriﬁ cation capacity 
required to compensate for the reduction in the self-cleaning capacity of the 
Danube (Kerekes et al., 1998).
The advantage of this group of methods is that they allow simple and fast 
estimations to be made concerning the value of environmental changes. On 
the other hand, they have the drawback that their assumptions are often not 
valid: for example, a speciﬁ c change may be a consequence of multiple effects 
(the fall in Szigetköz wheat crop yields may also have been due to factors other 
than the construction of the dams). Another negative feature is that only a mini-
mum estimate is provided for the monetary value of environmental changes, 
whereby beneﬁ ts are assumed to be equivalent to costs (which is often not the 
case). These methods can thus only be used to estimate a narrow segment of 
total economic value.
4.10.3 Valuation methods based on implicit markets
With evaluation methods based on implicit markets, inferences about the value 
of an environmental good are made from past market activity. The hedonic 
price method is based on the assumption that when people purchase prop-
erty, they pay the purchase price for the aggregate of the characteristics of 
the property. For example, the value of good air quality may be estimated by 
breaking down the price into individual characteristics. When using the travel 
cost method, the value of an environmental good is calculated as the amount 
of money that people are willing to spend in order to travel to a scenic spot. 
The valuation is carried out by referring to data about property sales and me-
thods of travel.
The hedonic price method is based on characteristics theory (Lancaster, 
1966), which assumes that demand for a good equals the aggregate of the 
demand for its individual characteristics. According to the theory, the utility 
derived from the good is determined by the level of each characteristic: sup-
posing there are two properties which are completely identical except for air 
quality, it is obvious that a higher value will be attached to the property lo-
cated in an environment with better air. Ultimately, the method seeks to es-
tablish a link between the price and characteristics of a property. From the 
perspective of environmental economics, environmental characteristics are 
the most important. The characteristics of a property are generally classiﬁ ed 
into four categories. Structural characteristics capture the physical features of 
a property (ﬂ oor space, number of rooms, ﬂ oor, main building material, etc.). 
Environmental and neighbourhood characteristics include those features for 
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which there is no market (air quality, noise level, scenic landscape, etc.) that 
require general valuation; whereas access characteristics (distance from and 
ease of access to shops and the centre) describe how frequented and acces-
sible a property is. Finally, the price of a property may also be inﬂ uenced by 
the socio-economic characteristics of its neighbourhood (unemployment rate, 
crime level, etc.). The method seeks to identify the direction in and extent to 
which property prices are changed by speciﬁ c characteristics (in particular, 
environmental ones), from which a demand curve and ultimately utilities may 
be quantiﬁ ed (i.e. people’s willingness to pay for property are used to calculate 
the utilities derived from the environmental good in demand). For the estimate, 
data about property purchases and sales are collected, taking care to ensure 
that the pool of property is sufﬁ ciently heterogeneous as regards individual 
characteristics (e.g. properties with one, two and three rooms, or properties 
with good, medium and poor air quality). In Hungary, the method has been 
applied on two occasions: In Debrecen, the hedonic price method was used 
to evaluate soil contaminated by a landﬁ ll (Kaderják–Szekeres, 2000), and in 
Budapest, the effect of free spaces and green areas on property prices was 
investigated (Takács, 2016).
The hedonic price method has the advantage that estimates are based on 
actual market behaviour and, if the data are available, a value can be assigned 
to the environmental/natural good in question following a relatively simple 
analysis. One of its drawbacks is that a reliable result can only be obtained by 
using a large quantity of data and information that is occasionally difﬁ cult to 
ﬁ nd. The method provides an estimate for the part of total economic value that 
is related to use.
The travel cost method is also based on consumers’ actual behaviour on the 
market. The method can be used to evaluate prices for areas or goods which 
may be visited by people. The travel cost method is based on the assumption 
that the costs that people are willing to pay to visit a particular area will be 
equivalent to the value of that area. Such costs may include:
• the actual cost of travel (the price of train or bus tickets, or petrol, etc.); 
• entrance fees; 
• the value of the time spent travelling, or in the area being valued.
Researchers obtain data about travel costs and the annual number of visits 
from statistics and questionnaires, which allow them to determine the demand 
curve of visiting a speciﬁ c area; i.e., the relationship between the frequency 
and cost of visits. In principle, the greater the distance between an individual’s 
residence and the area being valued, the less frequently the individual will visit 
that area within a speciﬁ c period of time. There are two approaches to us-
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ing the method: at the zonal, and individual level. In the zonal approach, the 
regions (districts, counties, etc.) in the surroundings of the area under valua-
tion are divided into zones, then information about travel from those zones is 
obtained from various statistical and other databases (e.g. in connection with 
distance covered). Mostly by means of questionnaires, the individual travel 
cost method allows data to be collected separately about each individual visi-
tor regarding both the number of visits and the cost of travel, potentially pro-
ducing far more accurate results compared to the other approach that uses the 
same method (Marjainé Szerényi et al., 2005). The advantage of the method is 
that valuation is based on actual market behaviours, and that estimates can be 
made relatively simply when the appropriate data are available. However, the 
method also has a number of drawbacks:
• What consideration should be given to costs incurred by people who 
only visit the area because of its proximity to their ‘real’ holiday destina-
tion? Or those of people who have holiday homes in the area, and travel 
from those locations?
• For the purposes of the method, local residents are considered not 
to incur any costs in connection with their visits, while it can reason-
ably be assumed that they in fact may have purchased property in the 
area because of their signiﬁ cant appreciation of the good being valued, 
which clearly shows that their preferences are not reﬂ ected in travel 
costs.
• In speciﬁ c cases, consumers may use the services of a signiﬁ cant 
number of substitute areas. How should this issue be addressed in the 
estimation process?
• The estimate only includes the part of TEV that is related to use (Kerekes–
Marjainé Szerényi, 2015).
4.10.4 Valuation methods based on constructed markets
Among valuation methods based on constructed markets, the identiﬁ cation of 
individuals’ preferences (willingness to pay) is done directly in contingent valu-
ation, and indirectly in contingent selection.
Contingent valuation is one of the most frequently used methods of envi-
ronmental valuation, which is primarily due to the suitability of the method 
for assessing virtually any environmental change or ecosystem service. Es-
sentially, respondents are presented with a change (program) concerning 
which their willingness to pay is investigated (Mitchel and Carson, 1989). 
Data are collected by means of questionnaires. The program describing the 
change explains the current state of the good being valued, the essence 
of the change, and the form in which payment is requested (e.g. voluntary 
contributions for ﬁ ve years). The most convenient method for administering 
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a survey is the personal interview because questionnaires tend to be long, 
and prompt respondents to answer questions they have never encountered 
before (e.g. how much would they be willing to pay for a speciﬁ c degree of 
improvement in the water quality of Lake Balaton) (Mourato et al., 1999). Not 
only is the method suitable for determining willingness to pay, it can also be 
used to identify the factors that inﬂ uence the amounts offered by individuals. 
The value of the good is derived as the product of the size of the relevant 
population (comprised of the affected individuals) and average willingness 
to pay. 
The advantage of the method is that it also measures non-use values, and 
is suitable for both ex-ante (before a change) and ex-post (after a change) 
appraisals, which also enables its use in cases where development has not 
yet started, and therefore environmental changes have yet to occur (this is 
primarily important when an intervention would negatively affect the state of 
an environmental good). Some of the drawbacks of the method are that it only 
concerns the valuation of a speciﬁ c change and thus cannot be extrapolated 
to other situations, and that it is also hypothetical (as is the payment itself). Due 
to the nature of the questionnaire survey involved, it is a time-consuming and 
expensive method to implement. It is also more expert-intensive compared to 
the methods that have previously been mentioned. Contingent valuation is one 
of the most frequently used methods. It has been used in a number of studies 
in Hungary (Mourato et al., 1999; Marjainé Szerényi, 2005; Marjainé Szerényi 
et al., 2011a, 2011b).
Entering the environmental economics evaluation toolkit only in the mid-
1990s, contingent selection has become increasingly popular ever since. 
The method identiﬁ es individual preferences by prompting affected indi-
viduals to select between various changes. The selection situations com-
prise independent characteristics of the good being valued, and the levels 
of those characteristics (e.g. in research on the Által-ér, a tributary of the 
Danube, the characteristics were water quality and ﬂ ood risk, the former 
taking the levels of medium, good and very good, and the latter identiﬁ ed 
as occurring once every 5, 25, 50 or 100 years; see also Marjainé Szerényi 
et al., 2011b). The characteristics always include a cost factor, which rep-
resents the component through which willingness to pay may be estimated. 
The method involves a questionnaire survey, which is most frequently car-
ried out by means of personal interviews (the questionnaires are even more 
complex than those used in contingent valuations). The characteristics and 
their levels may be used to construct a number of scenarios such as those 
shown in Figure 4-15. (e.g. Scenario A or B), of which those that are feasi-
ble and reasonable may be used to compile selection situations (cards). A 
selection situation will always include a status quo option to accommodate 
the possibility that a respondent will ﬁ nd the development unacceptable at 
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the cost indicated, which discourages them from selecting either Scenario 
A or B; in such cases, the status quo will be maintained, and the individual 
will not be required to pay. 
Characteristics Scenario A Scenario B Current situation 
Flood frequency Once every 25 years Once every 5 years
I select neither 
Scenario A or B, I 
prefer the status 
quoWater quality
Good Very good
Additional monthly 
water bill cost HUF 50 HUF 200 HUF 0
My selection
(identify as 
appropriate)
Select A □ Select B □ Select neither □
Figure 4-15. Example of a selection card for use in contingent valuation
(Based on Marjainé Szerényi et al., 2011b)
Contingent selection is considered to be one of the most advanced meth-
ods, because its use is not limited to the valuation of speciﬁ c environmental 
changes as is the case of contingent valuation, but it provides for the individual 
valuation of each characteristic (the willingness to switch between the char-
acteristics), changes between the levels of each characteristic, as well as any 
scenario that may be constructed from the characteristics and their levels. 
Another advantage of contingent selection is that it also enables the measure-
ment of the non-use value components of total economic value, and that it 
is suitable for the valuation of almost any hypothetical change. It can also be 
used ex ante. Drawbacks include the difﬁ culty involved in choosing charac-
teristics (i.e., in maintaining their mutual independence, and in the fact that an 
excessive number of characteristics and levels will make selection very difﬁ cult 
for respondents), the large sample size required for a reliable result, and the 
extreme complexity of data analysis, which makes the method highly expert-
intensive. As a combined result of the above, this method is the most time 
consuming and most expensive. Despite all these drawbacks, the method is 
becoming increasingly prominent in the monetary evaluation of environmental 
changes. In Hungary, it has been used in connection with efforts to enhance 
the natural features of the environment surrounding the Által-ér tributary (Mar-
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jainé Szerényi et al., 2011b), as well as with the valuation of caves (Krajnyik, 
2008).
4.10.5 The benefi t transfer method
The economic (monetary) valuation of environmental goods often requires es-
timates to be made within a short time in the absence of initial surveys. Such 
cases may be addressed using the beneﬁ t transfer method, which does not ﬁ t 
into the classiﬁ cation followed in this chapter, because it adapts the results of 
previous research to a situation that may be considered similar to the subject 
of the original analyses. The beneﬁ t transfer method may be used subject to 
the prerequisites that: the problem under investigation is similar to one in the 
context of which results have already been estimated; the supposed conse-
quences of the change to be investigated are similar to those involving the 
changes taken into account in prior ﬁ ndings; the valuation methods used in 
existing studies were carried out at an adequate level of accuracy and due 
care; and the staff, funding and time required for carrying out an original inves-
tigation are not available. Adaptation can be either spatial (to a different area) 
or temporal (to a subsequent point in time). Cases of simple value transfer 
involve the direct transfer of original results without regard to the special char-
acteristics of the population of the area chosen for adaptation. This may be 
adjusted by adapting willingness to pay relative to the average income of the 
population. Some solutions are even more complex: in transferring the utility 
function, consideration may also be given to differences in socio-economic 
characteristics other than income, whereas in the course of meta-analysis (the 
most complex method of beneﬁ t transfer), the results of multiple studies may 
be taken into account collectively. In this order, beneﬁ t transfer becomes in-
creasingly more complex, time consuming and expensive.
The greatest advantage of beneﬁ t transfer is its simplicity, which only applies 
to simple transfers and transfers adjusted for income. The method applied in 
the original survey will determine the parts of total economic value that may 
be estimated using this method. In Hungary, this method has been used on 
several occasion to estimate the value of environmental goods (e.g. Kerekes et 
al., 1998, Brouwer et al., 2016).
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4.11 Beyond monetary evaluation
At ﬁ rst sight, the monetary evaluation of environmental goods clearly implies 
that the economic value of changes can be measured in monetary terms, which 
does indeed appear to be the most convenient option. However, economists 
have long been concerned with the issue of examining the preferences of peo-
ple who have insufﬁ cient income, as is typically the case in most developing 
countries. When asked about their willingness to pay, individuals with a low in-
come may have nothing to offer, which could lead an investigation to conclude 
that the environmental change under evaluation is of no value to such people 
(i.e., willingness to pay may converge to zero), while in fact the exact opposite 
may be true (as pointed out, for example, by Holland, 1995). Based on an 
analysis of eight stated-preference studies conducted in developing countries, 
Whittington (2010) ﬁ nds that, in these countries, regarding almost any envi-
ronmental or health issue, willingness to pay (as measured using money) is 
low in both absolute and relative terms compared to income. So, how can we 
measure environmental changes in monetary terms in societies where people 
are struggling to make ends meet, and are both unable and unwilling, even in 
theory, to support environmental changes that they consider a luxury, or to 
preserve existing natural assets? (Kocsis–Marjainé Szerényi, 2018) 
Environmental economists offer several answers to that problem. Rather 
than money, one option is to use commodities and products that people are 
familiar with and encounter in their daily lives, and whose fair value is presum-
ably better known to them. For example, Shyamsundar–Kramer (1996) used 
rice as a substitute for money in a survey conducted among Madagascar’s 
population to ﬁ nd out how much rice would buy people’s willingness to dis-
claim an area which they had previously cultivated so that it could be used for 
the establishment of a national park.
Another option is to allow respondents to offer their time and labour for a 
cause, which could then be converted into a monetary equivalent by experts. 
There exists much greater equity with time or labour than with money (i.e., 
there is a lower degree of inequality of time than there is with wealth and in-
come): everybody has 24 hours in a day, which makes everyone equal in this 
regard. In the literature, a variety of interchangeable terms are used to refer to 
contributions of time or labour, such as willingness to spend time (WTST), will-
ingness to work (WTW), or willingness to contribute labour (WTCL). Although 
time (labour) as a measure of willingness to pay for environmental goods is 
primarily used in developing countries (precisely due to low incomes), there are 
also related ﬁ ndings from  developed countries (Ninan et al., 2007; Tilahun et 
al., 2013; Rai–Scarborough, 2014; Lankia et al., 2014).
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From the literature that investigates how to establish the relationship between 
money and the amount of contributed time, or to estimate the value of time, 
some conclusions may be drawn:
• comparisons between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to spend 
time (WTST) are becoming increasingly frequent in the literature;
• the monetary value of time offered tends to be much higher than values 
measured directly in terms of money in both developing and developed 
countries;
• the amount of labour offered is strongly dependent on the context: other 
than the amount of people’s spare time, willingness to contribute labour 
is also affected by the quality of labour that may be offered (light vs. 
hard), the time any work takes to complete, and the nature of the re-
spondent’s daily work;
• the literature offers a great many examples of how to determine the op-
portunity cost of time, ranging from the objective (wage based) to the 
subjective, all of which produce a different result; 
The foregoing observations show that the use of money still has the 
greatest number of advantages over other measures (time, commodities) 
in efforts to determine people’s preferences with regard to environmental 
goods.
Although the focus of this chapter is monetary evaluation and its meth-
ods and concepts, brief mention must also be made of another approach, 
namely non-monetary (for our purposes: socio-cultural) valuation. As shown 
earlier, the identiﬁ cation of ecosystem services and, consequently, of the 
components of total economic value often starts with a non-monetary valu-
ation. In addition to monetary valuation, ecological economists propose 
the use of multi-criteria, participation-based, socio-cultural non-monetary 
valuation methods, which are designed to capture a wide range of eco-
system services. For example, such evaluations could be instrumental in 
identifying conﬂ icts that arise from different ideas about landscape use, as 
well as in community planning for sustainable landscape use (Kovács et al., 
2011b, Kelemen–Pataki, 2014b, Kelemen et al., 2014). The ﬁ gure provided 
in Scholte et al. (2015) is a clear illustration of the criteria that are applied 
in these types of valuation (see Figure 4-16.). These criteria concern three 
interrelated areas: the characteristics of the natural environment, the inter-
actions between beneﬁ ciaries and ecosystem services, and the character-
istics of the beneﬁ ciaries. Socio-cultural value is derived as the aggregate 
of these characteristics, which may represent either group or individual 
values. The chart indicates the more detailed factors and issues that may 
be investigated in each ﬁ eld which also affect the nature of the values. In 
Hungary too, a number of examples of non-monetary (socio-cultural) evalu-
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ation exist (see e.g. Kelemen et al. 2009; Pataki et al., 2014; Kalóczkai et 
al., 2014; Fabók et al., 2014; Kalóczkai et al., 2015; Kovács et al., 2015a).
Figure 4-16. Determinants of the socio-cultural values of ecosystem services
(Scholte et al., 2015, p. 69, Figure 1.)
Non-monetary valuation explores the signiﬁ cance of natural capital and eco-
system services, proposing arguments that may be cognitive, emotional or 
ethical, but which may also express preferences, needs and demands (Pan-
deya et al, 2016). Although non-monetary valuation is a suitable complement 
to monetary valuation, and may provide an alternative to and, at least partially, 
address the critical issues raised in connection with monetary valuations, non-
monetary valuation, as used in the evaluation of ecosystem services, still lacks 
a consistent and established methodology, despite the pressing need for one 
to complement monetary evaluations.
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5. The economics of environmental pollution
5.1 Introduction
The classic economics-related publications saw the key to the efﬁ cient dis-
tribution of resources in the functioning of the market. However, the market 
functions perfectly only if competition is free and all inﬂ uential factors are taken 
into consideration in market transactions. It was realised relatively soon that 
such a situation is hardly likely to exist, and one reason for this is the existence 
of external economic inﬂ uences (‘externalities’) such as environment pollution, 
which damages the environment, but the cost of which is not incurred by those 
who engage in the damaging activities. The following chapter presents the 
economic theory about the treatment of such external inﬂ uences and the relat-
ed practical possibilities for their remediation. From neo-classical solutions we 
arrive at a presentation of the theoretical foundation of institutional economic 
remedies.
5.2 The Theory of Economic Externalities
At the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Marshall introduced the terms ex-
ternal costs and beneﬁ ts in a work entitled Principles of Economics. He used 
these terms to describe when an entity with ﬁ nancial autonomy, like an enter-
prise, directly inﬂ uences the position of another ﬁ nancially independent entity, 
an enterprise or consumer without them coming into contact on the market. 
A frequently cited example of such an inﬂ uence that is excluded from the tra-
ditional economy is environment pollution. The existence of such externalities 
disturbs the functioning of the market, which is why neo-classical economists 
found it important to involve them in economic accounting. 
The theory of internalising externalities originated with Arthur C. Pigou 
(1877–1959). His famous work that laid out the necessity of taxing pollution 
was entitled the Economics of Welfare and was published in 1920. 
To illustrate externalities (i.e., external economic inﬂ uences), let us examine 
two examples:
1. A bee-keeper places his hives near an orchard so he can get his bees to 
make honey for him. The bees do their work: they produce lots of honey 
for the keeper and en passant pollinate the ﬂ owers of the fruit trees, which 
thus fertilised will yield more fruit. From an economic perspective, this 
qualiﬁ es as a positive external inﬂ uence (a positive externality) insofar as 
the bee-keeper unwittingly creates beneﬁ ts for the owner of the orchard 
who is helped out by the ‘pollination service’. The owner of the orchard 
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does not pay the bee-keeper for this service; what is more, they may even 
think of forbidding the bee-keeper from placing the hives nearby. Occasion-
ally, the owner of the orchard is so ungrateful that they even fail to notify the 
bee-keeper that they spray against insecticides, by which they cause signiﬁ -
cant damage to the bee-keeper. This latter damage is the negative external 
impact of the spraying.
2. In supplying electricity for surrounding factories and homes, a lignite-
ﬁ red power plant also douses them with sulphur dioxide, carbon mon-
oxide and a foul mixture of dust and smoke. Those who live nearby suf-
fer badly from the pollution from the plant, while those living in more 
favourably situated homes are blessed with the advantages of an electric 
power supply but only a negligible amount of pollution. In this case, we 
may speak about a deﬁ nitely negative external inﬂ uence. There are three 
things in common to the examples above which deﬁ ne the character of 
the externalities, namely:
a) The activity modiﬁ es the welfare function of a third party or parties. 
Positive externalities increase welfare (the fruit producer will enjoy 
an increase in yield), while negative externalities reduce welfare (e.g. 
those living near the power plant will suffer from more frequent ill-
nesses, which will reduce their income).
b) When welfare increases (in the case of positive externalities) or falls (in 
the case of negative externalities), the third party is not made liable to 
pay for the beneﬁ ts or compensate any damages.
c) The inﬂ uence of the third party is not brought about willingly; that is, 
the bees mentioned in the example are not deliberately located in that 
orchard to help with pollination, and the power plant does not de-
liberately emit pollutants to cause nuisance to nearby residents. To 
brieﬂ y summarise the concept of such external economic inﬂ uences 
after Mishan, we can state that they are nothing more than involuntary 
impacts created by one economic participant that affect another par-
ticipant’s standard of welfare (Mishan, 2007).
5.3 Types of external infl uences
External economic inﬂ uences can be positive or negative. They can affect pro-
ducers and consumers equally.
We speak about a negative external inﬂ uence when a party suffers damages 
as a result of the external inﬂ uence. This may or may not be expressed in a 
pecuniary way (either directly or indirectly).
In the case of a positive external inﬂ uence, the given externality affects the 
consumer favourably. If the inﬂ uence involves a businessman, their proﬁ t in-
creases; if it involves a consumer, their standard of welfare grows.
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In our example, the lignite-ﬁ red power plant is a typical form of negative 
externality caused by a producer, while the bee-keeping example may involve 
a positive producer or consumer externality. 
It is common for negative and positive externalities to occur due to an activ-
ity. Let us take a Hungarian example. The motorway to the Balaton signiﬁ cantly 
contributed to tourists ‘overloading’ the lake in the 1980s and increased en-
vironment pollution. However, the positive externality of the motorway was 
that the prices of properties around the Balaton rose and improved locals’ 
income-earning opportunities through apartment rentals (this latter qualiﬁ es as 
a pecuniary external economic inﬂ uence). Interestingly enough, however, the 
extension of the motorway to the Croatian border is assessed as a negative 
pecuniary externality from the perspective of Hungarian tourism, because, ac-
cording to the evidence, most tourists now seek out recreation at the Croatian 
seaside, ignoring the Balaton.
Infrastructural development is mentioned as a special example, usually hav-
ing complex external inﬂ uences. In a telephone system, for example, every 
new subscriber represents a positive externality for others, because more and 
more contacts will be available within the network. With no changes in the 
standard of technology, however, the positive externality may turn into a nega-
tive one if delays occur and miscalls occur due to overloaded lines. 
For a long time the development of the public road system created a domi-
nantly positive external inﬂ uence. Today, however, the inﬂ uence of a busy road 
such as a motorway is rather variable. On the one hand, through pecuniary 
externalities it may boost the price of some producers’ and service providers’ 
properties, while causing signiﬁ cant (pecuniary) damage to residential proper-
ties and natural assets. No wonder home owners and conservationists protest 
against new motorways, while entrepreneurs hail them. 
Through the examples above we have sought to illustrate the diversity of the 
topic, rather than classify different types of externalities into a rigid system.
Since environmental economics expressly focuses on negative externalities, 
from now on when externalities are mentioned they should automatically be 
understood as a form of ‘public bad’; that is, as negative externalities.
To speak about externalities in an economic sense, the (technical) determi-
nation of the physical existence of a negative inﬂ uence is not enough: indi-
viduals must also be aware of its existence. While, for example, in an ecologi-
cal sense DDT has obviously caused environmental pollution since it was ﬁ rst 
used, it has been considered a negative externality in an economic sense only 
since its harmful side-effects were discovered.
Externalities may be classiﬁ ed in more ways than previously described. The 
most basic have been mentioned already. Positive externalities increase one’s 
welfare, while negative ones decrease it. 
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Within the class of negative externalities further differences can be identiﬁ ed. 
Accepting Viner’s classiﬁ cation, we may differentiate between technological and 
pecuniary externalities. From the perspective of conservationism, technological 
externalities are more relevant. In the case of the aforementioned lignite-ﬁ red 
power plant, sulphur dioxide emissions are the result of technology (i.e., they 
represent a technological externality). The environmental problems caused by 
slurry produced at an animal-rearing farm are also technological externalities.
An example of a negative pecuniary externality is a shopping mall built out-
side the city to which customers are attracted, as a result of which the sales 
and proﬁ tability of small shops in the city centre decrease. The same case 
may be thought of as a negative technological externality insofar as due to 
the construction of the mall outside the city – as a part of ‘sales technology’ – 
shopping-related car trafﬁ c and harmful emissions increase.
Besides pecuniary and technological externalities, Bator (1958) and Head (1962) 
differentiate between externalities linked to public goods (undepletable; unlimited 
availability) and private goods (depletable) (Baumol and Oates, 1988, p. 14.). 
A typical example of undepletable externalities is polluted air, the amount of 
which will not decline through being breathed in by others; this public bad will 
remain ‘available’ to everyone. Whether an externality is undepletable can be 
decided by checking if it is divisible, and whether individuals can be excluded 
from consuming it. 
It is more difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd environmental examples of private-goods-related 
externalities. A typical case is waste, which once deposited on someone’s plot 
cannot be simultaneously deposited on someone else’s. Waste is consequent-
ly a ‘private’ externality. This having been decided, the only question left is 
which plot is the ‘best place’ for the waste; i.e., an environmental policy should 
be pursued that ensures the division of waste among plots so that society will 
suffer the least possible reduction in welfare. 
Environment-related externalities are usually linked to public goods; the ex-
ample above about waste management is rather an exception, but here the 
public good quality of the externality has speciﬁ c environment political conse-
quences. Usually, when we focus on internalising externalities it is all the same 
from the perspective of pareto-optimality whether the externalities concern 
private goods or public goods. From an environmental perspective, the real 
problem is not posed by the type of externalities, but rather that the size of the 
externality is different from the perspective of the polluter and those who suffer 
from the pollution. This asymmetry is unsolvable using a single market price. 
A tax collected from the polluter may be enough to compensate a victim, in 
theory. If, however, we collect a tax (‘p’) that we pay the victim in compensa-
tion, we cannot be sure we have created an economically efﬁ cient situation. In 
many cases it is not at all practical to compensate victims to any extent. We 
shall return to these problems later on.
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5.4 Two basic types of environment pollution: fl ow and stock pollution
As stated earlier, a pollutant triggers a harmful effect when it exceeds the 
quantity that the environment can dispose of. The relationship between pollu-
tion that occurs as a result of economic activity and pollution-related environ-
mental damage is shown in Figure 5-1.
Depending on its chemical qualities and the conditions that predominate in the 
receiving environment, the pollutant emitted into the environment may behave in 
a variety of ways, a fact which must be accounted for by environment policy. 
One basic type of pollution, ﬂ ow type, when emitted into the environment tem-
porarily grows in concentration, while its harmful environmental effects depend 
on the quality of the material, the extent of the growth in concentration, and the 
conditions of the receiving environment. The same emission may cause different 
impacts in different circumstances (e.g. weather conditions). The extent of the 
damage also depends on the pollution-absorbing capacity of the environment. 
We usually speak about environment pollution when material/energy emissions 
accumulate more rapidly than the environment is capable of ‘disposing’ of them. 
Flow-type pollution is thus material and/or energy ﬂ ow that damages the environ-
ment, but since the extent of damage depends only on actual emissions, damage 
involves a one-off event. The pollution breaks down through dilution, chemical and 
biological processes and loses its environmentally damaging qualities over time.
Figure 5-1. The relationship between economic activity, pollution emissions and environmental damage
(Perman et al., 1996, p. 198.)
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Most environment pollution is the result of ﬂ ow-type pollution. It is thus not 
unexpected that the theory of environmental economics was built around such 
pollutants. Noise pollution is one of the most obvious examples of ﬂ ow-type 
pollution. Depending on wavelength and intensity, noise is rather disturbing, 
but only while it lasts. Once the activity that generates the noise ceases, the 
noise also ceases to exist by fully dissolving in the environment and becoming 
nearly undetectable. The size of any new noise pollution is not inﬂ uenced by 
earlier noise-producing events. 
From an environmental perspective, stock-type pollution is again of two ba-
sic types: one is fully stable, involving  pollution that accumulates; the other 
also involves accumulation, but slow decomposition occurs.
Fully stable, accumulating stock-type pollution is exempliﬁ ed by heavy met-
al pollutants such as mercury, lead, cadmium, etc., which accumulate in the 
soil, water, and organisms where their concentration continuously increases. 
Every new emission of these materials increases environmental impact, serv-
ing as good support for theories that advocate the ﬁ niteness of growth. In such 
cases, new emissions are added to earlier ones, working their effect through 
repeated increases in concentration.
Other stock-type pollution slowly but ﬁ nally decomposes. This group of 
materials include DDT and plastic waste, and even more typically radioac-
tive isotopes with precisely known half-lives that indicate their speed of 
decay. While the previous example supports ideas about the ﬁ niteness of 
growth, the latter exempliﬁ es the principle of sustainable development: 
the maximum emissions of slowly degradable waste should not exceed 
the speed of their disappearance from the environment. In the case of the 
above-mentioned isotopes, for example, the maximum additional isotope 
impact that does not increase background radiation can be precisely cal-
culated. 
5.5 The economic consequences of externalities
Insofar as the environment can be freely used by an individual producer, which 
is to say that they will fail to sense if their activity causes damages to others, 
this can lead to major disturbances in the functioning of the economy. How do 
these disturbances manifest? 
1. The polluting activity (e.g. the production of goods) becomes excessive; 
i.e., there is signiﬁ cant oversupply compared to the quantity of good needed 
in a healthy economy. This may be the situation with cars, cigarettes and other 
excisable goods today, but in so-called consumer societies the situation also 
applies to wrapping and even certain foodstuffs. 
2. Nothing encourages pollution to decrease, causing ‘overpollution’. Here 
it should sufﬁ ce to mention the environment pollution brought about by inef-
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ﬁ cient energy consumption, high-performance prestige cars, or ﬂ ights of only 
a few hundred kilometres.
3. The price of the polluting product or service is ‘too low’, which creates ex-
cessive demand on the market. If, for example, the price of cigarettes covered 
the functioning of an additional health service that provided suitable treatment 
for the victims of smoking, multiples of the present price should be paid for 
cigarettes. If the price of electricity contained the cost of fully eliminating the 
damage caused by acid rain, we would also be required to pay multiples of 
the present electricity tariffs. These higher prices would signiﬁ cantly depress 
demand for these goods. 
4. While the cost of pollution is external (i.e., is not incurred by the producer 
or directly by the user, but others) nothing will encourage a decrease in pol-
lution per unit of production, which will make the pollution level for the unit of 
product too high. 
5. The fact that emitting pollution into the environment is so ‘cheap’ hinders 
its reduction; what is more, in an economic sense it hinders the reuse of waste, 
and the recycling of pollutants. Nearly every solution for reducing pollution 
involves a cost. The composting of household waste, for example, typically 
involves expenditure and work that the value of compost does not cover. When 
household waste can be dumped in abandoned mine pits or other public areas 
nearly free of charge, composting will never be competitive against this tradi-
tional method of disposal.
5.6  The economically optimal level of environmental pollution
Environment pollution, as seen above, reduces the welfare of society. Citizens, 
just like scientists, should obviously consider the existence of environment pol-
lution to be outrageous and strive to fully eliminate it. In an economic sense, the 
situation is a bit more complex. According to neo-classical economics, the goal 
should not be to eliminate pollution but to achieve the economically optimal 
level of pollution. This suggest that there exists an optimal size of externalities 
which maximises the difference between beneﬁ ts and expenses in social terms. 
To clarify this, examine Figure 5-2., which illustrates the beneﬁ ts and costs of 
pollution-creating production from a social perspective under circumstances 
of free competition.
As the ﬁ gure shows, the aggregate private costs of supply are signiﬁ cantly 
lower than the social costs, including external inﬂ uences. This means that 
the production of the pollutant Qm, is more than if the effects of the pollu-
tion were taken into consideration, in which case only quantity Q* would be 
produced.
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Figure 5-2. The private and social costs of production (Kerekes–Szlávik, 1989, p. 56.)
The price would, of course, increase from Pm to P* if the damages caused by 
pollution were incorporated into the price of the product.
As we can see, the ﬁ gure supposes that, with the existence of free com-
petition, environmental pollution is proportionate to production, which, as 
clariﬁ ed later, is not necessarily correct. The ﬁ gure also indicates that the en-
vironment can endure pollution within certain limits without suffering any irre-
versible change. While the science of economics seems to be well grounded 
enough to decide whether the ﬁ rst two suppositions are correct, examination 
of the accuracy of the latter supposition remains outside the scope of our 
discipline. It is important that we state this right at the outset, because our 
conclusions can only be acceptable if these suppositions are true. Unfor-
tunately, just as there is no perfect situation of free competition, neither is 
there a level of pollution which is perfectly reversible. We should strive not to 
render an over-optimistic evaluation of the propositions of micro-economics, 
as described below.
5.7 The optimal size of externalities
After this short digression, let us see what would happen if our suppositions 
were correct: what would the optimal size of externalities be? The situation is 
illustrated in Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-3. The economically optimal size of externalities (Pearce–Turner, 1990)
It is clear that, in the case of free competition, changes in a single producer’s 
supply do not inﬂ uence price, thus the demand function remains parallel to 
the x-axis. We can calculate the individual net marginal beneﬁ ts that originate 
from a competing producer’s polluting activity by subtracting the individual 
producer’s marginal costs from the price. The line indicating the producer’s 
marginal beneﬁ t (MNPB: Marginal Net Private Beneﬁ t) shows the additional 
proﬁ t created by the extension of the private producer’s polluting activity by 
one unit. It is obvious that total beneﬁ ts are maximal if production is at level 
Qmax. The proﬁ t of the company equals the size of the sub-MNPB area, which 
in reality describes the net proﬁ t of the company. If this is contrasted with 
the external marginal costs generated on a social level – that is, at the level 
of third parties (MEC: Marginal External Costs), the intersection of the two 
curves at Q* indicates the quantity of activity where the private producer’s 
marginal beneﬁ ts are just equal to the marginal damages caused to society. 
This is the Pareto optimal point, because in the case of less activity beneﬁ ts 
would still be increasable, while in the case of a larger volume of activity 
their suppression would increase the beneﬁ ts. Areas under the curves have 
a special meaning:
B  the economically optimal level of externalities,
A+B the social optimum of net private beneﬁ ts,
A  the maximum social net beneﬁ ts,
C+D those externalities that should be avoided,
C  those net private beneﬁ ts not recognised by society,
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Q*  the socially optimal level of economic activity,
Qmax  the level of economic activity
where private beneﬁ ts are at a maximum.
The ﬁ gure expressively indicates that in the case of production exceeding 
Q*, beneﬁ ts will be evaluated lower by society than the damage associated 
with the production that accrues to society.
Provided our presuppositions are accepted (i.e., a situation of free competi-
tion exists, and environment pollution is proportionate to the activity), the ﬁ gu-
re convincingly proves that environment protection is not cost-free, and that 
producers will not decrease their performance to the desired Q* level unless 
forced to do so by an external intervention such as regulation that internalises 
any damages that are caused.
On 15th of February, 1994, David 
Pearce visited Hungary. As an ex-
pert, he was asked to comment 
our paper on environmental prob-
lems related to the Gabčíkovo–
Nagymaros Dams. At the Faculty 
of Business Administration at the 
University of Economics (used to 
be Karl Marx University of Eco-
nomics Budapest), we have been 
teaching environmental econom-
ics for four years already, and we 
have been using the book which 
was written in 1990 by David 
Pearce and Kerry Turner (Eco-
nomics of Natural Resources and 
the Environment). This book, and 
Pearce’s earlier book (Pearce–
Markandya–Barbier, 1989) has 
had signiﬁ cant impact on me, be-
cause it was the ﬁ rst book which 
stimulated the readers for actions. What I read before, related to the envi-
ronment they dealt with the ‘limits to growth’, ozone depletion, with acidi-
ﬁ cation etc. so with the catastrophic situation of the natural environment. 
Please do not forget the beginning of transition, we had a huge economic 
recession in Hungary and we had no resources for environmental protec-
tion, and we had a strange political situation as well. So, we felt the natural 
catastrophe, and we could not imagine that there is light in the end of the 
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tunnel. There was relatively little work in social sciences. Maybe I was 
misleaded by my previous profession chemistry as well. The blueprint was 
the ﬁ rst comprehensive and relatively optimistic book in my hands. Blue-
print encouraged action and did not say less than to avoid the disaster 
and even to change the operation of the economy is possible and not so 
difﬁ cult. With immense pleasure and respect, but with a rather pessimistic 
view of the world, I waited for David Pearce to meet him. And then it hap-
pened. David gave a lecture to my PhD students, and before we went to 
dinner, I took a bottle of wine to the table in my ofﬁ ce room and I tried to 
convince David, that the situation is hopeless at least from the perspec-
tive of an environmental scientist of the former eastern bloc. The glass 
wine was sold out slowly and David drew the essence of environmental 
economics on the ﬂ ipchart above. Today, I’m surprised to ﬁ nd that in 1994 
he summarized the essence in three graphs. Firstly, the circular economy, 
secondly the decoupling and Kuznets curves and thirdly the ﬂ ow economy 
– instead of stock economy. He took me to the optimistic side in less than 
15 minutes. Since then, our profession is still muddling around these con-
cepts. David, unfortunately, passed away, but I and my colleagues kept 
him and his visions. Teaching university students is a fantastic job, but 
even greater responsibility. One must believe that David Pearce did that 
we can shape our future and, of course, even in the Anthropocene there is 
hope for positive change.
Ten years later, in March 2005, I invited him again. He passed in May, but 
he wrote to me: All good wishes and I hope to see you again some day. 
(Kerekes, 2018)
 5.8 Handling externalities in economic theory – the size of the Pigovian tax
Pigou considered society’s expenses to be internalizable with the help of uni-
form taxes levied on production. According to the scholar, if a tax of t* quanti-
ty is levied on a unit of production, it will encourage companies to reduce their 
volume of production from the – disregarding external costs – economically 
‘ideal’ Qm to Q*, considered socially optimal. It is obvious that the optimal 
size of the tax will be equal to the external marginal cost of the optimal level 
of pollution. Consequently, in order to calculate the optimal extent of the tax 
we should know the trend and trajectory of both external marginal costs and 
private net marginal beneﬁ ts. Unfortunately, we encounter serious difﬁ cul-
ties with this in practice. Private producers are usually aware of the trend of 
their own net marginal beneﬁ ts at least theoretically, but regulatory authorities 
know little about them. On the other hand, private producers have no knowl-
edge of the damages their activities cause to society. This creates information 
asymmetry, making the practical use of the concept extremely difﬁ cult. 
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Figure 5-4. illustrates a producer’s marginal beneﬁ ts reduced with a uniform 
tax, obviously being zero at Q* levels of performance and declining thereafter, 
signifying that production (pollution) that exceeds this level is not considered 
by society to be useful. 
Figure 5-4. The optimal size of the Pigovian tax (Pearce–Turner, 1990)
The theoretical signiﬁ cance of Pigou’s point is undebatable, but a few of the 
underlying suppositions are incorrect.
One blemish in Pigou’s model is that it supposes fair competition, which 
does not occur in reality. Competition is always based on a market riddled with 
monopolistic conditions. This is of principal importance because a monopo-
listic producer has the opportunity to create a product shortage to increase 
their prices. A further increase in this artiﬁ cial shortage (e.g. through the use of 
a pro-environmentalist tax) would obviously be harmful from a social perspec-
tive.
The other shortcoming of Arthur Pigou’s model is related to the fact that it 
supposes that one unit of production involves one unit of pollution, and that 
levying taxes on production is enough to create balance.
The situation, however, is that the production of any type of good, depend-
ing on the raw materials, the technology and the environmental technologies 
employed, may result in quite different pollution emissions.
There are usually a variety of technologies involved in manufacturing a 
product, which certainly differ in terms of emissions. The sulphur dioxide 
emissions of an electric power plant can be reduced, for example, by using 
low-sulphur coal as fuel, or by introducing gas instead of solid fuel. Opportu-
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nities are rich because demand for products is usually ‘derivative’, meaning 
that it is not aimed at a speciﬁ c product – which may involve an environmen-
tally polluting method of manufacture, or involve a speciﬁ c product that is a 
pollutant (e.g. DDT) – but rather at the satisfaction of a demand (e.g. elimi-
nating insects), which can be done using other, less harmful technologies or 
products. 
A tax levied on production is obviously unsuitable for encouraging the spread 
of technologies that involve less environment pollution.
This drawback is avoidable if such a tax is not levied on production, but 
directly on pollution, but this necessitates the measurement of pollution and 
raises the costs of applying the tax. However, there exist means of simpliﬁ ca-
tion such as calculating the emissions caused by a given technology, making 
the ongoing measurement of emission unnecessary. This solution, however, is 
not feasible for use in the regulation of certain types of pollution (e.g. pollution 
caused by accidents).
Of course the greatest problem regarding the Pigou model – as mentioned 
earlier – is posed by the need to deﬁ ne the amount of pollution. This is exactly 
what challenges the applicability of this instrument.
In relation to the Pigovian tax, reference must be made to one more problem. 
Namely, the size of the tax, which, as we know, is determined by the external 
marginal costs of the optimal volume of emissions, which may be several times 
higher than the marginal manufacturing costs of the given product. Accord-
ing to some calculations, the Pigovian tax on cigarettes, for example, should 
be at least (approximately) 3000%, which, of course, seems irrational, even 
in an economic sense. The consequences of price adjustments of such an 
extent would be completely unpredictable. Similarly high taxes would also be 
incurred by engine fuels and some pesticides, etc.
Another consideration that is perhaps worth mentioning here is that while 
a Pigovian tax, or other similar penalty, may help control production quantity, 
whether or not it mitigates or eliminates the environmental impact of the units 
produced will depend, in part, upon how these collected tax monies are used. 
This economic solution may not result in an equal environmental solution. Of 
course, if the externalities tax motivates the producer to redesign the product 
or production process so as to eliminate the associated emission (and there-
fore avoid the tax), then both concerns can be met.
5.9 Coase theorem
In opposition to Pigou, Ronald Coase claims that there is no need for govern-
ment intervention because the market will create socially optimum outcomes as 
a result of transactions if proprietors ownership rights’ (perhaps also including 
the right of disposal) are well deﬁ ned (regardless of by whom the rights are held). 
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To prove Coase’s statement, let us ﬁ rst consider the example below. A 
wood processing plant is located beside a river, which receives the timber 
ﬂ oated down the river from the nearby logging camp. The timber is protect-
ed against fungal contamination by impregnation with a fungicide. Part of 
this chemical dissolves into the river while the logs ﬂ oat along. Further on, 
the river ﬂ ows into a lake which has a lakeside hotel. The guests at the hotel 
are mainly attracted by the favourable ﬁ shing conditions in the river and the 
lake. However, ever since the guests have learned that chemical residues 
are accumulating in the food chain, they have been concerned about the 
pollution in the lake. A few of them have even found another place to stay. 
What would Coase consider the solution to be? Let us suppose ﬁ rst that 
the wood-processing entrepreneur hires the right of disposal and that the 
logging plant happens to be owned by the hotelier himself. The hotel owner 
could stop the plant from polluting the river because they have the propri-
etary right. Since, however, up to a certain volume of production and level 
of pollution the proﬁ ts of the plant exceed the hotelier’s loss of income from 
the pollution, the plant manager can compensate the hotel for the loss and 
continue production. This situation will continue while the plant manager’s 
net proﬁ t is greater than the hotel’s marginal external cost. But what hap-
pens when the hotelier is not the owner of the wood-processing plant, and 
the polluter is also the owner? Then the hotelier cannot prohibit the pollut-
ing activity (remember: one prerequisite was that the government cannot 
interfere) so the timber plant manager actually has the right to pollute. In 
this case, the plant manager will seek to make the most proﬁ t possible, 
thereby causing the hotelier considerable damage. The hotelier’s damages 
may be considerably higher than the proﬁ t the plant manager generates 
from the increase in production. In this case, it is logical that the hotelier 
should compensate the plant manager for transporting less wood down 
the river (i.e., for his loss of proﬁ t) – i.e., the injured party should pay to 
decrease the damage. This will be a proﬁ table strategy for the hotelier as 
long as the potential external marginal damage is greater than the wood-
processing plant’s net marginal beneﬁ t. 
To understand the example even better, take a close look at Figure 5-5. 
Let us ﬁ rst examine the case involving the injured hotelkeeper who has the 
right of ownership (and perhaps the right of disposal).
In this case, the starting point is certainly at the origin (at zero pollution), 
because the injured individual does not want to be affected by pollution. When 
can the deal take place? See what happens if the parties involved would like 
to arrive at Point d. Then polluting would be proﬁ table according to area Oabd, 
causing damages to the injured party that match area Ocd. Since area Oabd 
is a lot larger than Ocd, the polluter can easily compensate the injured party, 
because even if they overpay they will be left with signiﬁ cant proﬁ t. It is clear
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Figure 5-5. The development of the optimal level of pollution by way of a deal
(Pearce–Turner, 1990, p. 72.)
that the situation in Point e would be similar; moreover, there is still reason 
to strike a deal as long as Point Q* (the point considered to be the social op-
timum), is reached. Production at levels higher than Q* causes damage that 
exceeds proﬁ t, and thus the polluter will be unable to compensate the injured 
party.
What happens if the polluter has rights of ownership (disposal) – is there any 
motivation for them to reach the economic optimum level of pollution?
Check Figure 5-5 again. In this case, we would probably start from Point Qm 
because this represents the maximum possible proﬁ t for the producer. Pollu-
tion will move to point f only if the injured party is willing to pay more than the 
lost proﬁ t of the polluter. As is clear, this condition exists at Point f, because 
the damage of the injured party (Qmfhi area) is a lot larger than area Qmfg, 
the polluter’s proﬁ t. The injured party then, at relatively minor expense (for an 
amount somewhat more than Qmfg), may be able to eliminate damage causing 
much greater cost. Proceeding using similar logic, we can see that the parties 
are motivated to arrive at a deal by even moving as far as Point j; moreover, the 
bargain may reach the optimal value Q*. It is obvious that such solutions may 
offend our sense of justice in places, but they are Pareto optimal, and thus are 
rational in an economic sense. 
The ﬁ gure thus proves that Coase is right: in theory there is no need for 
government intervention, and market mechanisms are capable of handling ex-
ternalities. 
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Coase claims no less than for an equitable reduction in pollution it is not 
always the polluter that the tax should be levied on, but at times the injured 
should pay the polluter to reduce their emissions. The agreement is theoreti-
cally feasible through negotiations between the polluter and the injured party, 
and the negotiation would also deal with the question of the size of any pay-
ment. Coase’s model, however, involves a few suppositions which seem incor-
rect in practice. One is that the transaction costs of the bargain are omitted 
from consideration, and another that the cost of the negotiations are not ac-
counted for, which may, in the case of many producers and injured parties, 
be sizable. Another theoretical supposition of Coase is that free competition 
exists, which it does not in practice, as we know.
In addition, the following objections may be made about Coase’s theorem:
• The model does not describe the real world very accurately. Only two-
player deals (in this example, anglers/hotel owners and producers) are 
rare or non-existent: it was also neglected from our example that the in-
secticide would also endanger the living standards of further generations 
and harm biodiversity, and it would reduce the wellbeing and decrease 
the welfare of sensitive environmentalists to know that the lake is pol-
luted, etc. Involving all those individuals who are affected (consumers 
and other injured parties) into the bargain is unrealistic, even in theory. 
This is especially true if we take into consideration that the pollution may 
last for decades, some of the injured parties (future generations) have not 
yet even been born, and identiﬁ cation of their preferences is impossible: 
who then is supposed to represent them in any deal? In the case of the 
public goods discussed in the previous chapter, who should negotiate 
with whom? Another problem is that it is often hard to tell who the injured 
parties or the polluters are; moreover, the information needed to deter-
mine the extent of injury is difﬁ cult to obtain, substantially increasing 
transaction costs. 
• The transaction costs of the bargain may far outweigh any proﬁ t. Thus 
we may easily arrive at the standpoint that the currently existing level 
of every externality is optimal, since overly high transaction costs will 
obviously outweigh any bargains, so indeed we have reached the Pareto 
optimum.
• Another important counter-argument is that only a few practical cases 
exist when a bargain has brought about a solution, and not even in obvi-
ous cases when conditions for negotiations were ideal. On the contrary, 
many examples prove that parties involved in such disputes are not in-
clined to reach agreement, and will rather devolve such solutions to so-
ciety.
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Based on the above-mentioned information, we could say that Coase’s 
statement about the lack of necessity for government intervention can be con-
sidered a specious theory. Coase’s institutionalist approach has, however, re-
cently gained signiﬁ cance in practice. It is in Coase’s theorem where the theo-
retical basis of the market for pollution rights is to be found. This is true even 
if the American creators of the market for pollution rights typically fail to refer 
to it. This is interesting, because the market for pollution rights exempliﬁ es an 
opportunity to engage in the practical realisation of the theory. As already men-
tioned, the weightiest argument against Coase’s theorem has been the lack of 
practical examples of its application.
5.10 A few environmental-political consequences of Pigou’s and 
           Coase’s theories
Approaches that prioritise self-regulation have been receiving more appre-
ciation in the  European Community’ practice of environment regulation. In-
volving the full range of environment management, the ISO 14000 series of 
standards, for example, expressly supports companies’ self-regulatory ac-
tivity aimed at improving environmental performance. The theoretical back-
ground of these efforts is again to be found somewhere in Coase’s theorem, 
although let us admit that direct parallels are hardly recognisable. As a com-
pany, bearing its own interests in mind, will only limit its pollution because 
this is worth doing even in an economic sense, the point is exactly that it is 
the institutional system (corporate goodwill, the expectations of clients and 
consumers, social pressure, government regulation, etc.) that can further de-
crease transaction costs to such an extent as to make the company realise 
it is worth operating in a more environmentally friendly way. A company can 
be compensated to reduce environmental damage by customers. Obviously, 
even this case tells us nothing but that Coase’s theorem still works. A differ-
ent question, of course, is whether Hungarian practice has only now arrived 
at the point where, with the introduction of product fees, we are on our way to 
practically applying a more-than-70-year-old theory (Pigou’s theorem). 
The use of Coase’s theorem in an economic sense is a lot more obvious and, 
of course, more market-friendly. Hopefully, we need not wait for its practical 
application for seventy years. There is a problem with its application, however. 
It does not generate money for redistributing in national budgets. Its applica-
tion of course has several beneﬁ ts, such as the fact that the environment will 
be cleaner, and what is more: cleaner at less social cost. This will also mean 
more socially redistributable money in the long run. The question is whether 
politicians who are responsible for the economy are (or will be) patient enough 
to employ the long-term approach, and whether inefﬁ cient means of environ-
mental protection will prevail, if any are used at all.
150 KEREKES – MARJAINÉ SZERÉNYI – KOCSIS
 5.11 Two methods of reducing pollution in the case of one polluter
Returning to Pigou’s concept, in the case of government intervention the pro-
ducer has several options to select from. One possibility is to reduce the vol-
ume of production, thereby approaching the optimal level of pollution. The 
other option is to reduce emissions per unit of product through the use of 
pollution-reducing technology. Obviously, this latter solution can happen only 
if any government intervention is tailored to emissions instead of the volume of 
manufactured products. 
In order to clarify the options, let us modify our original ﬁ gure a little. Figu-
re 5-6. focuses on the relationship between the private producer’s marginal 
abatement costs and external marginal costs. For this purpose, the horizontal 
axis does not show the usual economic activity but the size of pollution. As is 
obvious, very small amounts of pollution have relatively high abatement costs, 
and major pollution lower abatement costs. This situation matches the practi-
cal experience that pollution-reducing technologies (including so-called end-
of-pipe technologies – e.g. a ﬁ lter ﬁ tted to the end of a piece of equipment, 
but also brand new, lower-emission so-called ‘cleaner’ technologies) cheaply 
reduce most pollution that is generated in high concentrations, while the fur-
ther abatement of already low-concentration pollution is relatively costly. For 
example, the removal of the ﬁ rst ninety per cent of the phosphate content of 
waste water costs less than cleaning up the remaining ten per cent; the situa-
tion is similar with air pollutants and other emissions. 
Figure 5-6. shows the external marginal cost curve somewhat differently. 
This time, the starting point of the curve will, according to the practical experi-
ence and considering nature’s pollutant assimilation capacity, not be located 
at the origin but at Point Qa, slightly to the right of the origin. With this, we ac-
knowledge that there is a level of pollution which causes no damage to society. 
Let us examine based on the ﬁ gure how a polluter would react to the effects of 
an internalising type of tax, or any other government intervention.
The polluter will obviously select the solution (from the options mentioned 
above) that is associated with the lowest expense. In Figure 5-4., one possible 
means of abatement is to reduce the polluting activity to the level of Q*. If, ac-
cording to Figure 5-6., we also take the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve 
into consideration, production need not be reduced by all means; it is enough 
to reduce the pollution associated with the production-related activity. In this 
case, the optimal level of pollution will be found where MAC = MEC. When the 
marginal cost of abatement is lower than the marginal cost of the externalities, 
the company will keep on reducing pollution until it reaches an economically 
optimal level of waste emission. 
The MAC curve is similar in shape to the MNPB (Marginal Net Private Ben-
eﬁ ts) curve, but notice that the similarity is only in shape. However, the MNPB 
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curve can undoubtedly be considered a marginal abatement cost curve insofar 
as the only option for abatement is reducing the quantity of production.
Figure 5-6. The optimal level of pollution taking assimilation capacity into consideration
(Pearce–Turner, 1990)
 5.12 Cost-effective sharing of abatement obligations among 
        several polluters, or abatement options
So far we have spoken about the polluter’s options and cost-minimising pos-
sibilities; moreover, the theoretical justiﬁ cation of the victim’s obligations to 
assist in abatement activity. Next, we focus on how to share abatement obliga-
tions among several polluters in order to minimise costs (based on the facts 
mentioned earlier, it is obvious that this solution is also feasible when there is 
only one polluter, but there are several pollution reduction technologies. Fur-
ther on, we shall discuss the case of only two polluters, leaving the job of 
generalisation to the reader). 
First, let us suppose that pollution is immediately and perfectly mixed in the 
environment, which is why it is immaterial where the polluting sources are situated 
relative to each other. Based on Figure 5-7., let us suppose that we have two pol-
luters who have each emitted 15 units of pollution into the air. Environment quality 
regulations permit only a total of 15 units of emission, which is why the two pollut-
ers must remove 15 units of pollution in total. How should we share the abatement 
costs between them if we know the marginal abatement cost curves?
In Figure 5-7., the abatement cost curves of the two pollution sources (plants) 
are shown with joint abatement costs being exactly 15 units at every point. 
It is obvious that the area beneath the two curves is smallest exactly at the 
value belonging to the intersection (in the present case, at 10+5). Of course, 
we would arrive at the same result with more than two polluters, so we can 
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Figure 5-7. Sharing abatement obligations between two polluters in the case of the perfect mixing 
of pollution (based on Tietenberg, 1992, p. 371.)
generalise the theory that the costs of abatement of a given size are minimized 
if and only if the marginal abatement costs are equal for all polluters (i.e. it is 
always the polluter who should reduce pollution for whom it costs the least). 
The rest of the polluters must of course compensate the one who reduces the 
pollution for them. It is largely this theory on which practical systems designed 
to minimize abatement costs are based. 
Pollution does not always mix perfectly, which is why it happens that identical 
types and amounts of pollution emitted from different sources have different ef-
fects. The pollution of a factory situated far from a city disturbs the residents of 
the city less than that of one built in a residential district. In this case, calculating 
the share of abatement obligations is a little more complicated because, be-
sides marginal abatement cost curves, so-called pollution transfer coefﬁ cients 
that characterise the spread of pollution, must also be taken into consideration. 
Pollution transfer coefﬁ cients express how many units of pollution can be de-
tected in an area from a single emission unit of an individual pollution source. 
In the case of equal emissions and identical marginal abatement cost curves, in 
the example above the greater abatement obligation would apply to the source 
closer to the city. The share of abatement obligations in the case of identical cost 
curves would match the proportions of the transfer coefﬁ cients.
5.13 The regulatory matrix of environmental load
Economists have identiﬁ ed many forms of market failure, of which, in the ﬁ eld 
of environmental protection, the most prominent concern externalities. Pollution 
involves the negative external effect of production which is initially disregarded. 
On these grounds, the product concerned is said to have been produced in ex-
cessive quantities, and priced too low relative to the social optimum. The point is 
to increase the price of the polluting products (whether the pollution is direct or 
indirect), and/or to limit their production in line with the social optimum.
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It should be noted that each method of serving the above objective may be 
classiﬁ ed into one of four standard cases. In one extreme case, both the price and 
volume of pollution (thus the product) are regulated directly by the state, and mar-
ket mechanisms are left with no inﬂ uence regarding meeting the social optimum.
Command and control: One of the main types of environmental regulatory 
tools. According to ~ polluting companies should meet given standards. In 
the case of failure, different sanctions (penalties, criminal procedures, and 
closure) are applied. ~ type measures may be especially important in the 
case of substances that poison the environment or deteriorate health, where 
exceeding the limit is not allowed. The ~ approach is mostly a tool for pollu-
tion reduction that occurs at the end of a process (end-of-pipe regulation). ~ 
is less applicable in the case of a high number of scattered pollution sources. 
The application of ~ usually receives criticism for its high administrative costs 
and relatively low efﬁ ciency when compared to market tools (Láng, 2002)
In the other extreme case, the price and volume of pollution (product) con-
tinue to be regulated by the market, while the state remains in the background 
to the greatest possible extent, and in remedying market failure its role is ‘lim-
ited’ to attempts to exert a positive inﬂ uence on market conditions. In terms 
of determining price and volume, the ﬁ rst case involves a pure state solution, 
and the second a pure market solution, with two possible hybrids in between. 
In one of these cases, the price of pollution introduced into the environment is 
determined by the state, and the actual volume of pollution is established on 
the market; in the other case, the state determines the volume of pollution that 
may be introduced into the environment, and lets the market establish a price 
for the pollution. In Figure 5-8. – these four standard cases are arranged in a 
matrix, with each cell indicating the methods most frequently employed and 
the most prominent proponents of the corresponding theory.
Volume of
environmental load
determined by the state
Volume of
environmental load
determined by the market
Price of 
environmental load
determined by the state
direct regulatory 
instruments
(command and control)
(standard, offset, netting)
Pigou
(emission tax,
deposit refund,
abatement subsidy)
Price of 
environmental load
determined by the market
market for pollution 
rights
(bubble policy,
emission banking)
Coase
(establishment of
property rights,
legal liability)
Figure 5-8.: Regulatory matrix of environmental load
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In pursuit of direct regulation, the state takes all tasks over from the market 
and deﬁ nes detailed environmental protection standards for all companies. 
The volume of pollution that may be emitted will be clariﬁ ed by means of pro-
hibitions and norms (standards), and any company failing to comply with these 
will pay a penalty in proportion to its excess pollution, which is equivalent 
to setting the price of emissions. The standard may regulate the technology 
that should be employed by companies (providing them with no incentive to 
develop at all), as well as the permitted emissions or ambient pollutions (such 
standards may, even if to a minimal extent, encourage companies to improve 
the effectiveness of their pollution abatement). With more advanced forms of 
direct regulation, emission or ambient pollution norms (standards) are made 
applicable collectively to several plants at a speciﬁ c company, or several com-
panies in a speciﬁ c region. Examples include emission offset systems, emis-
sion netting, plant overhaul clauses and compensation proceedings (see also 
Kerekes–Szlávik, 2001, pp. 191–193). In such cases, new investments may be 
implemented subject to compliance with the standards applicable collectively 
to the premises of a company, or the companies of a region. These latter meth-
ods are the forms of direct regulation that most strongly promote innovation.
Pigou assumed that for internalising environmental externalities, the state 
should levy a tax to be charged per unit of product, applicable universally to 
all producers (see earlier in Chapter 5.8). The theory is also viable in cases 
when a tax is charged per unit of pollution, which will be assumed in the fol-
lowing example. In this case, the state will, so to speak, determine the price of 
pollution that has previously been emitted free of charge, prompting compa-
nies to choose between paying a tax and abating the pollution based on their 
own costs and beneﬁ ts (i.e., on market terms). The concept also works when 
rather than charging a tax per unit of pollution that is emitted, the competent 
authority offers companies a ﬁ xed subsidy per unit of pollution that is abated. 
A hybrid form of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies is the deposit refund system, 
where the tax collected through the sale of an environmentally harmful product 
is deposited in a ﬁ nancial fund that is subsequently used to support the collec-
tion of depleted products (as in the case of batteries).
Environmental practices based on Pigouvian theory are generally contrasted 
those based on Ronald Coase’s theory (see earlier in Chapter 5.9). According 
to the latter, the problem of externalities should be remedied without direct 
state intervention through a trade-off between the companies at fault and the 
injured parties. The theory supports the perception of the injured parties that 
above a social optimum of production, the damage they suffer exceeds in 
value the proﬁ t of the producers, which makes it reasonable for them to con-
tact the company and cover any loss of proﬁ t involved in maintaining produc-
tion within the conﬁ nes of the social optimum. Coase argues that once the 
rights pertaining to the use of the natural environment have been established 
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(which is all the state is supposed to do), the problem of externalities will be 
resolved by the market on its own. The establishment of a legal environment 
in which companies can be called to account effectively works on the same 
principle. In this case, a company must be prepared that the parties injured 
by its operations will take legal action to recover their damages, which will 
make it unreasonable for the company to raise its output to a level above the 
social optimum when the expected amount of damage is higher than the proﬁ t 
earned from production.
Finally, in the 1970s in the US the idea emerged that in certain cases it is 
simpler for the state to specify the maximum amount of pollution that may be 
emitted by companies in a region, then to issue polluters with the correspond-
ing number of pollution rights, which they can trade freely among themselves. 
In this arrangement, companies are required to abate pollution that exceeds 
the regional maximum, but the share of each company in the abatement ef-
fort will be determined by their individual costs and beneﬁ ts through the price 
of pollution rights (i.e., on market terms). Varieties of this kind of arrangement 
include bubble policy and emission banking, where any excess pollution rights 
obtained through technological development may be sold by one company to 
another (see also Kerekes–Szlávik, 2001, pp. 189–193).
While there are alternative taxonomies with which to classify the above-de-
scribed pollution regulation instruments, the foundations of such taxonomies 
are adequately highlighted in the regulatory matrix of environmental load. For 
example, direct regulatory instruments may be considered centralised solu-
tions where everything is controlled by the state, to be contrasted with meth-
ods associated with Coasean theory, which are aimed at creating decentralised 
responses to the problem of externalities (see also Field, 1997, p. 179). In the 
latter case, market participants solve the problem on their own, and the state is 
responsible for the establishment of the legal environment required for them to 
do so. The two hybrid solutions (Pigouvian taxes and the market for pollution 
rights) are also referred to as economy or incentive-based instruments on the 
grounds that they provide strong incentives for corporate innovation. In these 
cases, the state makes a partial intervention in market mechanisms (which 
have failed due to the existence of the externality) by deﬁ ning either the price 
of (previously free) environment use (a tax), or the maximum amount of total 
pollution that may be emitted (supply of pollution rights).
Today’s practice also makes use of voluntary agreements, by which com-
panies or industry associations enter into voluntary contracts with a compe-
tent authority in order to reduce pollution (see also Kerekes–Szlávik, 2001, 
pp. 196–197). Under such agreements, the state undertakes not to tighten 
up regulations, while companies commit themselves to the timely implemen-
tation of abatement measures. A key element of this arrangement is public 
disclosure. Depending on their nature, such agreements may be located in 
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various cells within our matrix. Where a single company is involved and non-
compliance with an agreement is expected to be punished by state sanctions, 
the case is one of direct regulation, whereas if a company is more likely to be 
punished by the market for non-compliance (for example, by a reduction in 
demand for the company’s products due to an ethical breach), Coasean theory 
is more relevant. In this case, when negotiating the terms of the agreement 
the state virtually undertakes to represent the parties injured by the negative 
externality, but leaves enforcement of the agreement to the market. Finally, in 
cases where contracting takes place between the state and an entire industry 
or professional advocacy organisation, the system will resemble the market for 
pollution rights. Under such an agreement, the state will recognise the desir-
able rate of abatement (which is also equivalent to deﬁ ning the total volume of 
pollution that may be emitted), and companies in the industry will allocate the 
required abatement opportunities on market terms. In such an arrangement, 
companies will also monitor one another to prevent the problem of free riding 
(when a company fails to comply at the expense of the rest).
 5.14 Choosing environmental policy tools (taxes and normative regulation)
We demonstrated above that environmental protection requires government 
intervention. The most common means of government intervention is setting 
standards. Recently, however, the application of economic tools has become 
more popular in the ﬁ eld of regulation for environmental protection. Politicians 
are gradually accepting the idea that resources are limited, pollution cannot 
be entirely eliminated, and, this being the case, they are expected to develop 
environment policy which is efﬁ cient in an economic sense. The criterion of 
efﬁ ciency may be brieﬂ y summarised in the following sentence: a policy is ef-
ﬁ cient when it creates the desired environment quality at the lowest possible 
expense. 
In the next chapter we return to the other requirements of environmental 
regulation and a discussion of the tools of regulation in detail. Now, however, 
let us brieﬂ y clarify only the economic background regarding the choices be-
tween two groups of tools. To do this we return to our basic ﬁ gure (Figure 5-9.), 
where you ﬁ nd illustrated the consequences of quantitative (standard-based) 
regulation. 
Let us examine two cases. In the ﬁ rst one, the regulatory authority allows 
the production of Qs quantity, or the emissions of maximum ws pollution. 
The activity level required by the standard is far below the optimum, as the 
positions of Qs and Q* illustrate. The keeping of rules is usually enforced 
by imposing penalties, but the size of a penalty (P) may not be sufﬁ cient to 
force the meeting of either standards or the level of activity that is commen-
surate with the level of pollution considered economically optimal, because
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Figure 5-9. Unsatisfactory normative regulation (Pearce–Turner, 1990)
private producers – in addition to any penalties – will ﬁ nd their activity worth 
continuing until the point QB. In the given case, regulatory authorities will 
have no choice but to trust that the producer is decent enough to abandon 
their own economic interests and act in the spirit desired by the regulatory 
authority by maintaining production at the level speciﬁ ed in the norm. In a 
favourable social situation, the regulatory authority could have even this 
strange-sounding wish come true. Of course, the regulatory authority may 
accidentally hit Q* while deﬁ ning the standard S2, and if they happen to 
impose a penalty (P*) corresponding to this level, the producer will be mo-
tivated by his economic interests to undertake activity at the level consid-
ered socially optimal. This situation can certainly be generated deliberately. 
It requires nothing more than a well-informed regulatory authority that is 
aware of the situation of marginal net private beneﬁ ts (MNPB) and marginal 
external cost curves.
We may draw the conclusion from the above-mentioned example that in 
a well-informed case the choice between regulation by standards or taxes 
should lead to the same result, but which one is applied is not a question for 
economic deliberation. 
In reality, a regulatory authority is never well-informed enough; moreover, its 
information is ‘asymmetrical’, being more precise in terms of marginal external 
costs and less so about producers’ marginal beneﬁ ts. Regulatory intervention 
thus relies on estimations. The estimation of environmental impacts is prob-
lematic in itself. Pollution usually has spill-over effects; damages are not easily 
conﬁ ned in space or in time. Even with well-known examples such as smoking, 
there are a number of disputable issues. The external costs of smoking will 
obviously include the costs of treatment, operations for lung cancer, sickness 
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beneﬁ ts and other support for patients, along with the cost of a loss of working 
hours, etc. Opinions are split, however, about whether pecuniary compensa-
tion for deteriorations in others’ living standards are justiﬁ ed. The costs to the 
victims of secondary smoking are hard to identify even statistically. Marginal 
net private beneﬁ ts are likewise difﬁ cult to estimate. Thus the question is not 
whether  regulatory authorities make mistakes, but rather how bad those mis-
takes are, and how bad the economic consequences of a regulation based on 
fallacious estimations is. From the perspective of choosing between taxes and 
norms, there are three basic options (Weitzman, 1974):
1. MNPB and MEC curves run in opposite directions but are nearly identical 
in slope, as shown in Figure 5-10.
Figure 5-10. Norms and taxes are equally effective (Baumol–Oates, 1988)
Let us suppose that the regulatory authority correctly estimates the MEC 
curve and guesses the slope of marginal net private beneﬁ ts, but gives a slight-
ly low estimate of beneﬁ ts. Resulting from this mistaken estimation, the norm 
will be set at Q instead of at the optimal Q*. Consequently, the producer will 
be forced to reduce their volume of production, and society will have to give 
up the beneﬁ ts that correspond to the area enclosed by the triangle abc. The 
producer will manufacture quantity Q instead of Q*, which is why their beneﬁ t 
will be less  –  as deﬁ ned by the area QcbQ*. Society, however, will not have 
to suffer the externalities matching the area QabQ*. The difference between 
private beneﬁ ts and social damages is the area of the shaded abc triangle. This 
is beneﬁ t lost to the producer, and also to society, of course. 
If an underestimation is used to create a tax instead of a norm, the amount 
of the tax will be too low, and producers will receive ‘false signals’ through the 
tax, as a result of which they will manufacture quantity Q‘ instead of Q*, result-
ing in damage to society that matches the shaded area bde. Since the abc and 
bde triangles are congruent, we may draw the consequence that provided the 
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MNPB and MEC curves are opposite in direction but identical in slope, it makes 
no difference whether regulation takes the form of a norm or tax, because due 
to the inaccurate estimate the damage to society will be identical.
It therefore follows that norms and taxes are equally efﬁ cient if the regulatory 
authority is perfectly informed, or if the slope of the MEC and MNPB curves is 
identical or nearly identical.
2. What happens if the MEC curve is steeper (a) or ﬂ atter (b) than the MNPB 
curve?
Case (a) happens with forms of environment pollution which are especially 
dangerous and cause signiﬁ cant damage. These pollutants include heavy met-
als, many carcinogenic compounds, and also water pollutants in lakes (ni-
trates, phosphates, etc.). 
As Figure 5-11. shows, the consequences of errors based on underestimat-
ing the MNPB curve are a magnitude less in the case of standards than with 
taxes. The shaded triangle that is associated with the difference between Q* 
and Q’ shows that the social damage generated by the erroneous imposition 
of a tax is a lot bigger than the loss of beneﬁ ts that society suffers due to the 
stricter norm. In such a case, regulation using norms has another advantage; 
namely, that in near-disaster situations, limitation of production does not have 
to be encouraged only for economic reasons. 
It follows from the above-mentioned example that if the MEC curve is steep-
er than the MNPB curve, regulation using standards is more effective.
We can give a more general explanation of the considerations relating to 
regulation. In the case of steep marginal external cost curves, tax-type regula-
tions are usually unfeasible. This is ﬁ rst because incorrect estimates may result 
in substantial social damage, and second, because the steep MEC curves sig-
nal that the environment is very sensitive to the given pollution, and it is quite 
ineffective to rely on an economic solution when the need to avoid a disaster 
is pressing. Thus, for example, it is inadvisable to use taxes to regulate the 
lead content of petrol, the mercury or phenol content of sewage water, or the 
use of pesticides, etc. In such cases the market for pollution rights may be of 
good service because this combines norms with economic tools that deﬁ ne 
the maximum permissible level of pollution.
In case (b), when the MEC curve is ﬂ atter than the MNPB curve (Figure 
5-12.), we may make a worse mistake when using standards if, due to an over-
ly strict standard, the beneﬁ ts to society are less than the standard permits, 
while in the case of an underestimated tax the social damages generated by 
environmental externalities will not be too dangerous. This type of regulation 
can appropriately be applied to reduce energy consumption or sulphur dioxide 
emissions, etc. The ﬂ at MEC curve means that the emissions of the given pol-
lutant will not cause changes in the environment that lead to major damage.
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Figure 5-11. In the case of steep marginal external cost curves,
the use of standards is more effective (Baumol–Oates, 1988)
Figure 5-12. In the case of ﬂ at marginal external cost curve, the application of taxes is more
effective (Baumol–Oates, 1988)
5.15 Does normative regulation spur innovation?
The role of regulation in motivating or hindering technological change is graph-
ically presented by Mendelsohn (1984), who arrives at the conclusion that 
technological-development-motivating effect of regulation through taxes and 
norms largely depends on the steepness of the marginal abatement curves. 
According to his ﬁ nal conclusion, regulation through norms motivates innova-
tion better than economic regulation. 
This conclusion is available in a relatively simple but more understandable 
ﬁ gure which enables us to draw some conclusions for environmental policy. 
Let us ﬁ rst look at a company’s adaptation to a given environment policy, and 
for now ignore the fact that environmental policies may and do change (Fig 
5-13). 
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Figure 5-13. The effect of stricter norms on marginal abatement costs (Mendelsohn, 1984)
If the authority prescribes keeping to the S1 norm, this will be possible for the 
producer at C1 marginal cost, and their total cost will match the area under the 
MAC1 curve. Keeping to the S1 norm can be encouraged by the authority by 
imposing a penalty of over C1 HUF / pollution unit. A company can decrease its 
costs and save the amount that matches area m if it changes for MAC2: a tech-
nology with lower marginal costs. As the ﬁ gure indicates, the potential savings 
are signiﬁ cant. Using a penalty of more than C1 HUF / pollution unit,  the prob-
ability that the limit will be exceeded after innovation will fall, yet nothing encour-
ages or forces the producer to decrease pollution that is emitted at over the limit.
Let us see what would happen if taxes were used. At the start, emissions 
matching S1 will be achieved by the authority using a tax deﬁ ned as C1 HUF / 
pollution unit. According to the ﬁ gure, the environmental expenditures of the com-
pany will consist of two parts: the tax matching the area below line C1- S1, and 
the area below the section of the MAC1 line up to point S1, as the real abatement 
cost. In the case shown in the ﬁ gure, the larger part of the cost is created by the 
tax. This tool thus motivates technological development, because if a company 
implements MAC2, a technology with lower marginal costs, its environmental ex-
penditures will signiﬁ cantly fall. Here, however, the proportion of cost reduction 
is smaller than with normative regulation because the share of costs originating 
from the payment of tax is deﬁ nitive. While with normative regulation the motiva-
tion for cost-reducing innovation is equally signiﬁ cant with both steep and ﬂ atter 
MAC curves, the steepness of cost curves affects the intensity of motivation when 
taxes are applied. With steeper marginal cost curves, the motivation is more mod-
erate. Regulation through taxes, however, has the obvious environment political 
advantage that due to cost-reducing innovation the state of the environment will 
improve even when tax rates are unchanged because emissions are lower. 
As seen in the example presented in the previous section regarding regulation 
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through taxes, enterprises may cooperate to hinder innovation in order to cut 
down on their environmental expenditure. Unfortunately, similar alliances may 
also develop as the result (or threat) of normative regulation. According to en-
vironmentalists, all harmful emissions that can be stopped should be stopped. 
This means, in practice, that the beneﬁ ts of making cost reductions as a result of 
technological development may not be realised by entrepreneurs. Authorities, in 
the knowledge of opportunities for cost reduction, may tighten up norms. Thus a 
company may be unable to reduce its marginal abatement costs to C2, marginal 
costs will stay at C1 (unchanged), while the standard shifts from S1 to S2, which 
will improve the state of environment but decrease the proﬁ t of entrepreneurs.
Since when establishing norms health limits and ecological expectations are 
equally taken into consideration as economic arguments (i.e., norms involve 
making so-called economically acceptable compromises), the tightening up of 
norms is a continuous process. This makes companies interested in hiding the 
results of emission-reducing-related innovation that is at their disposal for fear 
of norms becoming stricter. Normative regulation thus also creates engineers’ 
so-called ‘cartels of silence’ (Scharer, 1984).
5.16 The effect of externalities on a monopolistic market
We examined earlier what happens when the volume of activity and the vol-
ume of pollution become decoupled; i.e., when there exists some technology 
for abating pollution. Pigou’s second supposition was that competition on the 
market is perfect, which is why a private producer cannot affect prices. Let 
us see now how Pigou’s concept is modiﬁ ed in the presence of a monopolist 
market. We can do this analysis10 based on Figure 5-14.
Figure 5-14. The effects of externalities in the presence of a monopolistic market
(Baumol–Oates, 1988)
10 For more detail, see Baumol–Oates (1988) pp. 80–90.
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As seen in the ﬁ gure, the line DD’ shows the market demand for the mo-
nopolist’s activity, and DMR line the marginal revenue. Let us suppose that the 
monopolist’s private marginal cost (PMC) is constant, but for others the mo-
nopolist’s activity creates costs. Without intervention the monopolist’s activity 
creates AB quantity of pollution cost per unit; i.e., the real social marginal cost 
of their activity (SMC). If we do not take this external cost into consideration, 
the monopolist will target Qm level of emissions to maximise their proﬁ t (the 
intersection of the DMR and PMC lines). 
Let us see now what happens if we impose a tax proportionate to pollution, 
which will motivate the monopolistic actors to reduce pollution per product unit. 
This tax will have a dual effect, as clearly shown in our ﬁ gure. On the one hand, 
marginal costs (PMC) will increase, while on the other, after the monopoly makes 
efforts to decrease the pollution emission per unit of production due to the tax, 
the social marginal costs (SMC) of the activity will fall. The social cost of the 
activity will probably be at a minimum where PMCt = SMCt (the t index refers 
to the size of marginal costs provided that a Pigovian tax is levied). In this case, 
the company will opt for a manufacturing process which, considering that input 
costs also reﬂ ect external inﬂ uences (including the costs of the harmful emis-
sions) will minimize production costs. As indicated in the ﬁ gure, the monopoly, 
in the case that the pollution tax is levied, will aim to create OQ1 quantity (the 
intersection of DMR and PMCt = SMCt lines), which involves further unfavour-
able movement away from the Pareto-optimal point. To achieve the OQ2 Pareto 
optimum quantity of production (the intersection of the DD’ demand curve and 
the PMCt = SMCt social marginal costs curve) we must do two things: First, we 
must levy a tax on harmful emissions, by which SMC will drop to SMCt; second, 
however, per unit support (GF) must be offered (the difference between marginal 
cost and marginal revenue) in order to raise the volume of production to the op-
timal level. Since the existence of the monopoly and the externalities are two dif-
ferent issues, it is obvious that the environment policy needs two regulatory tools 
to achieve the optimal state. Taking these facts into consideration, one does not 
need to conduct quantitative analysis to see the complexity of the issue we face, 
and to understand how difﬁ cult it is to plan and actually implement environment 
policy that is efﬁ cient both in the environmental and the economic sense.
5.17 The case of joint application of direct and indirect tools
The amount of damage generated by pollution emitted into the environment 
not only depends on emissions but also environmental conditions. Harmful 
materials that enter the air do not, in the case of favourable weather conditions 
(rising air currents), cause environmental harm when properly diluted, while 
the same emissions that are not carried away may lead to the development 
of smog and easily escalate into a disaster. A similar example involves water 
164 KEREKES – MARJAINÉ SZERÉNYI – KOCSIS
pollution, where the inﬂ ux of wastewater of a stable quantity into a river may 
or may not cause environmental damage depending on the water output, the 
water temperature and other parameters of the river. As indicated in Figure 
5-15., the ambient pollutions that develop as a result of a pollutant exceed 
the desired marginal value (D; see shaded areas) at times, while at other times 
ambient pollutions remain within the level of tolerance.
Figure 5-15. Changes in the incidence rate of pollutants over time
(Baumol–Oates, 1988)
The question now is what environment policy would be effective, and what 
regulatory tools can we use in such a situation. 
If we would like to solve the problem with a Pigovian tax, the tax must be calcu-
lated so that ambient pollutions developing in regulation-led circumstances should 
never exceed the DD’ threshold. Let us suppose that r0 tax is levied to keep the 
average value of pollution at below the DD’ level considered to be dangerous. The 
P(r0) curve in the ﬁ gure indicates the temporal distribution of the developing levels 
of pollution. For the majority of the time, pollution stays at below the authorised 
marginal value and temporarily exceeds this concentration only at the indicated 
time points ta, tb, tc, and td. By imposing a higher (r1) tax, we can make sure that the 
highest peak (in this case, tb time point) stays near the marginal value, but then the 
average concentration would be far below the DD’ marginal value that we desire 
to deﬁ ne using regulation. This would not be a problem in itself if the regulation 
were cost-free, but it is not. The correct environmental policy in this case would be 
that which involves minimal cost to ensure that the pollutant concentration should 
never exceed the DD’ marginal value. Such an environmental policy solution ap-
plies taxes and direct intervention in a combined way. A levied tax helps (ropt) re-
duce ambient pollutions to a level where direct intervention (for example, a smog 
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alert in the case of air pollution, or higher-level waste water treatment in the case 
of water pollution) need to be imposed less frequently. The optimal rate of tax can 
be deﬁ ned by constructing pollution distribution curves that match different tax 
rates, and by analysing the transaction costs of a combined regulatory system. 
In Figure 5-16., the T T’ curve shows the development of the full cost of 
regulation using tax depending on the rate of tax r.
Figure 5-16. The optimal level of economic and direct regulation in the case of combined regulation 
(Baumol–Oates, 1988)
At over a certain rate of tax the total cost of regulation grows exponentially. 
The CC’ curve indicates the total cost of direct intervention, which, in accord-
ance with our expectations, reverses (i.e., at higher rates of tax – where limit 
exceedance is less frequent – the total cost of direct intervention needed to 
prevent limit exceedance decreases). The minimum point of the SS’ curve 
constructed by the vertical summation of the two curves will obviously be the 
tax rate at which the marginal costs of direct and indirect (by tax) regulation 
match.
5.18  Environment regulation in the case of non-stationary pollution
Interestingly enough, the library-size literature of environmental economics 
relatively rarely focuses on the issue of the economic regulation of pollution 
that occurs due to malfunctions and accidents, which typically cause the worst 
environmental-ecological problems.
Environment economic analyses normally suppose the existence of point-
like pollution sources with stationary emissions in most cases. However, in 
practice, the cases that have most public impact (Bhopal, Chernobyl, etc.) are 
due to accidents, which is why this special type of pollution deserves more 
attention.
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It is largely due to a lack of regulation that some of the pollution events that 
originate from accidents and malfunctions create ‘issues’, thereby enabling us 
to study all the deﬁ ciencies of environment regulation. 
In recent years, a signiﬁ cant amount of money has been spent on efforts to 
eliminate operational hazards. In Great Britain, techniques called ‘hazop’ (haz-
ard and operability studies) and ‘hazan’ (hazard analysis) have been developed 
(Kletz, 1985).
Hazop methods explore systematically and as completely as possible the 
sources of danger that exist during a process, and the options for their elimi-
nation and protection against their consequences. The hazan technique helps 
with estimating the signiﬁ cance of sources of danger and deciding how far it 
is worth incurring the extra costs of any changes needed to reduce the risk.
These decisions are very complex and often involve serious social conﬂ ict. 
Legislators are called on to decide about issues such as what fatality rate is 
‘acceptable’ to society, which involves taking a great deal of responsibility.
Posing such questions may seem cynical, but safety comes at a price, and 
higher levels of safety consequently cost more. Resources are not limitless, 
and money spent on improving safety must be spent in the most efﬁ cient way 
possible. We cannot afford to continue with hazardous operations without an 
analysis of possible sources of danger, or consideration of the probability and 
severity of accidents, or without calculating the hazard to life caused by tech-
nological processes. Brieﬂ y: we cannot bury our heads in the sand. 
On the other hand, we should not throw money out of the window in the 
spirit of humanism in an attempt to completely eliminate hazards which we 
already know of, while other – possibly more serious – sources of danger are 
left out of consideration. 
The prevention of environmental disasters that originate from accidents and 
malfunctions requires special environmental protection regulation. Existing laws 
need to be reinforced with stricter ﬁ nancial and civil rights sanctions. To avoid 
speciﬁ c types of pollution and to reduce risks, one efﬁ cient tool would be to force 
companies to be legally liable, regardless of who is at fault. In such a case, entre-
preneurs would have to take responsibility for the consequences of their activities 
even if misconduct on their part could not be established. This suggestion – es-
pecially for entrepreneurs used to the ‘polluter pays’ principle – may sound unfair, 
but it would make improving safety measures worth it for companies. 
The environment pollution risk of malfunctions and other accidents can 
also be reduced by  adequate societal preparations for eliminating the conse-
quences of such mishaps. International experience proves the usefulness of 
maintaining suitable emergency response organisations. However, it is still not 
clear who (and in what proportions) should bear the costs of the maintenance 
of such emergency organisations, nor what size and technical equipment re-
quirements are justiﬁ ed. 
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 5.19 The issue of infl ation and price elasticity regarding green taxes
A further issue with Pigovian taxes is that, due to inﬂ ation, taxes ‘devalue’ and 
lose their power to motivate. This is what happened in a very short time with 
some environmental taxes (for example, fuel taxes) that were applied in Hun-
gary. In consequence of the inﬂ ation that is customary in developed countries, 
taxes need to be increased on an ongoing basis, which usually causes social 
protest. A process of tax indexation would be relatively easy to manage, but 
would lead to inﬂ ation in itself. The inﬂ ationary effect of taxes is the main ar-
gument against environmental taxes in any case, and justiﬁ es the wariness of 
politicians about these instruments. 
The main purpose of the imposition of environmental taxes is very frequently 
to use the revenue they generate in environmental protection. This was the 
purpose of the fuel product fee in Hungary, and this is the primary goal of the 
packaging material product fee, and the product fees imposed on batteries 
and tyres as well. 
In the case of fundraising taxes, authorities may easily be surprised if 
they leave the price elasticity of consumption out of consideration. Among 
product groups usually subject to eco taxes (e.g. energy sources, ciga-
rettes, packaging materials, artiﬁ cial fertilizers), some are subject to dra-
matic decreases in demand when their price rises (for example, aerosol 
dispensers with gas propellants; see Figure 5-17.) while there are others 
with clearly non-elastic demand. A 300% price rise in crude oil, for exam-
ple, according to German statistics, decreased demand for oil by ‘only’ 
30% (see Figure 5-18.). 
Figure 5-17. Aerosol dispensers with gas propellants  –  the price elasticity of consumption 
(Weizsäcker et al., 1997)
From the perspective of ﬁ lling up environmental funds using taxes, the tax levied 
on aerosol dispensers with gas propellants is a rather insecure revenue source, 
because at a tax rate of 100%, demand drops by half, and at even higher tax rates 
the fall in demand may result in an absolute decrease in tax revenue. Taxes that are 
levied on such products will mean that they lose market share. This also means 
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that substantial environmental taxes must be levied on products with high price 
elasticity if the goal is to achieve a dramatic reduction in their consumption. This 
is exactly what the tax on CFC-based aerosol dispensers was meant to achieve.
For environmental protection authorities, taxes imposed on products with a 
stable demand are a safe source of revenue. As Figure 5-18. shows, the curve 
indicating revenue linearly increases in such cases.
It is true, however, that a green tax receives more social support if it is im-
posed on a product with elastic demand than one with non-elastic demand. 
No wonder there is such resistance in the US to taxing fuels, while otherwise 
the environmental attitude of American society is considered to be fairly posi-
tive – at least by American experts!
Figure 5-18. Crude oil  –  the price elasticity of consumption (Weizsäcker et al., 1997)
5.20 Accumulating externalities
In the literature, the theory of having decentralised state functions dates back 
to the 1950s. The theory of ﬁ scal federalism was most prominently advocated 
in the works of Wallace Oates. Later, Oates’ followers published a collection 
of essays to pay homage to the work of the outstanding scholar, whereby they 
also promoted the concept of environmental federalism on a wider scale. The 
debate about the approach known as the TOBM (Tiebout, Oates, Buchanan, 
Musgrave) model is periodically reignited both in the economic literature and in 
public policy. At the level of the EU, one element in that debate is the incorpo-
ration of the principle of subsidiarity into the Maastricht criteria, which makes 
a general organising principle of the need to decentralise state functions. To-
day it is generally accepted that local government and local civil society play 
a vital role in the provision of local public goods. Since the provision of local 
public goods largely requires fundraising and the allocation of funds, a major 
part of the related task involves the ﬁ eld of ﬁ nance. This book addresses both 
ﬁ nances at the level of local government, and the civil initiatives periodically 
prompted by dissatisfaction with the ‘ofﬁ cial’ ﬁ nancial system. The theory of 
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sustainable development and global issues such as climate change, loss of 
biodiversity, or demographic problems such as overpopulation and ageing in 
certain regions, as well as massive migration due to regional differences in 
development, have added intriguing new dimensions to the interpretation of 
local public goods.
Understandably creating a stir, the otherwise excellent Stern report (Stern 
et al., 2007) attributed climate change to the failure of the market, a debatable 
assertion. It is to be feared that climate change is not only attributable to mar-
ket failure, but to the general failure of humankind. Even if energy use could 
be priced appropriately, people would still go on travelling, heating and air 
conditioning, only slightly less. This would at most decelerate but by no means 
stop harmful emissions. The market is typically an ex-post regulator rather 
than ex-ante one. Foresight has never been an attribute of the market; this is a 
human characteristic, in fact mostly possessed by people involved in science 
who are not likely to be concerned with the current state of the market. This 
is a distinction worth addressing, because if climate change was ‘a mere mar-
ket failure’ the problem could be solved by means of economic intervention. 
However, it is not particularly appropriate to consider climate change purely as 
a market failure. It is a mistake to think that the heavy taxation of fossil fuels 
could stop the increase in the concentration of CO2. Our wasteful consumption 
habits and values will certainly not be changed by the market, which is capable 
of producing the very opposite effect. As soon as demand was shown to exist 
for the perhaps most energy intensive new form of tourism, the ‘product’ was 
introduced to market almost immediately. Just one week after the release of an 
ominous EU report on climate change, humankind embarked on tourist voyag-
es into space, and suppliers are now looking to diversify their offer. Therefore, 
despite the fact that climate change is not considered only a case of market 
failure, an inquiry is warranted into the speciﬁ cities of climate change as an 
externality. Climate change is commonly seen as a new type of externality, but 
one signiﬁ cantly different from the externalities addressed by classic economic 
authors. The key differences are that, as an externality, climate change 
• is global in terms of both its root causes and consequences – as re-
gards the effect of the emission of an additional ton of carbon dioxide, it 
makes no difference whether it occurs in Australia or Europe, whereas in 
the case of other air pollutants, the environmental circumstances of the 
emissions are very relevant to the speciﬁ c harm caused to health and 
other effects; 
• may potentially evolve over the course of centuries due to the effects of 
greenhouse gases, and there is often a lag in the climate’s response to 
changes in concentration, with long-term and permanent effects; 
• is unpredictable both in terms of risks and economic consequences; 
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• probably produces irreversible effects, leading to economic conse-
quences that are not marginal. The effects of climate change may have a 
signiﬁ cant impact on members of society, and cannot be addressed by 
simply ‘redesigning’ some projects. 
Owing to these speciﬁ cities, climate change cannot be addressed using the 
same economic approaches as conventional externalities. The theories of both 
Pigou and Coase are based on marginal analyses of the cost and beneﬁ t type, 
and seek to identify optimums along MAC and MEC curves. Climate change 
is not marginal in nature, as any minute shift along the axis of CO2 emissions 
could lead to changes that are in many cases unpredictable and virtually im-
possible to map on the axis of marginal damage. The effect of current pollution 
abatement efforts also depends on the characteristics of future emissions and 
abatement attempts. It will be readily apparent that as regards the CO2 con-
centration of the Earth as a whole, in principle it is completely indifferent where 
emissions are made and where they are reduced. Conversely, in terms of eco-
nomic effects, the economic circumstances under which remediation efforts 
are made do actually matter. For all these reasons, conventional techniques of 
analysis may only serve as points of reference, and a novel approach is need-
ed to solve the problem. Achieving lower concentrations of CO2 takes greater 
effort, which will act as a major drag on economic growth. The actual effects 
of climate change may only be shown on balance sheets. Initially indicating a 
deterioration in welfare, the related curve is of major concern to both policy 
makers and theoreticians since it ‘demands’ the seemingly altruistic sacriﬁ ce 
of present generations, implying a certain intergenerational inequality. It may 
appear that, as regards climate policy, present generations are giving up a part 
of their welfare (by investing in natural capital) to protect future generations 
against a radical decline in welfare. Obviously, in moral terms there is presently 
a need to make up for the negligence of generations following the industrial 
revolution, and it is precisely in response to this that some of the current popu-
lation are asking, ‘Why these generations?’, and, ‘Of all people, why us?’
 5.21 Towards strong sustainability:
        Expanding the notion of negative environmental externalities
After many years of teaching about environmental economics and external 
costs, there seems to be nothing more natural for us than to accept that ex-
ternal effects are unintended. The presence of a smoking chimney or exhaust 
pipe itself is not the ultimate purpose of activity, of course. The purpose is to 
produce electricity or move from point A to point B in space, and any envi-
ronmental load or pollution is only an unintended by-product of this process. 
However, by broadening our view and studying all of the possible technologi-
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cal options for achieving our goals it is possible that we will come to realize 
that these outcomes are not so natural and unintended. The use of a speciﬁ c 
technological solution clearly reﬂ ects values and preferences because we also 
accept the distribution of the costs created by the chosen technology. This 
choice ultimately informs us not only about the fate of ‘third persons’ who 
unintendedly suffer, but also tells a lot about the ‘ﬁ rst persons’ (producers), 
and second ones too (consumers). These individuals accept the technological 
solution by which a speciﬁ c product or service is ‘manufactured’, and they all 
accept the patterns of cost distribution associated with the related production 
and consumption by opting for a speciﬁ c technology.
Of course, producers and consumers can all refer to the general status quo 
by which technological practices are generally accepted by humankind, often 
in historical terms measured in hundreds of years. If a farmer uses artiﬁ cial fer-
tilizers and chemicals to decrease their own costs and increase productivity, is 
this an example of intentional ‘cost spreading’? Is the farmer really freely able 
to choose an alternative; can they employ a more environmental and costly 
technological solution in an economic system based on competition?
When analysing ‘intention’ we never should forget the logic of our market-
based economic system with the principle of proﬁ t maximization at its core. Of 
course, proﬁ t has two basic elements: revenue and cost. Our focus is on the 
latter: cutting costs means an increase in proﬁ t, all else being equal. We usually 
describe technologies that operate at lower costs as better, more powerful, 
and efﬁ cient. But we seldom investigate the source of this efﬁ ciency, which 
might be easily found by widening the scope of analysis: the fact is usually that 
costs are externalized to people who live far away in space and/or time (Read, 
2001; Hepburn et al., 2010); and/or, using an even wider analysis, by stepping 
over the boundaries of our anthropocentric world-view, by offsetting the cost 
to other living species like hens, pigs and other animals (see also Singer, 1995) 
which provide food and basic ecological services for our welfare, or just for 
our very existence.
In a ‘full world’ where frontiers disappeared long ago the sources of gains 
are usually losses somewhere else in space and time, and lots of scientiﬁ c 
information about the potential costs of advanced technologies is available (or 
will shortly become available) to a wide audience.
Thus the concept of negative external costs can be broadened. The core of 
the concept of externalities (see Chapter 5.2) is that disadvantageous effects 
are left uncompensated, while other assumptions may be systematically re-
moved. Thus, using a broader concept of externalities, we allow that a negative 
impact may be suffered by a second person (a consumer), by a ﬁ rst person (a 
producer) or even by a non-person (for example, a group of animals). The pur-
suit of proﬁ t by cutting costs in a highly competitive environment may result in 
cost-spreading strategies which are fully legal and rational in terms of economic 
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theory that is based on proﬁ t maximization; and are fully rational – if not always 
completely legal – in standard business practice. Thus, even producers as ﬁ rst 
persons might use methods which are detrimental and unhealthy for them-
selves to meet the demands for low-priced products of monopsonistic buyers 
(see also Princen, 1997), especially in the developing world, but also elsewhere.
But the concept of externalities may also be broadened by removing the 
assumption that the effect is unintended. As mentioned, when well informed 
about the broad consequences of a technology or method it is hard to believe 
in the ‘unintendedness’ of producers who use a technology at a lower cost; 
and it is also hard to suppose that consumers who buy a product or service 
at a lower price than could be produced without externalized costs do so un-
intentionally. Table 5-1. summarizes all the possible cases of our broadened 
concept of externalities.
1st person 2nd person 3rd person Non-persons
unintended
intended
Table 5-1. A broadened concept of negative externality. According to the deﬁ nition, 
the ﬁ rst person is the producer, the second is the consumer, the third person is not involved 
in the market transaction, and animals are ‘non-persons’. The shaded area indicates 
what is covered by the classic deﬁ nition of externality. (author’s own compilation)
Let us see the microeconomic consequences of the above! Suppose that 
the marginal net private beneﬁ t (MNPB) function is linear under perfect market 
conditions according to Fig. 5-19. As a basic scenario, we suppose that all 
costs are borne by the producer, and no external costs arise. Then the socially 
optimal level of production (Qopt) is equal to the level of production that cre-
ates maximum proﬁ t (Qmax). In this case, the total proﬁ t of the user (and thus 
the whole of society) is represented by the triangle A, and there is no need for 
intervention.
However, in the case of ‘material cost-shifting technological development’ 
(Kocsis et al., 2018), as production costs decrease and proﬁ ts rise for the pro-
ducer, external costs are generated for the broader community (including other 
species). Using our linear model – for the case of technological development – 
the MNPB function ﬂ attens and more product is created in the same period for 
a higher private proﬁ t (all else being equal; see the sum of triangles A, B, and 
C). However, in a ﬁ nite world, and in the case of destructive development, all 
saved costs are offset elsewhere in the form of external costs (see triangles B, 
C, and D under the Marginal External Cost /MEC/ function on Fig. X). Then Qmax 
and Qopt become separated, a condition which cries out for market intervention
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Fig. 5-19. Costs and beneﬁ ts before cost-shifting technological development 
(no external cost) (Source: author’s own compilation) (Note: Numbers are only illustrative)
(see earlier in this Chapter). It is worth noting that Qopt remains the same as it 
was in our basic scenario without external costs, and that triangle ‘A’ in Fig 
5-19. is the same size as in Fig. 5-3, which means that the beneﬁ ts derived 
from production at the whole – broadly deﬁ ned – social level is the same in 
both cases. (Supposing that we are at the social-environmental optimum Qopt; 
in all other cases the net beneﬁ t is even lower in this second case). However, 
there is a big difference between the two cases: the distribution of costs of the 
activity dramatically changes!
It is clear that external costs in our economic and ecological system are 
not so neutral, technical, and unintended as most economic textbooks claim. 
Thus, the theory of cost-shifting technological development may form the ba-
sis for strong moral and political claims. A more political and ethical analysis 
of technological development and cost shifting (Kapp, 1978, Swaney–Evers, 
1989; Broome, 2012) has been offered to re-evaluate the classical tools of 
environmental economics (norms, taxes, tradeable permits, the Coaseian bar-
gain) in the light of ﬁ nite resources and strong sustainability.
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6. The economics of environmental risks
6.1 Introduction
Economic theory is typically used to explain environmental problems as 
the existence of negative externalities and public goods. The economics 
of pollution deals with stationary processes. All of us are frustrated about 
the exhaust gases of cars or the chimneys of factories, the sight of litter 
dropped in the streets and polluted rivers. However, this kind of pollution 
that overshadows our everyday lives rarely makes it to the news, and hardly 
ever makes us think of ‘environmental pollution’. Environmental issues are 
associated with scandals and disasters in news headlines. It may appear 
that ‘accidents’ that lead to environmental disasters, such as those of Bho-
pal, Seveso, Sandoz, Exxon-Valdez, Chernobyl, Prestige – and we could 
go on listing such cases – have become milestones in the development of 
environmental protection. In relation to climate change, the risk of the oc-
currence of natural disasters has increased. Some of the metropolises of 
the world (such as Tokyo and Los Angeles) were built on earthquake zones, 
while areas regularly threatened by ﬂ oods have become densely populated 
(Holland and Venice). The increase in population is a risk factor in itself. The 
next chapter in this publication focuses on economic activities, while risks 
related to natural disasters will be mostly ignored, although we shall make it 
clear that the theoretical material we include may also be applied to natural 
disasters.
6.2 Risk theory and its relevance to environmental disasters
6.2.1 The term risk
Environmental risk refers to both the likelihood of the occurrence of a threat 
and the gravity of the consequences. Accordingly, when a risk is analysed it is 
ﬁ rst the frequency of occurrence of the natural event, and second the severity 
of the consequences of the event which are investigated.
• The risk (R) of an environmental event (x) is accordingly a function of the 
likelihood of occurrence P(x) and the damage that is caused: D(x).
• Risk is the expected loss or damage associated with the occurrence of a 
harmful event.
• R(t)=P(t)*D(t)
• An environmental hazard is deﬁ ned to be exposure to toxic chemicals 
and dangerous substances that leads to sickness, injury or death.
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Risk, by deﬁ nition, is the product of two factors: the amount of damage that 
is expected to be caused by an event that threatens people’s lives and valu-
ables, and the probability of that event occurring. Given the continuous growth 
in the population of the Earth (and the wealth it possesses), environmental 
risks are obviously increasing, no matter whether disasters are becoming more 
frequent.
 6.2.2 The acceptability of risk, the importance of technical and 
         cultural rationality
In consequence of the foregoing, what is deemed an ‘acceptable risk’ in-
volves not only scientiﬁ c but also social evaluation. The problem is only en-
hanced by the fact that science and non-professionals relate to risks dif-
ferently. Professionals make their decisions based on ‘technical rationality’ 
while non-professionals rely on their social experience. As seen in the ﬁ gure, 
the two types of logic barely have anything in common. Based on a techni-
cal rationale, a nuclear physicist considers electricity produced in a nuclear 
plant to be environmentally friendly energy, while an average citizen, howev-
er, will protest against nuclear plants for environmental reasons. The conﬂ ict 
is generated by the differences between the two approaches. Professionals 
sometimes forget that those who make their judgements based on culturally 
conditioned reﬂ exes are more numerous. We should not forget – and numer-
ous industrial accidents remind us – that the caution that is suggested based 
on cultural rationality could save mankind from disaster, while decisions that 
are made on the grounds of technical rationality usually do nothing but make 
certain people richer.
The environmental-ecological evaluation of speciﬁ c products and technol-
ogies also involves a social contract. Economic or scientiﬁ c rationalization 
concerning the use of the former is often pointless: if a social contract is 
not created, the use of a technology may never become widespread. De-
spite their favourable environmental and economic evaluations, the number 
of nuclear plants has increased signiﬁ cantly more slowly than was predicted 
ﬁ fteen years ago, despite the fact that some energy-related prognoses say 
there is no other option but to use them. The past ten years have witnessed 
some radical changes in the value systems of developed capitalist societies. 
Sensitivity, among other things, to very rare but ‘unpredictable’ accidents 
has increased, and there is also an increase in the fear of the long-term ef-
fects of environment pollution.
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Technical rationality Cultural rationality 
Trust in scientiﬁ c methods, explanations, evidence Trust in political culture and democratic process 
Appeal to authority and expertise Appeal to folk wisdom, peer groups, and traditions 
Boundaries of analysis are narrow and reductionist Boundaries of analysis are broad, include the use of analogy and historical precedent 
Risks are depersonalized Risks are personalized
Emphasis on statistical variation and probability Emphasis on impact of risk on the family and community
Appeal to consistency and universality Focus on particularity; less concerned about consistency of approach 
Where there is controversy in science, authority 
depreciates 
Popular responses to scientiﬁ c differences 
do not follow the prestige principle 
Those impacts that cannot be deﬁ ned are irrelevant Unanticipated or unarticulated risks are relevant 
Table 6-1. Factors relevant to the technical and cultural approaches to risk
(based on Plough–Krimsky, 1987, p. 9.)
Practical experience proves that the more signiﬁ cant the expected risks are, 
the higher the social propensity to reduce those risks will be. The less soci-
ety is capable of intervening to reduce risk, the higher the risk it will endure; 
moreover, it will underestimate the signiﬁ cance of these risks.
In peacetime, everybody pays a good deal of attention to vaccinating dogs 
against rabies, while during a drastic fall in living standards society is ‘capable’ 
of ignoring this issue. 
It is likewise not equal how risks are shared among members of society. The 
share of risks is considered fair if those who bear the consequences of a risk 
accrue the beneﬁ ts from the risky activity, and unfair if those who enjoy the 
beneﬁ ts of high-risk activities can offset the consequences to other people. 
Whether society accepts a risk largely depends on how it evaluates the risk 
that is generated by the threat. A risk is obviously more welcome if the related 
activity delivers signiﬁ cant beneﬁ ts, but there are also interesting social and 
sociological factors that inﬂ uence such decisions.
Below is a comprehensive list of the factors that inﬂ uence how risks are evalu-
ated. This includes:
• the beneﬁ ts of the activity, 
• whether the risks and beneﬁ ts are distributed among the same people, 
• whether risks disproportionately affect vulnerable populations such as 
the elderly or children, 
• whether they affect well-deﬁ ned groups or are randomly distributed, 
 ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 177
• the costs associated with risk reduction, 
• whether deﬁ ning a lower level of risk conﬂ icts with individual rights
• whether a risk is new or old
Fairness: distribution among participants in proportion to their contribution 
to the production of the object in question. The object to be distributed 
may be positive, negative or risky for participants. Injury to the principle 
of fairness will lead to the free-rider phenomenon when some participants 
will gain advantage to the detriment of others. (Láng, 2002)
Problems related to the evaluation of risks are enhanced by the fact that discount-
ing of the size of risk occurs in several dimensions. It is a known fact that impacts that 
occur later in time are usually underestimated. Smoking is perhaps the neatest exam-
ple of this. While a smoker smokes a cigarette, they consider the risk of lung cancer to 
be rather insigniﬁ cant, although the statistics tell us that the risk is rather high. 
Discounting of risk also occurs in space. People in Europe do not attach great 
importance to the risk of ﬂ ooding in Bangladesh, or radioactive contamination in 
Kazakhstan (or at least not so much as to sacriﬁ ce anything to reduce these risks). 
Discounting also occurs in relation to how closely we are related to the individuals 
who are (potentially) affected by a risk. We would not be ready to allow our loved 
ones near the scene of a nuclear reactor accident, although we consider it natural 
that people unknown to us should work on remediating the impacts of such an ac-
cident. These phenomenon always lead to the discounting of long-term interests. 
 6.3 Natural and environmental disasters, unlimited business for insurance
We know that in areas exposed to natural disasters (for example, earthquakes) 
buildings are designed to be especially earthquake resistant, and, for example, 
dams and nuclear plants are not built in such zones, etc. Natural disasters, 
however, are not always predictable. They sometimes occur in places where 
people are not quite prepared. The example in the box below proves that some 
natural disasters may hit even powerful economies hard. A single hailstorm 
caused $5 billion damage to Germany in 2013.
The most expensive event for the insurance industry in 2013 involved the hail-
storms that hit regions of northern and southwestern Germany between 27 and 
28 July. The ﬁ rm noted that it was the most costly hail event in the country’s 
history. Insurance losses from heavy hailstorms in July and August in Germany 
totalled $4.1bn, with an economic loss of $5.2bn. The hailstorms in late July, the 
ﬁ rm said, alone accounted for $3.7bn of insured losses, with an economic loss 
of $4.8bn. - See more at: http://www.theactuary.com/news/2014/01/munich-re-
2013-insured-catastrophe-losses-below-average/#sthash.TWTl17k8.dpuf
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According to the World Economic Forum (2011) the top 10 risks by likelihood 
and impact combined are listed in ranked order below:
1. Climate change 
2. Fiscal crises 
3. Economic disparity 
4. Global governance failures 
5. Extreme weather events 
6. Extreme energy price volatility
7. Geopolitical conﬂ ict 
8. Corruption 
9. Flooding 
10. Water security 
The list clearly indicates how broad the range of threats that mankind has to 
face in the twenty-ﬁ rst century is. Natural disasters, social inequality, ﬁ nancial 
crises and corruption are all found among the sources of threat. The economic 
signiﬁ cance that the illegal business sectors that endanger mankind have is 
surprising. Considering that $10-30 bn. would be enough to save Earth and the 
size of the market for illegal drugs is nearly $300 bn., we may feel sorry about 
man’s foolishness.
Counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs: 200
Prostitution: 190
Marijuana: 140
Counterfeit electronics: 100
Cocaine: 80
Opium and heroin: 60
Web video piracy: 60
Software piracy: 50
Cigarette smuggling: 50
Human trafﬁ cking: 30
Environmental crimes and 
natural resources trade: 20
Logging: 5
Art and cultural artefacts: 5
Small arms: 1
Table 6-2. Rough estimated market size of illicit goods based on public sources (in USD billion) 
(World Economic Forum, 2011, p. 23.)
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Tom Massey, director of RWE Power, admitted in reply to a question that 
‘Fifteen years ago, companies were saying that climate change was not rel-
evant to business. You could not measure it, companies had no individual re-
sponsibility for it and there were no global regulations to control it. Many com-
panies argued it was not happening at all. Scientiﬁ c evidence and government 
action have fundamentally changed this scenario.’ 
In the ﬁ eld of environmental protection we have become accustomed to the 
fact that any signiﬁ cant and dangerous problem that is recognized by science 
or the public is initially denied, or stakeholders attempt to neglect it. The car-
cinogenicity of asbestos had long been proven by science when large building 
material producers were still insisting that slates and asbestos-cement pipes 
were harmless. It also took a long time to convince economic actors that halo-
genated hydrocarbons damage the ozone layer, and to limit or prohibit their 
production and use. 
The front page of the world-renowned economics periodical The Econo-
mist has hardly featured anything but climate-change-related news for the 
last couple of years. Still, it is rather certain that it is not these articles but 
rather those about extreme weather events (like the 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
that killed more than 1800 people and ﬂ ooded the city of New Orleans) 
that call the attention of the public to the potentially disastrous impacts of 
climate change. The tsunami that followed the Great Sumatra-Andaman 
earthquake which killed 225,000 people has had a more signiﬁ cant effect 
on humanity than all the UN development summits that have been held 
for years. These phenomena have made the public realize that, in spite of 
all our ingenuity, humanity does not ‘rule over’ nature. It took more than 
225,000 lives to make us consider that all we have ‘achieved’ so far is 
to create a weapons stockpile which, even in the case of an accidental 
misunderstanding, is powerful enough to destroy civilization. We have not, 
however, developed anything to protect us from drought-triggered famines, 
or AIDS, and even less from earthquakes, the latter which we cannot even 
forecast. Even the most sophisticated models fail to cope with nature’s 
‘inventiveness.’ 
We are surrounded by natural and industrial disasters. The threat is grow-
ing continuously despite humanity’s enormous effort to avoid risks. Figure 
6-1. makes it obvious that even although international effort has increased, 
industrial disasters have not become any less frequent. The waves stirred 
by Hungary’s 2010 red mud catastrophe had not even settled before we 
were already in the middle of a nuclear crisis at Japan’s tsunami-stricken 
power plant.
180 KEREKES – MARJAINÉ SZERÉNYI – KOCSIS
Aznalcollar (Spain). Failure of tailings dam
retaining wall, 25 April, 1998.
Kolontar (Hungary). Failure of the ‘red mud’ dam 
retaining wall, 12 October, 2010. 
Figure 6-1. Historical overview of accidents and two photographic example (Kerekes, 2011)
Still, the answer to the popular question whether today’s world is actually 
more dangerous than in the past is rather unclear. Have natural disasters re-
ally become more common, or is it just the damage that is caused that has 
increased? There is no deﬁ nitive answer. As a result of a globalizing world and 
advanced communication infrastructure, the number of known / reported ca-
tastrophes is relatively high, but that does not necessarily mean there has been 
an increase in their frequency. The total number of victims of these is also not 
above the average of many years.
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Figure 6-2. Columns show the numbers of victims in millions, while the dashed line represents the 
number of reported events (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011, p. 3.)
Considering per capita damage, the picture is even more confusing. The pop-
ulation of the Earth continues to grow exponentially, thus the denominator also 
grows rapidly. Yet while the number and severity of disasters ﬂ uctuates, there is 
no clear upward trend. This would suggest a drop in relative risk. The increase in 
risk, consequently, is instead caused by the rapid growth in wealth, which is also 
behind the increase in the value of insured damage (see Fig. 6-3).
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Figure 6-3. Changes in Economic Losses (green columns) and Insured Damage
(blue columns), 1950 to 2000. (Hoeppe, 2000)
Even conservative professionals have no doubt that risks related to climate 
change have actually increased. Among other phenomena, ﬂ oods are often 
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associated with climate change and are apparently becoming more and more 
common in Europe. As evinced by the two tables below, European statistics 
about the frequency of and the damage caused by ﬂ oods do not fully support 
the former assumption: although ﬂ oods have indeed become more frequent, 
both the numbers of people affected and the amount of damage has fallen 
during the last ten years. The improvement indicated by these ﬁ gures is, of 
course, a consequence of efﬁ cient ﬂ ood control measures. As we can see, ap-
propriate protection might offset or even reduce the growth in risk induced by 
the accumulation of wealth.
1980-2009 2000-2009
Number of ﬂ oods 239 147
Number of countries af-
fected 22 19
Number of people killed 1309 511
Number of people affected 
(millions) 3.0 1.3
Economic losses  (billion 
USD) 92.3 45.0
Table 6-3. Floods and their Impacts (total) in European Countries.
(EM-DAT The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database)
Countries Number of ﬂ oods
Number of 
people killed
Number of 
people affected
Economic 
losses (billion 
USD)
Romania 25 169 187,400 1.7
France 14 34 22,500 1.6
Greece 14 15 12,200 0.7
Italy 13 72 20,000 2.1
UK 12 26 379,500 16.6
Bulgaria 11 52 13,300 0.5
Austria 8 1 45,800 0.2
Hungary 6 14 61,400 3.8
Czech Republic 6 38 218,800 3.1
Germany 6 29 331,600 14.1
Table 6-4. European Countries most severely hit by Floods (2000-2009)
(EM-DAT The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database)
Nevertheless, the cost of protective measures is very high. Rich European 
countries already have appropriate ﬂ ood protection systems in place, yet ef-
forts still continue. In economically underdeveloped regions like Bangladesh 
ﬂ oods still cause incredible devastation. The 1970 storm took more than half 
a million lives; the storm in 1991 killed ‘only’ 138,000, while the 2007 ﬂ ood 
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caused 1,042 deaths. Although ﬂ ood control protection systems are being built 
in these regions too, the poor are more severely affected by natural disasters. 
Some storms and ﬂ oods can at least be forecast in advance. There are, how-
ever, some natural disasters that cannot be predicted, and there is no suitable 
way of protecting against them. Earthquakes or tsunamis are some of these.
6.4 Managing risk: the business approach
6.4.1 Risk assessment and its consequences
Scientists and technologists usually pay a great deal of attention to the risk 
analysis of projects or technologies and these risks are usually taken into con-
sideration during the design process. Practical experience shows that only 
events where both the likelihood of occurrence and the related effects are 
signiﬁ cant are considered to be risky. If both factors are nearly zero, it is usually 
not worth dealing with the risk. In the case of a gas leakage, see Table 6-5.:
If seals are made 
conscientiously
If any gas that leaks is not 
dangerous the activity is not risky
If seals are made 
conscientiously
If any gas that leaks is 
dangerous
the risk is small or 
immaterial
If seals are not made 
conscientiously
If any gas that leaks is not 
dangerous
the risk is small or 
immaterial
If seals are not made 
conscientiously
If any gas that leaks is 
dangerous
the activity is very 
dangerous
Table 6-5. The risk of leaking gas (Vastag et al., 1996)
The likelihood that a gas leakage will not cause a problem depends above 
all on how conscientiously pipe seals are made and maintained. International 
statistics  convince us about this fact, which is also well known by designers 
and manufacturers alike, because, interestingly enough, containers, pumps, 
valves, etc. used with hazardous substances leak a lot less frequently than 
those employed with less hazardous substances. This is a good example of 
the fact that professionals are capable of solving problems that they really 
want to when cost considerations are replaced by safety as the top priority.
The effectiveness of related mathematical formulae is strongly limited be-
cause there is no clear function-like relationship between the magnitude of 
damage and the occurrence of an event. If, for example, a reactor explodes 
during a night shift when only operator staff are nearby, or when shifts are 
changing, the consequences of the explosion will be rather different. What is 
more, the likelihood of occurrence and the size of damage are not totally in-
dependent. As seen from the example above, if a risk is high and damage po-
184 KEREKES – MARJAINÉ SZERÉNYI – KOCSIS
tentially signiﬁ cant (e.g. a gas is very toxic), efforts will be made to reduce the 
frequency of occurrence, and vice versa. This is usually true at the plant/cor-
porate level, while regarding the economy as a whole consideration of these 
correlations is very often neglected due to the complexity of the problem, the 
immaturity of decision-making mechanisms, and the underdevelopment of 
political-institutional systems.
Preventing risks (that is, environmental risk management) often meets with 
the dilemma of choosing between a more frequently occurring but less severe 
risk and a less frequently occurring but more severe outcome. These decisions 
are supported by risk analysis. As for when conducting a risk analysis is una-
voidable, Figure 6-4. offers some guidance. While with high-frequency, high-
severity events risk analysis is obligatory, low-frequency, low-severity events 
are usually considered more acceptable because society considers these a 
natural part of existence. 
Categorization of activities based on risks
Frequency of environmental impact
Low High
Consequence of
environmental 
impact
Low
severity
Risk usually 
acceptable
Environmental 
risk analysis 
recommended
High severity Environmental risk analysis obligatory
Project in 
suggested form 
not acceptable
Figure 6-4. Risk management efforts are a function of the frequency and severity of risk events 
(Vastag et al., 1996)
It is deﬁ nitive not only from the perspective of company managers’ exis-
tential safety but also the future development of a company whether it reacts 
appropriately to environmental challenges. Environment management that cre-
ates unduly strict requirements may also be dangerous. Instead of a higher 
level of safety, ‘overprotection’ may sometimes end up in negligence and a 
slackening of concentration. For example, ﬁ re brigades are well-organized and 
efﬁ cient only in cities where ﬁ res sometimes do occur. The same applies to 
environmental management. For a well-designed system work to work seam-
lessly, it must be used. When seeking to assess a companies’ environmental 
management, the correct thing to do is simply to examine how much the man-
agement is capable of controlling the environmental risks of the company.
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6.4.2 The appropriate environmental management strategy
Any corporation that faces environmental management challenges must deal 
with three questions: (1) it needs to determine its foundational level of commit-
ment to protecting the environment, (2) what is the appropriate level of environ-
mental standards to which a company should adhere (and what is the prudent 
environmental management strategy that a company should follow); and (3) 
at what level of the organization should environmental issues be addressed?
Companies can make two types of errors when developing an environmental 
management strategy:
1. They can underestimate or overestimate the business opportunities cre-
ated by growing worldwide concern for environmental protection;
2. They can underestimate or overestimate the costs and constraints cre-
ated by legal and market demands for environmental management.
Both mistakes can signiﬁ cantly affect a company’s competitiveness and prof-
itability. If management does not recognize the business opportunities created 
by environmental awareness, it may overlook a growing market segment and 
eventually lose market share to more sensitive and agile competitors. On the 
other hand, overestimating environmental threats may result in unnecessarily 
costly expenditure, or constrain the company from undertaking otherwise proﬁ t-
able activities. If the business opportunities offered by the increase in demand 
for environmental protection are overestimated, a company may initiate projects 
that do not create revenue. But if a company does not spend enough to comply 
with regulations it may be unable to meet new or stricter requirements in the fu-
ture, resulting in catastrophic costs, ﬁ nes, penalties, or other legal liabilities that 
may threaten its competitiveness, proﬁ tability or survival. Unfortunately, compa-
nies are often led to make such errors by regulatory experts or consulting ﬁ rms 
that try to impose common guidelines or universal standards on companies that 
do not all have the same characteristics and needs, or that do not operate in 
the same economic and social environments. The trend towards adopting inter-
national charters (see, for example, the ICC or CERES principles) or standards 
(see http://iisd.org , for example) that seek to impose the implementation of uni-
versal principles of sustainable development and environmental management 
often push corporations to adopt environmental management strategies that 
may be either inappropriate for their circumstances or imprudent. As Bartman 
(1993) points out ‘no bright line standard exists for an environmental-compliance 
management framework.’ Legal requirements often impose on companies what 
regulators consider to be ideal common standards. Although a sound environ-
mental management strategy should be based on widely-accepted general prin-
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ciples, it must also be speciﬁ cally designed to reﬂ ect the characteristics of the 
company and the external conditions that affect its operations.
6.4.3 Endogenous and Exogenous Elements of Environmental Risk
The primary criterion for designing an appropriate environmental management 
strategy is the company’s ability to manage its environmental risks. A company’s 
environmental risks can be deﬁ ned as the probability of causing environmen-
tal damage and the severity of that damage. A company’s environmental risk 
depends not only on its own activities but also on their environmental conse-
quences, which are functions of external factors. Broad environmental conse-
quences include not only those risks inﬂ uenced by the physical environment but 
also those resulting from the social environment in which the company operates. 
Public reaction to environmental damage is often shaped not so much by facts 
as by the public’s perception of the facts. This difference explains much of the 
debate that takes place between managers and engineers and the rest of the 
population after environmentally damaging incidents. ‘Experts’ and the public of-
ten perceive and evaluate the same facts differently because their knowledge of 
the facts, perceptions about the damage, and ‘social environments’ are different.
In reality, the environmental risk of an activity is always somewhat uncertain. 
As Wynne concluded from his studies of hazardous wastes: ‘The scientiﬁ c 
uncertainties about what happens chemically, physically, and biologically at a 
landﬁ ll site are huge, and the opportunities for examining and reducing them 
extremely limited. Thus, the effects of putting a given waste into a site can 
only be approximately known; these effects are not in any case determinate, 
but depend (inter alia) upon how the site is operated and managed. At which 
site a waste ends up, and in what condition, also depends upon many social 
unknowns and contingencies.’ (Wynne, 1993)
A similar level of uncertainty attends the environmental consequences of 
other impacts of company activities, and attempting to predict either the real 
impacts or the public reactions to them is often impossible for managers. 
However, in practice, due diligence and responsible care may be sufﬁ cient 
strategies for most companies; scientiﬁ c exactness is not required.
Based on these assumptions, we propose that a company’s environmental 
risks can be analysed in two dimensions, although we are fully aware of the multi-
dimensional nature of the problem. One dimension – endogenous environmental 
risks – involves the internal operations of the company, including the materi-
als, technologies, and human resources used in the manufacturing process. The 
other dimension – exogenous environmental risks – are determined by the com-
pany’s ‘external world’: its location, the ecological characteristics (biodiversity, 
winds, etc.) of the physical environment in which it operates, the demographics 
(population density, age, and income distribution, etc.), infrastructure (roads, tel-
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ecommunication networks, etc.), educational levels of the population, and their 
attitudes toward environmental hazards. Political institutions play an especially 
important role in exogenous environmental risks. As Wynne (1993) points out 
from an analysis of the hazardous waste practices of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the impact of regulatory agencies in environmental risk is a 
function of political culture. In the United States, the response of regulators to 
the uncertainty about what happens to waste in landﬁ lls is accentuated by the 
fact that opponents expose and publicize these uncertainties, implying that any 
uncertainty is equivalent to a lack of safety and thus calls for a ban on the waste. 
The American social environment is conﬂ ictual, mistrustful and adversarial. In 
contrast, the political culture in the United Kingdom is such that ‘the ofﬁ cial at-
titude towards the same scientiﬁ c uncertainties has been far more relaxed. The 
response has been that if things are uncertain they could therefore turn out to 
be better – there is no reason to assume the worst. ... If the risks depend upon 
sound operation and diligent waste handling, optimistic assumptions may be 
made unless strong evidence to the contrary exists.’
It is not always easy to decide if a company’s suppliers and customers are part 
of the set of internal or external risks. We may claim that suppliers are selected 
by a company and therefore the latter should be responsible for any potential 
damage caused by their transactions with the company. The situation is different 
for customers, because a company has far less inﬂ uence on them. But if cus-
tomers use a company’s products (e.g., fertilizers) improperly, this may cause 
signiﬁ cant pollution and destroy the company’s environmental image.
Both endogenous and exogenous dimensions of environmental risk are com-
plex, but they differ in terms of their implications. The ﬁ rst dimension – environ-
mental risks created by the internal operations of a company – is more clearly 
under the control of management and regulatory authorities. The second di-
mension – environmental risks created by externalities – are usually beyond the 
inﬂ uence or control of either the company or regulators. As a result, environmen-
talists and managers debate whether multinational companies should comply 
with the requirements of the host country in which they operate, or the home 
country in which they have their headquarters. One issue that became critical 
after the Bhopal accident, for example, was ‘whether the Union Carbide afﬁ liate 
was operating with equivalent procedures, safeguards, and equipment to those 
at comparable facility in the United States.’ (Morelli, 1999) But even if Union 
Carbide had implemented American standards in India, these would have been 
inadequate because of the lower-level education of employees, less-developed 
infrastructure, and the increased exogenous environmental risks of a chemical 
company operating in this region of India. To lessen the environmental risks of 
the Bhopal plant, Union Carbide would have had to adopt a more stringent and 
constraining environmental management strategy than at its American plants to 
compensate for the differences in infrastructure and levels of education in India. 
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The level of education and training of people who live around a plant are at least 
as important as the internal operations of the company in determining environ-
mental risk. The Bhopal accident and the Chernobyl incident would have caused 
much less damage if the neighbouring population had been more concerned 
about environmental hazards and better trained in emergency procedures.
The importance of considering both endogenous and exogenous factors in deter-
mining a company’s potential environmental risk can be further illustrated using an 
example from Hungary. In Hungary, many chemical companies that had originally 
been located well outside cities were later surrounded following the development 
of urban centres into suburbs and rural hinterlands. At the beginning, even heavily 
polluting companies did not cause a problem because they were relatively far from 
cities. Today, even those companies that meet all environmental regulations but 
which are now surrounded by cities may have environmental conﬂ icts and prob-
lems. The 1993 explosion at a Budapest chemical plant – although the damage 
from the explosion did not extend beyond the fence – produced signiﬁ cant conﬂ ict 
among city ofﬁ cials and the public. Many people in Budapest demanded that the 
plant be closed, whereas forty years earlier people living in Budapest would not 
even have noticed that something had happened on the grounds of the plant.
6.4.4 Environmental Management as a Function of Environmental Risk
Based on endogenous and exogenous risks, alternative environmental manage-
ment strategies can be categorized into four groups, as shown in Figure 6-5.
 
Proactive
Reactive
Strategic
Crisis Preventive
Exogenous Environmental Risks
Endogenous
environmental
Risks
Small
Large
Small Large
 
Figure 6-5. Exogenous and endogenous environmental risks (Vastag et al., 1996)
The endogenous environmental risks along the vertical axis and exogenous 
environmental risks along the horizontal access are, for the purposes of il-
lustration, divided into small and large. The cells describe four environmental 
management approaches with these combinations of large and small exog-
enous and endogenous risks.
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1. Reactive Environmental Management (Group A): Group A consists of those 
companies, for example, that emit low levels of pollution and these pol-
lutants are not environmentally dangerous, or the number of people that 
they affect is small. In this group, companies may use non-exhaustible 
resources as raw materials, production is not energy-intensive, and their 
activities do not involve the transportation of massive volumes of hazard-
ous materials. Mass production industries such as textiles that use well-
developed technologies, precision industries, and some food industries 
could appropriately adopt a reactive environmental management strategy. 
At these companies, environmental management calls merely for comply-
ing with environmental regulations without the need to take extraordinary 
precautions to prevent highly unlikely environmental damages. This ap-
proach does not have a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on the company’s operations, 
and responsibility for monitoring compliance can be carried out at the 
middle-management level by an environment and safety ofﬁ cer.
2. Proactive Environmental Management (Group B). Group B consists of those 
companies that have high levels of pollution or that produce pollutants 
that are environmentally dangerous. However, because of their location or 
good environmental infrastructure the adverse ecological and health conse-
quences of these pollutants are small. At these companies the environmen-
tal function is more signiﬁ cant than in Group A; managers have to anticipate 
future changes in environmental regulations, technology and public opinion. 
The environmental management of these companies is often highly decen-
tralized to the plants where the critical technologies are concentrated.
3. Strategic Environmental Management (Group C). This group consists of 
companies that are highly polluting and that operate in a social or physical 
context in which risks are further increased by the external infrastructure or 
public attitudes toward environmental hazards. At these companies, envi-
ronmental management must be an important part of the company’s wider 
business strategy and should be dealt with at the senior management 
level. These companies must often go beyond compliance with environ-
mental regulations and employ more aggressive safeguards to prevent or 
reduce environmental damage. Their environmental management strategy 
should be well-deﬁ ned, highly visible in company publications, and moni-
tored carefully to protect managers against legal action.
4. Crisis Preventive Environmental Management (Group D). In this group, compa-
nies are not high-level polluters either because they do not use large volumes 
of inputs, or associated pollution happens indirectly (e.g., tourism, fast food 
chains) and their direct effect is not signiﬁ cant. Whatever pollution does occur, 
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however, may be visible and affect large numbers of people or a wide territory. 
Examples include electrical energy plants that use clean energy sources, nu-
clear plants, and hydroelectric stations (except for ﬂ at-land based ones). The 
related environmental management strategy can be best characterized as crisis 
preventive, where public education campaigns are combined with elaborate 
technical precautions that assure the public that pollution is not worsening, and 
nor do they misperceive the dangers of the low-level pollution that is occurring.
6.4.5 Comparing Reactive and Strategic Environmental Management
The reactive and strategic environmental management approaches represent two 
extremes where external and internal environmental risks are balanced. In the 
former, there is no pressure to do anything beyond comply with routine regula-
tions; in the latter, the company is under enormous pressure to go beyond compli-
ance. In the other two approaches (proactive, and crisis preventive) the situation 
is unbalanced: either the perceived environmental damage or opportunities are 
overestimated or they are underestimated. In these cases, it may not be necessary 
or proﬁ table to move from proactive or crisis preventive approaches to a strategic 
management approach. Through control of technology and public opinion moni-
toring, moving toward reactive management may be another option. The differ-
ence in costs and requirements between the reactive and strategic environmental 
management approaches are enormous, as illustrated in Table 6-6.
Reactive Activity Strategic
Mid-level management 
involvement, environmental 
committee less critical.
management seniority level
Senior management leadership, 
environmental committee in key 
position.
Low. environmental management reporting level
Very high (Chairman or CEO 
level).
There is time to ﬁ x problems. uneven performance of environmental management
Serious and immediate 
intervention is required.
Cost optimization is important. cost control Risk reduction is the critical issue, cost does not matter.
Special training for experts and 
for middle management training and education.
Corporation-wide, speciﬁ c 
training for senior and middle 
management.
Emission reduction. management focus Outstanding environmental performance.
Monitoring and control. main activity of environmental management Innovation and communication.
Compliance with regulation. regulatory focus To be the industry standard.
Use of (slightly) less than 
state-of-the-art technologies is 
acceptable.
innovation in pollution 
prevention
Technological innovation to 
state-of-the-art level is critical 
for staying in business; it is part 
of competitiveness.
Table 6-6. Comparison of reactive and strategic environmental management (Vastag et al., 1996)
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A reactive environmental management approach does not mean that compa-
nies pay no attention to opportunities for emission reduction, waste manage-
ment, or more stringent water treatment practices. But because these are not 
central to the operations of the company, they can be dealt with by middle 
managers or experts rather than by senior management. Problems normally 
do not require immediate intervention because their non-crisis nature leaves 
time to ﬁ x them. Not every employee will automatically be given environmen-
tal education and training; it may be enough to have activities monitored by 
company experts. Reducing pollution through monitoring equipment or ‘end of 
pipe’ ﬁ lters is the primary goal of these companies. Demand for environmental 
investment comes from stricter regulations and norms, and these regulations 
and norms are the main forces driving these companies to make environmental 
improvements.
At those companies where environmental performance is a crucial element 
of business activities, environmental management has to be part of the com-
pany’s overall business strategy, and is formulated and implemented by top 
management. A high-level environmental committee that includes outside ex-
perts should play an important role in environment-related decisions. The ob-
jectives of environmental management are derived from the company’s long-
term strategy and not from current environmental regulations. All employees 
should be educated about environmental hazards and environmental invest-
ments should include state-of-art technology and intensive attempts to reduce 
waste and pollution in the manufacturing process rather than relying on end-
of-pipe solutions.
6.4.6 Lessons learned from a combined natural and industrial disaster
The red mud spill in Hungary was a special combination of an industrial and 
a natural disaster. This is one of the reasons it is difﬁ cult to pinpoint who was 
responsible for the event. Natural disasters tend to raise questions about re-
sponsibility that are different from those of ‘purely’ industrial catastrophes. 
Interestingly, however, nature often plays an important role in industrial dis-
asters. Extreme weather played a role in both the Exxon Valdez incident and 
the accident in the Gulf of Mexico. The role of exceptional weather conditions 
– rainfall amounting to ten times the average and a severe windstorm – was 
also mentioned in connection with the accident in Hungary. Yet is it also true 
that extreme rain and wind (extraordinary natural phenomena) can absolve 
corporate managers from their responsibilities, or limit the extent thereof? 
How should the important principles of environmental protection such as the 
‘principle of due diligence’ or the ‘precautionary principle,’ be interpreted in 
the context of industrial disasters or activities associated with signiﬁ cant eco-
logical risk? 
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A Harvard case study treated the Exxon Valdez incident as a human resource 
issue. According to the study written by the world’s leading business school 
the problem was that the tanker’s captain was an alcoholic. Leaving the crew 
and the cargo to be transported by an alcoholic was no doubt an HR mistake. 
It is surprising, however, that the case study did not mention the continu-
ous environmental catastrophe that many huge oil tankers were causing at the 
time. These boats regularly pumped seawater into their tanks on the way back 
from port as ballast, and then pumped the oil-contaminated water back into 
the sea near the oil rigs. No one called to account the owners of such boats 
for this ‘slow catastrophe’. Also, the case study never mentioned that the size 
of the tankers represented an unjustiﬁ able magnitude of risk. Those enormous 
tankers were only built to economize on oil transportation costs. Accordingly, 
fuel was slightly cheaper in the US, while corporations’ proﬁ ts grew larger. 
Whether the saving of a few cents per litre is worth the increased risk of a po-
tential environmental disaster has, ‘naturally enough’, never been investigated.
Morelli (1999) argues that business and industry are preparing for a dramatic 
shift in responsibility. Recent decades have shown that trust has become a 
fundamental issue for both governments and economic actors. According 
to Eurobarometer surveys, politicians and corporate managers are no longer 
trusted by European citizens, and neither are scientists. One could make the 
rather cynical argument that the public does not greatly trust NGOs either, 
even although it is members of the public who establish them. 
It was apparently due to this mistrust that, besides Hungarian green or-
ganizations, two international NGOs – Greenpeace and Robin des Bois from 
France – also decided to create an on-the-ground presence at the site of the 
red mud catastrophe. 
Based on the work of respectable scientists and a number of studies, a 
signiﬁ cant number of Hungarian institutions concluded that neither drinking 
water sources nor the soil were endangered by the material that had been spilt; 
nevertheless, the two NGOs ﬂ ooded the media with statements claiming quite 
the opposite.
‘Robin des Bois cannot really give credence to the statements of those Hungar-
ian professors and scientists who claim that there is no risk of radioactivity, nor of 
heavy metal migration into the deep soil layers’ (Nithart–Bossard, 2010). This is 
despite the fact that they only sent two experts to the affected area, who reported 
that ‘The area ﬂ ooded by the red mud spill in Hungary directly affects the lives of 
some 8,500 inhabitants. Only to mention a couple of examples: approximately 70 
tons of arsenic, 70 t lead, 130 t nickel, 650 t chromium, 700 t vanadium, 1 600 t 
sulphur and 114 000 tons of aluminium were released into nature. Arsenic, nickel 
and chromium 6 have carcinogenic effects’ (Nithart–Bossard, 2010).
And: ‘On 4 October 2010, at 1:30pm, the western wall of one of a chain 
of red mud reservoirs operated by Magyar Alumínium ZRt – MAL collapsed, 
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freeing about 600 to 1,000 thousand cubic meters of red mud, a waste prod-
uct of the bauxite reﬁ ning process’ (http://greenproﬁ t.hu/forum/viewtopic.
php?f=34&p=28048 ).
I have not actually checked whether these numbers are correct, but they 
do sound rather frightening. What I do know, however, is that those elements 
were not added to the mud during processing, but they were there originally, 
and their concentration could have at most doubled, and even then only if the 
bauxite had been of very good quality (in this case, sodium hydroxide would 
have dissolved at most half of the bauxite ore – only the aluminium oxide – 
thereby increasing the concentration of various other elements in the remain-
ing mud). Of course, nor does this mean that those elements would have been 
‘free’, as they are present in the mud in the form of insoluble compounds. 
A long citation such as the following one may not be exactly appropriate here, 
yet in this very case it might be worth knowing what the ‘ofﬁ cial’ statement (al-
beit not really read by anyone outside Hungary) about the accident says:
‘Based on the independent examinations of the National Institute of Envi-
ronmental Health and the experts of HAS, there are no signiﬁ cant amounts of 
metal contaminants in the red sludge and the concentrations of toxic metals 
do not exceed the standard limits in the soil, but the pH measured from an 
aqueous extract of the industrial waste is 11.8, which indicates a strong base. 
According to the analysis of the samples taken by the Institute of Materials and 
Environmental Chemistry of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on October 
5th, the red sludge contained cadmium, chrome, mercury, nickel, lead and zinc 
in concentrations smaller (in some cases considerably smaller) than the values 
allowed for waste mud. The arsenic content of the samples taken from the 
area of Kolontár and analysed by the Institute of Materials and Environmental 
Chemistry was also less than the values allowed. The laboratory analysis of the 
soil samples taken on October 8, 2010 conducted by HAS’ Research Institute 
for Soil Science and Agricultural Chemistry has shown that heavy metals from 
the red sludge did not reach deeper than 10 centimetres into the soil, and even 
there their level did not exceed the values permitted for contaminants. Based 
on these results, it is safe to conclude that the deeper layers of the soil and the 
ﬁ rst water-table are not in immediate danger. 
Based on laboratory analyses, the Ofﬁ ce of the Chief Medical Ofﬁ cer has is-
sued a statement to the effect that the red sludge waste matter is dangerous 
to human health, living organisms, and the environment because of its highly 
basic effect.
Experts of the National Service for Radiation Health Emergency Prepared-
ness examined the radiation levels of the affected area, mainly in Kolontár and 
Devecser. The spilled red sludge is not radioactive. The so-called activity-con-
centration of the samples gathered is close to natural values of soil, so it is safe 
to say that they do not pose health risks. According to the ofﬁ cial statement 
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of the National Service for Radiation Health Emergency Preparedness, the red 
sludge does not pose any health risk for those living in the area as far as radio-
activity is concerned.
After the analysis of the samples taken according to strict regulations, The 
University of Pannonia and the National Public Health and Medical Ofﬁ cer 
Service announced that the amount of airborne dust in the affected areas has 
not exceeded the levels allowed since October 17, and the level of air pollution 
has decreased in every settlement examined. In order to continuously monitor 
the level of airborne dust in the affected areas, the National Service for Public 
Health and the Middle-Danube-Valley Inspectorate for Environmental Protec-
tion, Nature Conservation and Water Management have been operating an in-
tegrated monitoring system since October 11.
There is on-going quality control of drinking water in the area stricken by 
the disaster. Water can be safely consumed over the whole area. The Middle 
Transdanubian Regional Institute of the National Public Health and Medical 
Ofﬁ cer Service has conducted more than 120 examinations so far to moni-
tor the quality of water, and all results are negative.’ (http://mta.hu/mta_hirei/
osszefoglalo-a-vorosiszap-katasztrofa-elharitasarol-a-karmentesitesrol-es-a-
hosszu-tavu-teendokrol-125859/)
The debate, of course, is still ongoing. Interestingly, society has begun to 
pay more attention to the role of authorities and other political concerns, while 
limiting the responsibility of the company that operates the reservoirs to the 
issue of material compensation, just as good taxpayers do. The ‘big’ questions 
turn out to be who issued the permits, and who supervised the operation of the 
reservoirs? In this case, the question of responsibility is a multi-faceted one. 
Concerning the responsibility of the local notary or the mayor, one might ask 
why there were people living near the dam and how and why permits had been 
issued, or, if these individuals did not have the necessary permits, why was it 
not ensured that they were prohibited from actually living there? It is hard to 
imagine, however, how a local notary could be responsible for the building per-
mits for the reservoir itself. Having some knowledge about how environmental 
authorities operate, we know that they also do not have the necessary exper-
tise. The Ofﬁ ce of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations sug-
gested that the Hungarian Ofﬁ ce for Mining and Geology might be the compe-
tent authority. Although we know this now, it was not very clear until now. Had 
we known of the competent authority, could we have avoided the disaster? 
Probably not. Satellite measurements might in theory have been used to detect 
whether soil was moving, and how fast. If it was actually moving, this could 
have indicated the likely failure of the dam. Then who should have conducted 
such examinations: the authorities, or the company that operates the reser-
voir? Probably both of them, but the ‘principle of due diligence’ would rather 
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assign that responsibility to the operating party, especially as the authorities, 
following the ‘precautionary principle,’ can hardly be expected to know about 
all the potential risks, technologies, and sources of human error. The company 
has the necessary means for dealing with these issues, and they, too, receive 
the proﬁ t, not (or just very indirectly) the employees of the authority. 
Risk theory distinguishes between fair and unfair risks. A risk is considered 
fair if the accidental and material damage of the hazardous activity is borne by 
the same ‘person’ who enjoys its beneﬁ ts. This is, of course, merely a rational 
(or maybe even emotional) way of reasoning. It is almost certain that legislation 
could never deal in practice with such concepts. International experience and 
practice, which may serve as a starting point for solutions, does, nevertheless, 
exist in this ﬁ eld.
6.4.7 Industrial disasters, and how they are treated
Recently, the number of cases where managers have been subjected to crim-
inal trial because of their companies’ environmentally harmful activities has 
grown, primarily in Canada and the US. This is theoretically possible according 
to Hungarian legislation as well. Managers usually react defensively to actual 
legal practice. First, professional responses tend to emphasize the need for 
adjustments in legal practice, and the provision of increased personal protec-
tion for managers.
Corporate managers apparently consider complex, bureaucratic, and over-
documented environmental management systems (typically developed by ex-
ternal consultants) to be the best method of defence in civil law proceedings, 
although it is quite obvious from American examples that such an approach is 
not a sure-ﬁ re method of self-protection. 
The environmental risk of any activity is inherently uncertain, even theoreti-
cally. Wynne makes a convincing point about this with respect to hazardous 
waste materials, ‘Scientiﬁ c uncertainty is rather high about what is going on 
inside a waste dump site in chemical, physical and biological terms, while op-
portunities for examining and reducing this uncertainty are very limited. There-
fore we can only make approximations about the impact a dumpsite has on the 
surrounding area, as the effects are always dependent on how the dumpsite is 
operated. The conditions under which waste is transferred to a dumpsite and 
which site it is transferred to is also a function of a number of unknown social 
factors’ (Wynne).
Considering Wynne’s thoughts, one might conclude that corporate manag-
ers are asked to practice the ‘art of the impossible’ concerning environmental 
management. Yet we should not forget that the lack of a theoretical solution 
does not necessarily imply that there is no practical solution. Concerning the 
avoidance of environmental risks, scientiﬁ c accuracy is not a requirement but, 
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on the contrary, responsible conduct is (usually deﬁ ned as ‘due diligence’ in 
legal terms) (Bartman, 1993).
For practical purposes, the environmental risks of any business activity can 
be analysed along two dimensions. One of them, in our opinion, is a function 
of the materials, technologies, and human resources that are used, since these 
are the factors that determine the company’s inputs and outputs, and also the 
frequency and the nature of breakdowns. This dimension contains everything 
that depends on the company’s internal systems.
The other dimension is the company’s perception of the ever-changing ex-
ternal world. We consider this dimension to include the company’s geographi-
cal location, the ecological characteristics of the surroundings, biodiversity 
and prevailing winds, in addition to demographics (population density, age, 
and income distribution), and other characteristics such as the existing in-
frastructure (roads, telecommunication networks, and the presence of hazard 
intervention systems), the population’s educational level, environmental atti-
tudes, employment levels, and political institutions. 
Obviously, both dimensions are rather complex, but making a distinction is 
important as both corporate managers and regulators tend to devote serious 
attention to the ﬁ rst dimension (environmental risks pertaining to the com-
pany’s internal matters), while the effects on risk of all the external factors are 
inclined to be forgotten by both directors and authorities. Typically, it is only 
after a major catastrophe that they realize the existence of these phenomena.
Informing local citizens and preparing them for damage containment is at 
least as important to the future of a company as reducing the probability of oc-
currence. In the case of a potential accident, it is critical whether local inhabit-
ants and disaster response organizations are prepared to reduce the adverse 
consequences of any accidents. Both the Bhopal and the Chernobyl disasters, 
and even the recent red mud catastrophe in Hungary, would have claimed far 
fewer lives if the authorities and inhabitants had been prepared for their pos-
sible occurrence. 
We believe that companies should not limit their theoretical and practical en-
vironmental risk prevention efforts to their own premises, but should also take 
into account a constantly changing natural and social environment. Corporate 
environmental management must thus not be limited to within the company’s 
own four walls. 
What we can learn from the red mud accident in Hungary and from Bho-
pal and the other above-mentioned cases is that corporations are very often 
prepared for accidents, but even more often they are insured against them. 
Managers are ready to make any effort which reduces their personal responsi-
bility. They often employ external experts, and preferably very highly respected 
ones; they are ready to pay for expensive insurance, and they are ready to co-
operate with different authorities. However, all this effort does not protect them 
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fully against accidents. Every company has to meet the strictest environmental 
and risk regulation standards, should have a good record of environmental 
performance, and should maintain good communications with people who live 
in the surrounding area. But they must also understand that good communica-
tion and environmental management systems, experts and advisers (and even 
the ‘operating licenses’ issued by different legal authorities) cannot neutralise 
their moral responsibility for society and for local communities. Those who 
directly beneﬁ t (proﬁ t) from an operation are and should be the real experts, so 
they should take full responsibility for them, even in the case of natural disaster 
or terrorist action directed against them. The moral responsibility of corporate 
leaders cannot be shared with external actors.

III. WELFARE
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7.  The welfare effects of environmental regulation and 
environmental protection services 
7.1 Introduction
It is the responsibility of the state to ensure the good ecological status of cer-
tain reproducible goods such as clean water and surface waters, and to ensure 
that waste is properly managed. Unfortunately, we have to pay for all of these 
services. Members of society choose from the available options depending on 
ﬁ nancial circumstances, their value system, and on the political environment. 
But someone has to pay the bill. There is no doubt that we want to use the 
best sewage treatment technology, obtain the best quality drinking water, and 
operate state-of-the-art waste treatment processes. It is better to heat with gas 
than wood, but we cannot afford the best of everything. Infrastructural invest-
ment can lead to growth in prosperity, but can also reduce the wellbeing of 
society. Due to high public utility fees, some members of society are not able 
to pay their bills. Those who are free riders not only cause problems for public 
service providers but also generate social distain for themselves. Sometimes 
an environmentally ‘weaker’ public service better supports social sustainability 
than a strong one.
 7.2 The unfavourable consequences of the polluter pays principle
At the time of their accession, new CEE entrants to the European Union, in-
cluding Hungary, had substantial deﬁ cits in terms of environmental protec-
tion, primarily as regards the level of infrastructural development. They were 
lagging behind particularly in terms of sewage systems, wastewater treatment 
plants, and the conditions for waste disposal. On the other hand, they had 
a major advantage in terms of the level of conservation of nature and semi-
natural habitats. In acknowledgement of this lag, the European Union has 
been making efforts to make up for the disadvantages, especially through 
cohesion policy.
The EU’s cohesion policy, which was speciﬁ cally designed to eliminate 
regional differences in welfare, in fact increased welfare inequalities in the 
short term. The construction of motorways, sewage systems, wastewater 
treatment plants, modern landﬁ lls and natural gas pipes was ﬁ nanced 
from EU funds, and these investments were completed within a relatively 
short time. However, following the polluter pays principle, the mainte-
nance and operational expenses of the new ‘utilities’ are borne directly 
by residents.
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Polluter Pays Principle, PPP: one of the most important economic directives 
of environment policy. When applied, the polluter shall cover any costs incur-
ring from the prevention and the reduction as well as the regulation of pollu-
tion. The term was introduced by the OECD in a Council Recommendation 
in 1972. In 1974, the OECD ratiﬁ ed a new recommendation for the concrete 
application of PPP, saying that governments should not support polluters by 
bearing the costs relating to pollution reduction and regulation. This applica-
tion was extended by the OECD to cover extraordinary pollution events in 
1989. The principle was integrated into the Single European Act in 1987. In 
1992, the PPP, as one of the most important environment-political principles, 
was incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty that focuses on integrating the 
countries of the EU. (Láng, 2011)
Some problems are caused because village populations are ageing, small 
villages are gradually becoming depopulated, and the related municipalities 
are experiencing an overall decline in economic activity, while the costs asso-
ciated with environmental protection are rising due to infrastructural develop-
ment. In the regions that have been the beneﬁ ciaries of cohesion policy, the 
incomes of the population have not increased, at least not in the short term. 
Infrastructural investments have been completed which are suitable for treat-
ing waste and wastewater in compliance with EU standards, but the utilisation 
of their capacities falls short of targets, which makes their speciﬁ c mainte-
nance costs unreasonably high, while their operation causes a major loss of 
welfare, especially for the residents of smaller municipalities. Paradoxically, 
developments in the ﬁ eld of environmental protection are also accelerating the 
depopulation of smaller municipalities.
 7.3 Excessive self-criticism, inaccurate situation assessment,
      wrong assumptions in Hungary
The ﬁ rst environmental policy analyses produced after the change of regime 
showed a much grimmer picture of Hungary’s environmental conditions than 
would have been warranted by the facts. For example, the country report pro-
duced for the 1992 Rio Conference gave an account of near-disastrous pollution, 
and not only in relation to abandoned Soviet barracks. The statistics that were 
cited seemingly demonstrated many problems, but only seemingly. One of the 
most striking errors in the report was its ‘account’ of Hungarian fertiliser over-
use. The report highlighted nitrogen fertiliser use per hectare in 1987, and drew 
general conclusions from that piece of information. In Hungary, in 1987, nitrogen 
fertiliser use in agriculture indeed exceeded 400 kg per hectare, but that value 
was accurate for only one or two years, and was not characteristic of the dec-
ades either before or after those years. The high value for 1987 was attributable 
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to the relatively low cost of Soviet natural gas at the time (a major component 
of nitrogen fertilisers). The authors of the reports made attempts to objectively 
describe indicators for sewerage supply, wastewater treatment capacities and 
landﬁ lls, but failed to address issues such as the effects of population decline and 
the migration of villagers to towns and cities. Paradoxically, the statistics were 
unsuitable for even showing ageing in the villages, mostly because aggregate 
statistics are signiﬁ cantly distorted by the Hungarian Roma population. This pop-
ulation is characterised by a relatively high number of children, and a relatively 
low proportion of people aged over 70. The aggregate statistics fail to show the 
real demographic situation because the Roma population is distributed unevenly. 
They are relatively concentrated in Szabolcs, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Baran-
ya counties, while their proportion is insigniﬁ cant in other countries. For example, 
Table 7-1. appears to show that in villages the proportion of young people (under 
20 years of age) is higher (21.9%) than the national average (20.5%), and that the 
proportion of the elderly (above 60 years of age), at 22.9%, is lower than the na-
tional average (23.4%). This is obviously not the case. In fact, villages are ageing 
and are becoming depopulated, and where they are not, in villages inhabited by 
the Roma there is no effective demand for utility services.
Age group Population Proportion Combined age group %
Village population by age group
 –14 483,338 0.1593 Population under 20 years of age 21.9
15–19 183,737 0.0605
20–29 353,193 0.1164 Population aged 20–39 26.2
30–39 443,785 0.1462
40–49 417,543 0.1376 Population aged 40–59 28.7
50–59 455,266 0.1500
60–69 344,957 0.1137 Population aged over 60 22.9
70– 351,951 0.1160
Total 3,033,770 1
Total Hungarian population by age group
 –14 1,447,659 0.1456 Population under 20 years of age 20.5
15–19 593,534 0.0597
20–29 1,229,536 0.1237 Population aged 20–39 26.2
30–39 1,580,913 0.1590
40–49 1,316,193 0.1324 Population aged 40–59 27.7
50–59 1,438,682 0.1447
60–69 1,176,962 0.1184 Population aged over 60 23.4
70– 1,154,149 0.1161
Table 7-1. Village population by age group Source:
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_demograﬁ a, accessed on 02/11/2015
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No analyses have been carried out, for example, to examine how consump-
tion has been inﬂ uenced by increasing water and gas tariffs, and by the in-
crease in the efﬁ ciency of heating and water supply systems. Development 
goals derived from such identiﬁ ed trends ultimately led to the generation of 
excess and oversized capacities in nearly every ﬁ eld. The nearly 50% fall in 
the use of water shown in the statistics is rather spectacular, but it also led to 
a severe decrease in the efﬁ ciency of water supply and wastewater treatment. 
Figure 7-1. provides a good illustration of the radical fall in water consumption 
as a result of the increase in water tariffs between 1990 and 2013.
Figure 7-1. Changes in Hungarian water tariffs and water consumption, 1990–2012
(https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/telepinfra/telepinfra13.pdf)
The tendency for sewerage and water tariffs to increase is also causing an-
other problem of equal signiﬁ cance. Currently, certain wastewater treatment 
plants have extremely low capacity utilisation, and in some cases municipalities 
are unable to supply the quantity of sewage required for the operation of their 
activated sludge plants. The investment and operating costs of treatment plants 
are substantial, and the expected underutilisation of the intended networks will 
cause major losses on a countrywide scale. Statistics are unable to show the 
extent of the increase in the performance of local supply systems while the per-
formance of piped supply has dropped by 40%, despite major developments. 
In some supply arrangements, water is abstracted from local wells, but sewage 
is discharged into sewers. Despite the environmental beneﬁ ts of such solutions, 
they add to the costs of the provider, putting upward pressure on utility tariffs. 
Such inaccurate ‘forecasts’ led to an unnecessary increase both in the speciﬁ c 
costs of services and the utility tariffs charged to consumers. In summary, the 
foregoing situation suggests the conclusion that the documents underlying envi-
ronmental policy simply ignored the likely welfare effects of proposed measures.
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 7.4 Socio-economic problems concerning the establishment and
         operation of environmental protection infrastructure
According to analyses carried out in Hungary, with regard to with the envi-
ronmental criteria concerning EU accession the greatest expense arises in 
connection with dealing with the problem of wastewater and, more speciﬁ -
cally, with bridging the utility gap. This is the ﬁ eld in which the most detailed, 
and in technological terms, the soundest inventory was taken of tasks to be 
performed, yet most professional debates were sparked by plans relating to 
wastewater drainage and treatment. Since environmental protection policy 
makers are not demographers, they seek to bridge the utility gap even in cases 
where this is not necessarily justiﬁ ed on environmental grounds, including in 
municipalities facing complete depopulation. 
Norms are standardised by EU directives at the European level, and by na-
tional regulations at the level of member states, generally without allowing for 
regulation based on municipality size. Although the Wastewater Directive only 
requires drainage for municipalities above a population equivalent to 2,000, 
it makes no distinction as regards permitted pollutant concentrations in the 
wastewater that is discharged. In the EU, the preference for a sewerage sup-
ply for municipalities with a population of below 2,000 was not due to an as-
sessment of pro-rated costs and beneﬁ ts, but to the fact that, as a result of 
their lower volume of pollution, the environmental pressure caused by smaller 
municipalities does not compromise catchment areas, or only to a limited ex-
tent. The EU directive on urban wastewater treatment (91/271/EEC) does not 
require nutrient removal in settlements with populations equivalent to or less 
than 10,000 individuals. Hungarian regulations are considerably tighter, be-
cause in Decree 28/2004. (XII. 25.) of the Ministry of Environment and Water 
on limit values of discharges of water polluting substances and their rules of 
application, the limits for ‘sensitive’ catchment areas as provided for in the EU 
directive were transposed as technological limits. The requirement in the EU 
directive that drainage must be in place by 2005 in all municipalities with a 
population of at least 2,000 provided a strong incentive and grounds for lob-
bying interest groups, intensifying such existing (partly negative) tendencies.
Due to the speciﬁ c characteristic of Hungarian territorial administration that, 
with a view to the acquisition of city status and other reasons, smaller mu-
nicipalities were merged or annexed to larger ones, there was a signiﬁ cant 
increase in the number of municipalities whose populations were under the 
limit provided for in the Directive. It would have been essential to make an 
adjustment whereby a distinction could be made between the boundaries of 
municipalities in terms of both physical geography and administration. The 
applicable EU regulations include the elements of both the level of sewer-
age supply depending on the categories of municipalities, and environmental 
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sensitivity. The initial Hungarian concept was developed in this spirit: by 2010, 
different levels of sewerage supply had been targeted according to the vari-
ous categories of municipality, and 68% nationally. However, with the onset 
of ‘sewerage fever’, these targets were forgotten, and every municipality and 
mayor sought to achieve the highest possible level of sewerage supply, re-
gardless of municipality size and the sensitivity of the local environment. 
According to the Hungarian territorial classiﬁ cation, for receiving waters in 
sensitive areas, wastewater treatment is mandated without regard to the size 
of the discharging entity, and therefore typically to an extent far exceeding EU 
requirements (Kovács, 2011).
Since sewer construction and access to the required funds are a ‘bargain’ 
for major interest groups, facilities were also constructed in locations where 
this was not justiﬁ ed by environmental factors (soil conditions and sensitiv-
ity), or where the situation could have been improved through modiﬁ cations of 
inappropriate and irregular individual drainage practices, and the enforcement 
of the applicable rules. 
7.5 The decline of utilities and villages
In smaller municipalities, not only are there problems with raising the funds re-
quired for infrastructural investment, but the support of residents is also lack-
ing for the implementation of environmental protection initiatives. According to 
Pickvance (2002), Hungarian public administration is fragmented; the average 
municipality size (3,290 residents) is the second smallest in Europe, which is 
one of the causes of constrained municipal resources. Low levels of revenue 
prevent local governments from employing a sufﬁ cient number of adequately 
qualiﬁ ed professionals. With an ageing population sustaining itself on pensions 
and allowances, signiﬁ cantly higher environmental costs will have to be paid 
by people who fail to ‘perceive’ the improvement in the quality of their environ-
ment. 
While bridging the utility gap has clear environmental beneﬁ ts, its welfare 
effects on the population are rather complex. It is an important issue whether 
a citizen perceives the improvement in environmental quality, or only perceives 
the need to contribute to the signiﬁ cant cost of that improvement. Residents of 
smaller municipalities did not perceive (or only to a minimal extent) the quality 
deﬁ ciencies of their environmental infrastructure. In most municipalities, the 
supply of drinking water was ensured and wastewater was collected in tanks. 
In quantitative terms, the collection and disposal of waste was also guaran-
teed, causing no nuisance to local residents. The failure of landﬁ lls to comply 
with norms was not perceivable; waste was disposed of in abandoned mine 
pits, which was seen by many as the ‘utilisation’ of the pits, as it were. In the 
short term, this practice did not give rise to any issues in terms of aesthetics or 
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environmental quality; however, time bombs may count down slowly. Shortly 
after the completion of environmental protection investments that complied 
with EU directives, higher waste management tariffs were introduced, amount-
ing to several times the previous charges. There was also a sharp increase 
in the cost of wastewater treatment; moreover, the costly water tanks con-
structed only a few years earlier were no longer needed, and their backﬁ lling 
added to the ﬁ nancial burdens of authorities. Currently, sewer construction is 
accompanied by the re-drilling of previously backﬁ lled wells, and the construc-
tion of local water supply systems. In addition to the problems caused by well 
water quality in terms of hygiene and therefore safety, this may also lead to 
severe disruptions in the operations of utility providers.
In smaller municipalities, the application of standard environmental norms 
involves a loss of welfare. Through the rapid increase in utility tariffs, even 
without an understanding of the theoretical context, rural residents understood 
that although their income had previously been lower compared to the capital, 
the costs of living were also much lower compared to urban populations. It 
is exactly this advantage that is being eroded by the increasingly stringent 
requirements of environmental protection through forced investment in infra-
structure. The speciﬁ c costs of constructing smaller systems are higher than 
those of larger systems based on economies of scale. This is dangerous be-
cause, in the longer term, it compromises the ability of villages to retain their 
populations. Differences in utility tariffs have a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on the cost 
structure of small enterprises. Even in the case of a simple service such as a 
carwash, water and wastewater tariffs represent a major cost item. This cost 
differential may be offset by the differential in property prices and rents; in 
cases where it is not, subregions may be left without such services. Of course, 
this will not make villages uninhabitable.
The situation that emerged is well illustrated by the National Environmental 
protection Program for 2014–2019, drafted by the Ministry of Rural Develop-
ment, which contains the following statement: ‘By 2007, access to piped 
drinking water was provided in 100% of the municipalities in the country. 
In 2012, the homes connected to the water network exceeded 94%. At the 
same time, the volume of water produced and supplied, including the drink-
ing water supplied to households, continued to decline in the period between 
2000 and 2012, due partly to rising water tariffs, and partly to consumers 
switching to supplies from their own wells. In terms of water production, 
this amounts to a 17% fall […] The number of municipalities with access to 
sewerage more than doubled from 854 in 2000 to 1,833 in 2012. However, 
the municipalities without a public sewerage system also included 7 towns: 
Csanádpalota, Kadarkút, Nagybajom, Nagyecsed, Sándorfalva, Tápiószele 
and Tompa. The rest of the 1,314 municipalities without a public sewerage 
system are villages, of which 961 have fewer than 1,000 residents. A county 
208 KEREKES – MARJAINÉ SZERÉNYI – KOCSIS
breakdown shows that most small municipalities in Baranya (214), Somogy 
(150), Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (120), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (115), Zala 
(108) and Vas (97) counties have no access to a public sewerage network. 
These municipalities are typically located in areas where the operation of 
public sewerage is not viable economically.’
In 2000 more than 35%, and in 2009 more than 24% of treated wastewa-
ter was discharged into receiving waters following only mechanical treatment. 
This degree of treatment fails to comply with the requirements for public health 
and environmental protection. The proportion of at least biologically treated 
wastewater within the total volume of treated municipal wastewater approxi-
mated 100% in 2013 (up from 65% in 2000), including the disposal of liquid 
municipal waste transported to treatment plants directly.
Mainly as a result of the development in sewerage and wastewater treatment 
implemented in Budapest in recent years, in 2013 the proportion of municipal 
wastewater transported to a treatment plant and only mechanically treated re-
mained at 0.2%, the level of 2012. Figure 7-2. shows the results that have been 
achieved with wastewater treatment. It is a welcome fact that the proportion 
of chemically treated wastewater within the total volume collected increased 
from 20% in 2002 to 80% to 2013.
Figure 7-2. Public wastewater treatment
(https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/telepinfra/telepinfra13.pdf)
One should acknowledge the fact that these results have indeed been 
achieved, but perhaps regret the twenty-ﬁ ve year delay. That said, it remains 
a fact that some present environmental problems are attributable to the in-
frastructural underdevelopment of the country, while the potentially negative 
environmental effects of inevitable development could be mitigated by the in-
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tegration of environmental considerations into spatial planning designs and 
programs. If small regions now seen as artiﬁ cial ecosystems were conceived 
of as a single system, natural, economic and social effects could be addressed 
though a more integrated systemic approach. This would improve both eco-
nomic and environmental efﬁ ciency and social satisfaction. In a mutually rein-
forcing way, environmental protection and urban planning could create numer-
ous beneﬁ ts.
7.6 Rising utility tariffs, falling capacity utilisation
Relying on surveys carried out in the Czech Republic, Somlyódy et al. (1998) 
showed that the speciﬁ c costs of a wastewater treatment plant constructed for 
a population of 2,000 - 5,000 are 5 - 10 times those of a wastewater treatment 
plant constructed for a population equivalent of 100,000.
Since local governments are elected bodies and their members are also 
consumers of public services, ‘as residents and consumers they share […] 
other residents’ interest in keeping the water utility tariff as low as possible’ 
(Somlyódy, 1998, p. 308). According to most professionals, this is one of the 
reasons why tariffs fail to cover the costs of services, and why the capital 
raised for maintenance work is insufﬁ cient. Undoubtedly, this phenomenon 
exists. Local governments are not particularly active at assessing local taxes, 
and seek to reduce the cost of public services to the greatest extent possi-
ble. Critics of the phenomenon view artiﬁ cially low prices as a political instru-
ment, and have reason to cite such fundamental propositions of economics 
as full cost recovery (Somlyódy, 1998, p. 307). But is it right to seek the root 
cause of the problem in the lack of responsibility of municipal leaders? (ibid., 
p. 308) The description of the phenomenon, and the conclusion that the cur-
rent practice is not sustainable because it leads to the depletion of water pro-
viders’ assets, are valid. That said, can privatisation or market competition 
offer a solution to the problem, or is state intervention, even in the form of 
subsidised prices, needed in the long term? Even if the conditions for market 
competition are supported, which is not an easy feat due to supply obliga-
tions and the technical monopoly held by virtue of the utility network, neither 
the supply of drinking water nor wastewater treatment can be done on a mar-
ket basis, and state intervention will continue to be needed (Kerekes, 2002).
There are substantial differences among various suppliers in terms of the 
producer price of water. In 1998, water tariffs varied between 80 and 2,300 
HUF/m3 (Somlyódy, 1998). Generally, water tariffs (varying between 80 and 
400 HUF/m3) are insufﬁ cient to cover costs and are supported by signiﬁ cant 
subsidies. The annual growth rate of water tariffs is faster than would be jus-
tiﬁ ed by inﬂ ation or economic growth, and regional differences among tar-
iffs also keep increasing. However, one major factor in cost increases is the 
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signiﬁ cant shortfall in capacity utilisation compared to expectations, thus it 
is uncertain whether additional price increases could improve the economic 
viability of the supply of utilities. To date, price increases have led to a fall in 
capacity utilisation, causing speciﬁ c costs to rise. In this light, it is not only up 
to the political insight of local government representatives whether sufﬁ cient 
proﬁ t will be generated for the sustainable use of utilities. If it is accepted that 
the production of water can cost anything between 100 and 2,000 HUF/m3, as-
suming a family with a low monthly consumption of 10 m3, this will mean that 
the same welfare gain would cost HUF 1,000 in a favourably situated city, and 
HUF 20,000 where consumers are connected to a less favourably situated, 
smaller water supply system.
If the principles of economics were fully applied, small municipalities 
would become depopulated, accompanied by further deterioration in the 
carrying capacity of the natural environment. The solution should not be 
limited to subsidised prices. There are obviously water supply systems 
which signiﬁ cantly reduce speciﬁ c consumption and where ‘water is ex-
pensive’ such systems should be used. However, this could also mean 
that where the production cost of water is 2,000 HUF/m3, the public utility 
system that is needed will be different from one that could be used in a 
cheaper location. On balance, however, the differences in the tariffs paid 
for environmental protection services should not exceed what can be offset 
by the difference in the quality of the environment. The more an individu-
al’s welfare is improved due to better environmental quality, the more they 
may be required to pay for environmental protection services. For example, 
residents of the Balaton region use the catchment in a sensitive area, but 
enjoy the welfare effects of better water quality, which may in itself justify 
a higher sewerage tariff compared to the average. By contrast, in cases 
where the high costs of public services are not due to such differences but 
to considerations concerning economies of scale, they should be offset so 
that residents of an unfavourably situated supply area do not suffer a loss 
of welfare. 
The establishment of this new infrastructure was accompanied by a 
sharp rise in environmental protection tariffs, and in many municipalities 
tariffs amounted to 30 to 40% of monthly income in some population cat-
egories.
An examination of the 1999 Decree which regulated the water and sewer 
tariffs charged by national companies shows major variability in tariffs (Table 
7-3.). The tariff charged by the Danube Regional Waterworks (in Vác) is one-
half of that charged by the Transdanubian Regional Waterworks (Siófok), which 
in professional terms is probably justiﬁ ed by differences in environmental sen-
sitivity. Nevertheless, residents of the northern coastal region of the Balaton 
may have the perception that they are being charged such a high tariff because 
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of the capacity that has been created for holiday resorts that are only used on 
a seasonal basis.
 Name of 
waterworks
Water tariff 
(HUF/m3)
Sewerage tariff 
(HUF/m3)
Combined tariff 
(HUF/m3)
Danube Regional 
Waterworks (Vác) 135.70 118.70 254.40
Transdanubian 
Regional 
Waterworks 
(Siófok)
207.80 323.30 531.10
Northern 
Transdanubian 
Waterworks 
(Tatabánya)
176.00 111.80 287.80
North Hungarian 
Regional 
Waterworks 
(Kazincbarcika)
190.00 212.00 402.00
Tisza Waterworks 
(Szolnok) 256.50 201.40 457.90
Table 7-3. Maximum tariffs that may be charged for drinking water and sewerage use by state-
owned waterworks (Decree 47/1999. (XII. 28.) KHVM, net of VAT) (http://www2.vizugy.hu/vir/vizugy.
nsf/7efd30c51842ae20c1256a8900382968/2f31d8edc1efc3e6c1256a9000614e0f?OpenDocument)
The 1999 Decree has another peculiar feature. The difference between the 
lowest and highest items is twofold for drinking water tariffs, and threefold for 
sewerage tariffs. The lowest sewerage tariff is charged in Tatabánya, despite 
the well-known fact that the environmental pollution caused by the Által-ér 
river has given rise to constant water quality problems in Tata Old Lake, 
which is located in the catchment area. The situation has changed since 
1999. In 2012, the water tariff charged in Tatabánya changed to 331 HUF/
m3, and the sewerage tariff to 261 HUF/m3, while in Oroszlány the sewerage 
tariff increased to 330 HUF/m3, clearly due to the application of the state-
of-the-art membrane ﬁ lter technology, which will be explained brieﬂ y below. 
All this has brought about a welcome improvement in the water quality of 
Tata Old Lake, providing visiting tourists and the residents of the town with 
a signiﬁ cant welfare gain, which will obviously be of little consolation to the 
citizens of Oroszlány, where one of the highest sewerage tariffs is charged 
among municipalities of similar sizes. In 2012, residents of the village of Szár 
paid outstandingly high tariffs: 499 HUF/m3 for sewerage and 415 HUF/m3 
for water, net of VAT.
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Municipality Provider(data source)
Net water 
tariff 
(HUF/m3)
Net 
sewerage 
tariff 
(HUF/m3)
Combined 
water and 
sewerage 
tariff 
(HUF/m3)
% of 
Budapest
Budapest
http://www.
dbrt.hu/index.
php?id=49
218.85 385.95 604.8 100
Gyál
http://www.gyal.
hu/informaciok/
kozuzemi-dijak
354.46 301.63 656.09 108.48
Győr, Nyúl
http://pannon-
viz.hu/cikk/
viz_es_
csatornadijak.
html
220.22 444.12 664.34 109.84
Felsőpataj
http://www.
dakov.hu/index.
php?pg=water_
select
289.2 402.5 691.7 114.36
Kőröstetétlen
http://www.
dakov.hu/index.
php?pg=water_
select
312.4 337.8 650.2 107.5
Monor
http://www.
dakov.hu/index.
php?pg=water_
select
257.8 425.5 683.3 112.97
Valkó
http://www.
dakov.hu/index.
php?pg=water_
select
255.3 416.6 671.9 111.09
Table 7-4. Utility tariffs in some municipalities (author’s selection)
(based on http://www.saar-ujb.hu/ﬁ les/00000938.pdf); http://www.kemma.hu/
komarom-esztergom/kozelet/igy-valtoznak-a-kozuzemi-dijak-a-varosokban-421417 )
Table 7-4. clearly shows that utility charges have increased signiﬁ cantly over 
the past one and a half decades despite state intervention, but also that re-
gional differences are beginning to become more balanced. Due to economies 
of scale, the Budapest tariffs remain lowest, while those charged in small mu-
nicipalities are only about 10% higher. This situation may be seen in a favour-
able light in terms of welfare requirements, but it is widely known that at best 
the tariffs cover operating costs, without any allocations for amortisations that 
would make the systems sustainable in the long term. In 25 to 30 years’ time, 
today’s new sewerage networks and wastewater treatment facilities will be-
come rundown, with hardly any funds for their overhaul. Intervention by the 
state will become inevitable, but not unproblematic. The case described below 
concerns a wastewater treatment plant that represents the category of ‘too 
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good’, while it also has environmental consequences that ‘did not need to 
be considered’ during the time of investment. The membrane technology that 
is applied meets all needs, but the operation of the pumps requires a large 
volume of electricity. Due to climate policy, this may have highly negative con-
sequences.
 7.7 Wastewater treatment in the Által-ér catchment area –
      The case of a small town’s wastewater treatment plant
In order to protect Tata Old Lake and the Által-ér tributary in the same catchment 
area, strict limits must be observed with regard to wastewater treatment in ac-
cordance with the European Union’s requirements for environmental protection. 
In water discharged from wastewater treatment plants in the catchment area of 
the Által-ér, total phosphorus concentration must not exceed 1 mg/litre through-
out the year, and total nitrogen concentration 10 mg/litre from 1 May to 15 No-
vember. In order for the wastewater treatment plant to meet this requirement, 
it must reach a level of efﬁ ciency of at least 90% in terms of pollutant removal. 
This creates the need to improve the puriﬁ cation performance of the plant so 
that the quality of the treated water complies with the emission limits set out 
in the decision of the Northern Transdanubian Inspectorate for Environmental 
Protection, Natural Protection and Water Management. As part of the Environ-
ment and Energy Operational Programme (KEOP), the Northern Transdanubian 
Waterworks was granted assistance to the amount of HUF 2,223,488,650 for 
the development of the two wastewater treatment plants in the area. Using EU 
funds, development work on the plants started on 14 July 2011. For the larger 
plant, the total development cost amounted to HUF 1,459,864,000 of which HUF 
1,112,497,000 was granted in assistance by the European Union and the Hun-
garian State, while for the smaller plant the total cost of development amounted 
to HUF 1,307,049,000, of which HUF 1,110,991,650 came in the form of grants 
from the European Union and the Hungarian State. As the dominant service 
provider in the region, during the implementation of its development objectives 
the Northern Transdanubian Waterworks pays particular attention to complying 
with increasingly strict Hungarian and EU regulations for environmental protec-
tion. Additionally, it is also mindful of the need to provide a quality service that 
meets the needs and requirements of both consumers and local governments. 
As of 2015, the operation of the wastewater treatment plant is also expected 
to be taken over by the waterworks. The wastewater treatment plant meets the 
highest standards for water quality, and the water that is discharged clearly im-
proves water quality in both the receiving Által-ér tributary and Tata Old Lake. 
However, the usual SWOT-type analysis of the wastewater treatment plant (i.e. 
a map of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) does not show a 
clearly positive outcome. Table 7-5. provides a good overview of the strengths 
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and weaknesses of the technology, helping decision makers to determine when 
to opt for this solution. Moreover, the table highlights the need to make further 
improvements to the project.
Strengths Weaknesses
• Possibility of compliance with the 
highest standards of environmental 
protection
• Modern, computer-controlled 
management system
• Minimal stafﬁ ng requirements
• Minimal environmental charge due to 
low pollutant emissions
• High speciﬁ c costs of wastewater 
treatment plant
• Approximately 1.6 kWh/m3 of 
electricity required for treatment
• Signiﬁ cant dependence on electricity 
tariffs
• Absence of a solution to sludge 
utilisation
• Restoration of primary settlement and 
use of sludge for the production of 
biogas, and use of biogas to generate 
electricity
• Separation of rainwater from 
municipal wastewater to reduce costs
• Initiation of demonstration projects 
relying on the vicinity of the 
membrane manufacturer
• Ideal conditions existing at the plant 
for research and development related 
to wastewater treatment
• Possibility to develop the plant into 
a national or even global example of 
best practice
• Insufﬁ cient capacity of the two 
rainwater reservoirs to manage 
torrential rains
• Inoperability of the wastewater 
treatment plant due to prolonged 
disruption to electricity supply
• Foaming at the biological treatment 
facility due to major surfactant 
pollution or inadequate ventilation, 
causing the wastewater treatment 
plant to be ﬂ ooded with foam
• Vendor dependence regarding 
supply of parts and technological 
components due to the membrane-
speciﬁ c design of the technology 
Table 7-5. SWOT analysis of membrane bioreactor wastewater treatment (Authors’ compilation)
As can be seen from Table 7-5., the direct beneﬁ ts of a project may be out-
weighed by its indirect beneﬁ ts, which implies that a decision based solely 
on a cost-beneﬁ t analysis would be premature. In the case at hand, while the 
costs of wastewater treatment may exceed what could be achieved with oth-
er technologies, the project should be implemented even for demonstration 
and research purposes due to the vicinity of the membrane production plant. 
Therefore, it is certainly possible that use of the technology in question would 
only be reasonable under particular environmental and economic circumstanc-
es. It will be readily apparent that although a holistic approach would suggest 
rejection of the choice of this technology in the case at hand, some features of 
the evaluation still provide a rationale for the choice. However, this raises the 
question whether the costs of that ‘other kind of rationale’ should be borne by 
the small-town population. The ethical answer to that question is a ‘no’. The 
high treatment costs resulting from the demonstration project would not serve 
the interests of the small-town population, but those of a broader community, 
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or the owner of the innovation (the developer of the membrane technology); 
consequently, the high speciﬁ c costs of treatment should not be borne by the 
citizens of the small town, but be distributed among all the parties that would 
subsequently derive proﬁ ts from or enjoy better environmental quality as a 
result of the project. 
If environmental protection services are provided to the population on a pro-
rata basis at market prices, environmental protection efforts will have a pecu-
liar market inﬂ uence. With larger supply systems (wastewater treatment plants, 
waste disposal facilities, etc.), speciﬁ c treatment costs and size are digressively 
proportional (i.e. involve successively lower costs). Due to this extremely high 
degressivity factor, all activities the cost structure of which include a high ratio 
of such costs will be established in the surroundings of major supply systems, 
creating a deﬁ nite comparative advantage for larger municipalities. However, 
this direction of development is largely unfavourable from an environmental 
perspective because even environmental protection measures will accelerate 
urbanisation and the disappearance of small municipalities. The contradiction 
can be resolved through norms based on differentiation by municipality size, 
or through subsidy regimes.
7.8 General trends in utility development in Hungary
The acceleration of infrastructural investment motivated by environmental 
protection is well illustrated by changes in the sewer length per 1,000 m 
of water pipeline. After 1995, sewer construction accelerated as economic 
performance improved, which could be seen as leading to the closure of the 
utility gap. The sharpest change is observed in Pest County. In 1990, Pest 
County lagged far behind the country average in terms of access to utilities, 
but took the lead by 2000, which is a major achievement considering the 
fact that in 1990 it recorded the lowest sewer length per 1,000 m of water 
pipeline. 
Apart from improvements in economic performance, in this phase of de-
velopment a major role was occupied was the peculiar development path 
of the Budapest agglomeration, which was by no means beneﬁ cial in en-
vironmental terms. The exodus of the higher-earning population from the 
capital powerfully stimulated infrastructural development. Additionally, the 
‘effectiveness’ of these developments is well illustrated by the fact that in 
terms of sewer length per home, the situation is the worst in Pest County. 
While in 2000 Pest County had a sewer length per 1,000 m of water pipe-
line which was far above the national average, regarding the percentage of 
homes connected to the sewer network its rate of 35% still ranked among 
the worst.
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Figure 7-3. Change in the proportion of homes connected to the sewer network by region (%) 
(1990–2000) (Kerekes, 2003)
Aggregate data show clearly that while sewer construction progressed rap-
idly and sewer length doubled, the proportion of connected homes increased 
by a mere 10-12%, accompanied by an overall decline in the volume of drained 
wastewater. The latter is partly attributable to a sharp fall in water consump-
tion. In this regard the only exception is again Pest County, due to the speciﬁ c 
development path of the agglomeration. Owing to the exodus of the popula-
tion from Budapest (largely those in the top income decile), Pest County saw 
an increase in both gas and water consumption, as well as in the volume of 
drained wastewater. Nationwide data are counterbalanced by the data from 
the capital and Pest County. 
In terms of sewer construction, there are substantial differences across the 
country. In more advanced Transdanubian regions, sewer construction and 
network connections have developed in a relatively balanced manner, and 
utility development efforts are aligned with the income of the population in 
the region, whereas in the eastern part of the country developments are be-
ing implemented at a slower rate. Although the rate of trunkline construction 
signiﬁ cantly exceeds the growth rate of connected consumers even in these 
regions, developments are more balanced, yet the lag of these regions is be-
coming increasingly serious.
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Characteristics of the utility supply of drinking water 
(based on Statisztikai Tükör, 2012)
The purpose of municipal water supply is to meet the needs of the popula-
tion for drinking and household water, and to supply drinking quality wa-
ter to commercial entities, public institutions and smaller industrial plants. 
Water may be supplied from private wells, public wells, through the pro-
prietary waterworks of plants and institutions, and utility water pipelines.
By 2007, access to piped water was present in 100% of the municipalities 
in the country. In 2012, homes connected to the water network exceeded 
94%. The volume of water produced and supplied, including the drinking 
water supplied to households, continued to decline in the period between 
2000 and 2012, due partly to rising water tariffs, and partly to consumers 
switching to supplies from their own wells. In terms of water production, 
this amounts to a fall of 17%.
In 2000–2012, 3.247 km of pipeline was added to the drinking water net-
work, the size of which reached 65,532 km in 2012, accompanied by an 
increase of more than 394,000 units in the number of homes connected to 
drinking water utilities.
Utility wastewater drainage
Regarding the preservation of the purity of water reserves in the long term, 
the development of sewerage and wastewater treatment is of great impor-
tance. In international comparison, Hungarian municipalities have decent 
performance indicators in terms of utility drinking water supply. In the ﬁ eld 
of wastewater drainage, concerning the ratio of connected homes the util-
ity gap still exceeds 20%, but it is nevertheless being closed progressively 
as a result of the developments of recent years.
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Utility gap (2012)
The number of municipalities with access to sewerage more than doubled 
from 854 in 2000 to 1,833 in 2012. However, those municipalities without a 
public sewerage system also included 7 towns: Csanádpalota, Kadarkút, 
Nagybajom, Nagyecsed, Sándorfalva, Tápiószele and Tompa. The rest of the 
1,314 municipalities without a public sewerage system are villages, of which 
961 have fewer than 1,000 residents. Breakdown by county shows that most 
small municipalities in Baranya (214), Somogy (150), Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 
(120), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (115), Zala (108) and Vas (97) counties have 
no access to a public sewerage network. These municipalities are typically 
located in areas where the operation of public sewerage is not viable eco-
nomically.
In 2000–2012, the number of homes connected to the sewerage network in-
creased by more than 1.18 million from 2.079 million in 2000 (51%) to 3.259 
million in 2012 (74%), making up some of the major shortfall compared to the 
number of homes connected to the water network. The volume of wastewater 
drained through public sewers, including the discharge from institutions, in-
dustry, proprietary wells and other wastewater sources as well as the volume 
of rainwater drained through combined sewerage systems, amounted to an 
average annual 529 million m3 in the period 2000–2012. This corresponds 
to more than 79% of the average annual drinking water production of public 
waterworks (666 million m3). Similarly to the data for 2000, in terms of the 
number and proportion of homes connected to a public sewerage network, 
Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Heves and Tolna counties 
lagged far behind the average at the end of 2012. The situation is still the worst 
in Bács-Kiskun county (49.7%). Even in the capital, which is in the best situ-
ation, certain areas on the outskirts with some 38,000 homes (4.2%) remain 
unconnected to sewerage systems.
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Wastewater treatment
In 2009, over 4.5% (24 million m3) of the wastewater collected through 
the utility network was discharged into recipient waters without treatment. 
Wastewater from the capital accounted for the vast majority of that, with 
approximately 22.4 million m3 being discharged directly into the Danube 
in Budapest.
In 2012, nationwide only 1.4% (6.3 million m3) of the wastewater collected 
through the utility network was discharged into recipient waters (mainly 
into surface waters) without treatment.
The efﬁ ciency of wastewater treatment plants varies depending on technical 
conditions, technology, capacity deployed, the volume of wastewater that is 
treated, the pollutant load, and the professional standards of operation, etc. 
at each plant.
Wastewater drained through public sewers, and treated wastewater
A rather large proportion of treated wastewater (more than 35% in 2000 
and still more than 24% in 2009) was discharged into receiving waters only 
following mechanical treatment. This level of treatment fails to comply with 
requirements for public health and environmental protection.
By 2012, the proportion of municipal wastewater drained to a treatment 
plant and treated only mechanically fell to 0.2%. The proportion of at least 
biologically treated wastewater within the total volume of treated munici-
pal wastewater approximated 100% in 2012 (up from 65% in 2000). This 
included the disposal of liquid municipal waste transported to treatment 
plants directly. The signiﬁ cant improvement is primarily attributable to the 
development of wastewater treatment in Budapest.
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8. The characterisation of welfare, welfare indicators
8.1 Introduction
Citizens expect successful economic policy to improve their standard of life 
and their welfare. Quality of life is not equivalent to material consumption, 
although we are inclined to deﬁ ne our individual standard of life in terms of 
ﬁ nancial income, while on the level of the national economy, the economic 
state of the country is expressed via the Gross Domestic Product indicator. 
Again, the devil is of course in the detail. GDP can be made more precise, 
of course (household performance can be considered, inequalities of dis-
tribution can be examined, and other modiﬁ cations are also possible when 
computing GDP). GDP, however will never make a good welfare indicator 
because it indicates only one dimension, an economic one, and inaccurately, 
too. Many have experimented with other indicators that comprise more di-
mensions of the quality of life. One of the most successful of these attempts 
is the UNIDO Human Development Indicator, the structure and calculation 
of which is presented below. If, however, we think more deeply about the 
concept of welfare, we are bound to arrive at the conclusion that we cannot 
trust efforts to characterise our welfare and its changes with a single scalar. In 
this chapter we describe how nearly every single indicator system struggles 
with the same problems as those they were meant to replace; i.e., they tell us 
barely anything more than a more detailed analysis of GDP already has. At the 
end of the chapter we discuss how subjective well-being and sustainability 
relate to each other.
 8.2 The characterisation of inequality in the distribution of income
The Gini coefﬁ cient was developed by Conrado Gini, an Italian statistician, 
to characterise inequalities in the distribution of incomes. Details were ﬁ rst 
published in a book by Gini in 1912. Its value varies between zero and one. If 
all the members of a given society receive exactly identical incomes, the value 
is 0.00, while the value is 1.00 if one person receives all the income while the 
rest receive nothing. The calculation of the Gini coefﬁ cient is illustrated in the 
ﬁ gure below.
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Figure 8-1. Calculation of the Gini coefﬁ cient (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_curve)
The line in the ﬁ gure is the so-called Lorenz curve, which can be shown when 
the cumulative population rate is indicated on the horizontal axis, while the verti-
cal axis shows the income share received by the given population from the total, 
starting with the lowest-income individuals of the population. A diagonal means a 
perfectly equal share of income, while the larger the area between by the Lorenz 
curve and the diagonal, the larger the inequalities in the distribution of income.
To calculate the Gini coefﬁ cient, ﬁ rst deﬁ ne the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45o diagonal and divide it by the area below the diagonal. If the 
distribution of incomes is perfectly equal, the Lorenz curve will coincide with 
the diagonal, making the coefﬁ cient 0.00, while if only one person receives 
all the income (this never happens in reality, of course), the Lorenz curve will 
coincide with the axes, obtaining the quotient of the area of two congruent 
triangles; that is, 1.00 as the coefﬁ cient.
In reality, the value of the Gini coefﬁ cient is usually 0.2-0.5, while the 
Gini index varies between 20 and 50%. The lower values (25-35%) are 
characteristic of the countries of the former communist bloc, and the so-
called welfare states (including EU and Canada), while values between 35 
and 40% refer to more substantial differences. The relevant group includes 
Italy, Latvia, Israel and Russia. Values over 40% reﬂ ect signiﬁ cant inequali-
ties, but this group is rather heterogeneous, including the USA where the 
difference between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% is ‘only’ 15.9-
fold, while this value is 24.6-fold in Mexico and 40-fold in Chile. If we had 
comparative data, the highest inequalities would surely be indicated by the 
Gini coefﬁ cients for the African continent, where according to 1995 data 
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even differences of 100-fold are not rare between those belonging to the 
poorest and the richest decile.
Interestingly enough, the USA’s already high Gini coefﬁ cient has continually 
grown in past years, signalling an increase in social inequality, while exactly 
the opposite would be desirable for more sustainable development. Figure 
8-2. shows the income inequality in the USA between 1980 and 2016.
Researchers have arrived at a surprising result: the upper one-tenth, or rather 
one-hundredth of American society has become very rich again. Ninety per cent of 
society owns as little as 25% of total income, and the richest one per cent more than 
10%. The Golden Age of tycoons of the 1920s has now returned, while the middle 
class is disappearing again, which is rather threatening to social sustainability.
Figure 8-2. Income inequality in the USA (1980–2016) (WID.world, 2017,
see http://wir2018.wid.world/methodology.html for data series and notes )
8.3 The measurement of human development
Until the late 1960s, quality of life was largely equated with material welfare. ‘Qual-
ity of life’ became a multi-dimensional concept, inseparably associated with fac-
tors that deﬁ ne living circumstances like health, social circumstances, or the state 
of the natural environment. Moreover, concerning the interpretation of the quality 
of life, a distinction is now made between objective (real) life circumstances and 
the subjective welfare of individuals. The latter reﬂ ect individual’s expectations 
about their own life circumstances and subjective judgements about them. 
The welfare concepts developed so far mainly fall into two groups (Berger-
Schmitt–Noll, 2000). One involves the so-called ‘quality of life’ concept, which 
may be split into several trends itself, and is relatively well supported with 
research and empirical analyses. The other, fairly new trend focuses on social 
dimensions of welfare such as social cohesion, exclusion, social capital, hu-
man development, sustainability, etc.
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Within the quality of life trend, two fundamental schools are differentiated. 
One was established by Scandinavian researchers of standard of life, while the 
other is rooted in the US.
8.4 The quality of life model
8.4.1 The Scandinavian model – prioritising objective elements
             in quality of life
The quality of life model is the product of Scandinavian research, and its 
elaboration is associated with the names Jan Drewnoski, who took the deﬁ -
nition of man’s objective needs as the foundation of the idea, and Richard 
Titmuss, who examined ‘man’s command-over-resources’. The researchers 
interpreted ‘resources’ rather broadly to include incomes, assets, education 
and knowledge, social relations and networks, etc. These scholars claim that 
an individual’s command over resources is determined by the external cir-
cumstances of their life, so they also considered these factors as components 
of objective quality of life. That their scrutiny focused on objective quality of 
life did not mean that they attributed no signiﬁ cance to individual subjective 
aspirations, but since no government policy can be developed on the grounds 
of the former, the authors claim, the measurement of welfare must be based 
on objective elements. 
8.4.2 The American ‘personal satisfaction’ model
The reverse of the Scandinavian resource-based concept is the American 
quality of life concept, which equates quality of life with satisfaction of in-
dividual needs; consequently, it considers quality of life to be approachable 
through an examination of individual-level factors (Berger-Schmitt–Noll, 2000; 
Husz, 2001). The self-evident goal of social development according to this 
approach is not to achieve objective goals concerning quality of life, but to 
increase individual subjective quality of life; i.e., to enhance individual satisfac-
tion and happiness. The measurement of welfare in this approach is ﬁ rst of all 
possible through social indicators. Argyle says subjective welfare has three 
components: satisfaction, the existence of favourable effects, and a lack of 
unfavourable stress (Berger-Schmitt–Noll, 2000, p. 10).
According to Johan Galtung, basic needs can be expressed through the 
‘having, loving, being’ triangle, where ‘having’ refers to material goods and hu-
man needs, ‘loving’ to the human relationships necessary for happiness, and 
‘being’ to social integrity and a harmonious relationship with nature. Indicators 
that express these may capture the extent to which one takes part in politics, 
opportunities for doing rewarding work, or enjoying nature. 
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8.4.3 The quality of society model
In the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, development theory that 
put the social dimensions of welfare into focus was published. In evaluating 
human development, this sought to examine the quality and liveability of so-
ciety and aimed to deﬁ ne the ‘good society’. Veenhoven (1996) differentiates 
four dimensions of the quality of nations: the ﬁ rst being ‘liveability’, which in-
dicates  national quality of life, the second the stability of the system and its 
subsystems, the third productivity, and the fourth the prevalence of principles 
relating to freedom such as independence and equality. There are two basic 
methodological approaches to measuring the goodness of societies. The ﬁ rst 
approach is based on input, and the other on output indicators.
Methods based on input indicators start by measuring the welfare of socie-
ties, which is characterised through the life circumstances supported by soci-
ety. This factor is what is expected to create harmony between citizens’ needs 
and abilities and includes welfare, political freedom, and access to education. 
As for the practicability of input indicators, two problems arise. One is that this 
method implicitly presupposes that we know societies’ opinion about its needs 
and abilities, while the other (not necessarily fallacious) supposition is that in 
every dimension higher values also relate to higher quality.
With a method based on output indicators, researchers try to identify to what 
extent a given society provides prosperity for its citizens. Physical and mental 
health, general satisfaction and happiness may be indicators that express such 
prosperity.
The outstanding sociologist Emile Durkheim was the ﬁ rst to consider social 
cohesion a signiﬁ cant element in the analysis of the quality of society, which he 
deﬁ ned as mutual dependence, shared values and solidarity among members 
of society (Berger-Schmitt–Heinz-Herbert, 2000, p. 15). As a consequence of 
the economic growth of the past decade, social cohesion is under threat, and 
probably this is why it has been under the spotlight of international politics. 
Jenson deﬁ ned ﬁ ve areas of social cohesion:
• belonging – isolation: a sense of the existence of shared values, identity, 
and commitment,
• inclusion – exclusion: equal opportunities and access,
• participation – non-involvement, 
• recognition – rejection: tolerance for different viewpoints and respect for 
pluralism,
• legitimacy – illegitimacy: respect for the institutional system designed to 
manage the conﬂ icts that arise in pluralist societies.
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An increase in social cohesion, which is considered a positive factor from 
the perspective of sustainable development, assumes a decrease in social in-
equality and the simultaneous reinforcement of relationships within society.
8.5 The UNDP Human Development Index
The concept of human development was elaborated by Miles through a United 
Nations University project carried out in 1985. The term became internationally 
known through the inﬂ uence of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) 
and received its ﬁ nal form through the work of the former Iraqi Head of the Hu-
man Development Report Ofﬁ ce (HDRO) Mahbub ul Haq, and the 1998 Nobel 
Prize winner for economics, Amartya Sen. The ﬁ rst published issue of HDR was 
dominated by Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘capabilities’, according to which ‘Hu-
man development is a process of enlarging people’s choices’ (UNDP, 1990, p.1). 
Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’ concept involves supporting the essence of welfare 
through ‘functionings’ (including ‘doings and beings’, like going to the movies and 
reading books, the existence of good health, and social integrity). Sen’s approach 
can be considered an extension of the Scandinavian quality-of-life model.
The Human Development Index is used to characterise the level of develop-
ment along the three basic dimensions of human development in the member 
states of the United Nations.
The Human Development Index, in the form conceived of in 1999, differenti-
ates three dimensions of human development:
• Health and longevity expressed as average life expectancy at birth (I1)
• Educational attainment expressed in the literacy rate of the adult popula-
tion (assigned a weight of two-thirds) and combined enrolment ratio in 
basic, secondary and higher education (one-third weight) (I2)
• Decent standard of living expressed in discounted USD (or its logarithm) 
in the form of purchasing power parity of GDP (I3)
The performance per dimension of the subject country is expressed using the 
following formula:
The index of the subject dimension =
actual value – minimum value
maximum value – minimum value
The value of the index was at ﬁ rst inﬂ uenced by the maximum and minimum 
values. If, for example, a new country was involved in the system, this not only 
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changed the rankings but also the value of all indices. To monitor the changes 
in annual data over time, the maximum and the minimum values were then 
ﬁ xed. These values are shown in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1. Pre-2010 and post-2010 HDI Construction Methodology
(http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/human-development-index/human-development-index-hdi-
an-overview/11782 – accessed on 25/04/2018)
One advantage of this index is that it characterises reality in a more com-
prehensive way than earlier, more one-dimensional concepts. The index has 
received a great deal of criticism since it was published in 1990. One group of 
concrete critiques object to the arbitrariness of the selection of components, 
claiming that freedom, safety, equality, etc. could equally well be dimensions 
of human development as a decent standard of living, longevity, or education 
(Lind, 1992, 1993; Diener, 1995). Substantial changes in the composition of the 
index have been made only once, when in 1991 the index of the adult literacy 
rate was supplemented with the estimated value of the average duration of 
schooling (Husz, 2001). This was necessary (among other reasons) because 
in developed countries the adult literacy rate approaches 100%, which puts 
a stop to its further development. The last comprehensive reform of the cal-
culation methodology for the HDI took place in 1999. At that time, the original 
method for discounting GDP was reinstated (between 1991 and 1999 other 
methods were used), so the index is now calculated using the logarithm of 
discounted GDP data measured as purchasing power parity. However, the in-
volvement of GDP in the index raises yet other problems. It adversely affects 
economies where the distribution of labour is less developed, and cash ﬂ ow 
is not as necessary for providing a livelihood for individuals. Critics of HDI ﬁ nd 
it problematic that, owing to arithmetic averaging, differences in one indicator 
can easily be compensated by improvements in another. In this respect, it may 
be found somewhat ironic that in a developing country a one-year increase 
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in average life expectancy at birth (meaning a several-per-cent improvement 
in the index) can be compensated for by a raise in GDP of a few hundred 
USD, while compensation for the same increase in most developed countries 
would require an improvement of thousands of dollars. This situation gives the 
impression that the lives of the citizens of developed countries are ‘more valu-
able’ than those of developing countries. 
Averaging raises yet another problem: that of the independence of the three 
indices. Critics claim that the correlation between the HDI and its constituent 
individual indicators is usually over 0.8, and the correlation between the HDI 
and women’s life expectancy at birth is even higher: this questions whether the 
indicator is a genuinely complex one. 
However, the index is fairly resistant to criticism, probably because it pro-
vides simple and easy-to-interpret data for those involved in development-
related policymaking. 
The HDI ﬁ rst became public in the 1990 United Nations HDR. Following this, 
the group of indices used in the calculation was broadened. Figure 8-3. shows 
the ﬁ ve most signiﬁ cant human development indicators and their correlations. 
Besides the classic HDI, the 2004 HDR published two types of poverty indices 
separately for developing and OECD countries.
The HPI-1 index expresses poverty through the probability at birth of surviv-
ing to age 40, the proportion of adult illiteracy, the proportion of population 
with sustainable access to an improved water source, and the proportion of 
children that are underweight for their age.
In OECD countries, poverty is characterised using HPI-2, which calculates 
the probability at birth of surviving to age 60, the proportion of adults lacking 
functional literacy skills, the population below the income poverty line, and 
long-term unemployment. 
The GDI (Gender-Related Development Index) indicates the inter-gender dif-
ferences of human development. It considers the homogeneity of the inter-gen-
der distribution of life expectancy at birth, inequalities between sexes in school-
ing and illiteracy, and the equality of gender-related income distribution. GDI 
alone cannot be used to make an international comparison of gender-related 
discrimination. Deductions can only be made through a comparison of the HDI 
ranking and the GDI ranking. If the given country is positioned lower in terms 
of GDI than HDI, this implies disadvantageous discrimination against women. 
The GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) expresses the distribution of po-
litical and economic power between men and women. 
The system of ﬁ ve indexes is shown in the ﬁ gure below.
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Figure 8-3. Components of the Human Development Index (based on HDR, 2005)
Figure 8-4. HDI values per county in descending order and component indicators in 2001
(Melinda Smahó: A humán fejlettség regionális dimenziói http://www.sze.hu/etk/_konferencia/pub-
likacio/Net/eloadas_smaho_melinda.doc accessed on 16/04/2018)
The HDI is theoretically calculable using regional data if the differences are 
signiﬁ cant enough for the three component indicators. As the Hungarian data 
for counties show, the data only partially meet this condition. The ﬂ uctuation 
in the calculated HDIs are largely caused by regional differences in one indica-
tor: GDP. Differences in life expectancy at birth and education are luckily not 
yet signiﬁ cant. In consequence of this, all the regional statistics indicate is that 
Budapest and Győr-Sopron favourably, and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Nó-
grád unfavourably ‘stick out’ in terms of the HDI average.
8.6 Sustainable consumption and the Easterlin paradox
Developed by researchers of the far-from-environmentally-biased Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), the petals of the sunﬂ ower of well-being clearly illus-
trate the components of the quality of life (Figure 8-5.). Value-system-dependent 
shifts can be made between individual dimensions. For example, we often give 
up our free time and risk our health to obtain material wealth. We appreciate mak-
ing an immediate proﬁ t – such as a higher income – more than we value distant 
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losses such as the inconvenience caused by a deterioration in our health or the 
irreplaceable joy of chatting and having fun with loved ones. The shifts may appear 
to involve independent decisions, but in reality we may be trapped. We all know 
well that a person who cannot be counted on during times of abundant work will 
soon remain without anything to do. Social value systems may also be centred on 
competitiveness, which has little to do with quality of life.
Figure 8-5. The Sunﬂ ower of well-being: primary components of the quality of life
(graphic by Imola Kocsis, ©2018)
The idea that the main goal of a human life is ‘self-fulﬁ lment’ has become a 
major theme in Hungarian public perception. In practice, ‘self-fulﬁ lment’ does 
not mean maximising one’s quality of life, but more strongly suggests the pro-
motion of selﬁ shness, which may be useful for the efﬁ cient operation of the 
economy, but has little to do with human happiness. Quality of life does not 
seem to be related to welfare or sustainable development; in reality, social 
perceptions about quality of life fundamentally inﬂ uence sustainability. Making 
a differentiation between welfare and ‘well-being’ is important because if a 
‘shopping cart’ contains more of a ‘cultural component’ (as broadly interpret-
ed), any increase in well-being will require less growth in material and energy 
consumption, and thus have reduced environmental impact.
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Quality of life: a standard composed of the total of factors that affect 
one’s life and well-being. The concept includes the components of living 
standard, as well as factors that are ﬁ nancially inexpressible yet which 
signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence our life and well-being. These include, for exam-
ple, the social condition of individuals and groups, health situation, life 
expectancy, the status of cultural values, and the environment. Environ-
mental impacts – beyond direct economic and biological effects – may 
also have psychological consequences which signiﬁ cantly affect quality 
of life. These can include feelings of discomfort and depression about the 
contamination and aesthetic deterioration of the environment, an increase 
in the risk of damage to health, or risk of industrial disaster. (Láng, 2011)
The market economy in its classic form was based on local support sys-
tems and cultures which are sustainable. Capitalism developed through radical 
growth in labour productivity and distribution, while material consumption has 
become ‘gloriﬁ ed’ as a value in itself. Material consumption has become the 
main driving force of the development and existence of the global economic 
system. Under conditions of globalised capitalism, the local market economy 
is outside the direct control of members of society and economic power domi-
nates; consequently, the global economic system is not sustainable in an en-
vironmental sense. 
According to estimates, the population of the Earth is still growing and will 
reach between seven and ten billion until 2050. It is also public knowledge that 
at present 800 million people are ‘living’ (starving) on less than $1 per day, 
while nearly three billion live on less than $2 daily (i.e., at poverty level). 
This still means that the economy can be operational, because people who 
work 10–14 hours a day are fairly productive, and can ‘ﬁ nance’ serious social 
support systems. 
The focus on ‘competition’ generates the illusion that every ‘game’ in life is 
zero-sum. If tax revenue is spent on environmental protection, there will be no 
resources left for building motorways. If pensions are subsidised, there will be 
nothing left to support small enterprises. These suppositions that suggest that 
one goal can be realised only to the detriment of another are all too familiar. 
Sustainable development needs a radically different way of thinking. ‘Sus-
tainability’ refers to the multiple dimensions of development and can help 
erase the word ‘or’ from our dictionary (since the simultaneous development 
of multiple dimensions can only be expressed using the words ‘and/both’). 
Favourable compromises always exist, while it is never true that there are only 
two options to pick from: typically, innumerable options exist in parallel. The 
sin of dominant paradigms is that during certain periods certain solutions are 
prioritised, and society is faced with a choice. It is precisely this situation that 
necessitates government intervention: a system of institutions operated by so-
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ciety is required without which there would be no environmental safety, or even 
an environment of tolerable quality. 
It is notable, with reference to human needs, that in a study from 2000 Csík-
szentmihályi questions Maslow’s general thesis that consumers make rational 
decisions about how to satisfy their own needs (see Maslow’s pyramid, Figure 
8-6.). 
Figure 8-6. Maslow’s pyramid (based on Maslow, 1954,
https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html – accessed on 16/04/2018)
Csíkszentmihályi (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) states that in a welfare economy 
consumers care little about ‘existence’, itself but their attention turns towards 
satisfying ‘experiential’ needs. That is, they need to engage in activity to satisfy 
a need for practical experience. Interestingly enough, the consumer’s main 
interest is no longer in merchandise, but the experience of shopping itself. This 
may have positive or negative consequences from the perspective of sustain-
able development.
Sustainability means ensuring the continuous existence of ‘something’. GDP 
growth does not necessarily involve a growth in welfare, and even less that of 
well-being. Growth in well-being includes the development of education, an 
increase in healthy life expectancy, an improvement in life and social security, 
and even the improvement of factors such as personal freedom, which are all 
components of the quality of life. 
According to the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin, 1973), the satisfaction or hap-
piness of people is poorly correlated to growth in wealth (Stevenson – Wolfers, 
2008 ). Those who do not get preoccupied with statistical averages but have 
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thought about individuals claim that over half of the active population suffer 
from depression, and this illness tends to attack those who are ‘wealthy’. It is 
perhaps not only them, but this group certainly constitutes the basis for the 
diagnosis of depression as the endemic disease of the modern age. Earth’s 
carrying capacity is limited, and seems to be failing under the environmental 
impact continually generated by mankind: the needless and mindless con-
sumer habits of the rich, and the misery of the poor, since both overload the 
global ecosystem.11
Mária Csutora and her colleagues at the Institute of Environmental Science 
at Corvinus University revealed an interesting phenomenon about people’s en-
vironmental awareness and ecological footprint. While one would expect the 
ecological footprints of environmentally conscious people to be smaller than 
those of non-environmentally conscious people, the related research found no 
such correlation. In a study with major international relevance, Csutora calls 
the phenomenon, which we might label the Csutora Paradox, the ‘Behaviour–
Impact Gap’. The main point of the paradox is that the ecological footprints 
or the carbon footprints of so-called brown- (the least environmentally con-
scious) and green- (the most environmentally conscious) consumers do not 
signiﬁ cantly differ from each other. Ecological footprint depends on income, 
but the beneﬁ cial effect of environmental awareness cannot be demonstrated 
(Csutora, 2012).
Environmentally conscious consumers are ready to ‘self-limit’ in some ways 
(such as selectively collecting waste, turning off the tap, disconnecting the tel-
ephone recharger, etc.) that have only marginal effects on ecological footprint, 
while they refuse to make radical changes. They typically do not give up ﬂ ying, 
or become vegetarians, or move into smaller homes. This certainly does not 
mean that environmentally conscious consumption does not have long-term 
beneﬁ cial effects. However, these long-term effects are structural in nature, 
and are difﬁ cult to express in ﬁ gures. 
There seems to be only one feasible option left, and that is to make consump-
tion sustainable. This, however, also involves some challenges with deﬁ nition.
UNEP 1999: ‘Sustainable consumption is not about consuming less, it is 
about consuming differently, consuming efﬁ ciently, and having an improved 
quality of life’
National Consumer Council, UK, 2003: ‘Sustainable consumption is a bal-
ancing act. It is about consuming in such a way as to protect the environment, 
use natural resources wisely and promote quality of life now, while not spoiling 
the lives of future consumers.’
11 For a comprehensive parallel analysis of subjective well-being, economic perform-
ance (GDP) and sustainability (ecological footprint) using the analytical ‘Dataquad-
rate’ tool, see Kocsis (2012).
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How can this be realised? According to SEPA’s study, the following are the 
available options:
• Decrease the raw material content of products and services – 
demate¬rialisation
• Lengthen the life cycle of products
• Increase eco-efﬁ ciency – the environmental impact associated with a 
unit of product/service 
• More efﬁ ciently exploit the useful life span of a product 
There is huge potential in every ﬁ eld. This is easy to realise if we consider how 
different the per-capita level of material consumption of individual countries is.
One of the structural differences involves the role of services in the economy. 
A high level of use of services is typical of the Italians (and Mediterranean 
people in general), who often eat out (the average use of ‘outside’ catering is 
as high as 7-15 %), while the rate is relatively low in North-European countries 
(4-5.5 %). There are exceptions, of course, but structural differences of such 
a scale in terms of food consumption (constituting 20-25% of total consump-
tion) have signiﬁ cant employment-related and environmental effects. It may 
seem strange, but the speciﬁ c per capita environmental impact of restaurant 
services is certainly lower than for those associated with home-made meals, 
which involve a lot of avoidable cost and indirect environmental impacts re-
lated to refrigeration, transport, etc.
Food Non-alcoholic drinks Alcoholic drinks
Restaurants, 
catering services
EU27 11.9 1.2 1.5 6.9 
Belgium 12.5 1.1 1.7 5.2 
Czech Republic 14.1 1.5 3.7 5.2 
Germany 9.8 1.4 1.5 4.8 
Greece 16.0 0.8 0.9 10.4 
Spain 13.1 1.0 0.8 14.8 
France (2010) 12.2 1.1 1.5 5.4 
Italy 13.7 1.0 0.7 7.7 
Hungary 15.1 2.6 5.3 3.5 
Malta (2010) 13.6 1.9 1.4 8.6 
The Netherlands 10.7 1.0 1.2 4.5 
Austria 9.6 1.2 1.3 7.9 
Poland 18.2 1.8 3.8 2.2 
Romania 26.6 2.5 2.2 2.8 
Finland 11.9 1.1 3.7 6.0 
United Kingdom 8.5 1.2 1.7 8.8 
Table 8-2. Final consumption of foodstuff by households as percentage of total consumption (2009) 
(Eurostat, 2011/27)
If the rate of use of services increases, will this spur radical growth in the 
eco-efﬁ ciency of the economy? It is conceivable that such a shift would result 
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in some change in the growth of the life cycle of products, and a decrease in 
the volume of resources that are consumed. 
Is it possible that products will largely be replaced by services in the future? 
Does the path to the future really involve producers extending the life cycle of their 
products (with their main proﬁ le then being rentals rather than one-off sales) instead 
of striving to produce more and more new models to sell? As long as the provision 
of services involves a greater competitive advantage and less cost than produc-
tion, companies will probably be inclined to use this business model that is more 
environmentally friendly. We should not forget, though, that companies are not al-
truistic: if a model or process is created that is more competitive and proﬁ table, 
environmental interests may again take a back seat to business considerations.
Product group 2002 2011 2011/2002 %
Bread and cereals, total 105.6 81.3 77
Beef and veal 1.1 0.7 64
Pork 17.2 15.3 89
Fowl 21.4 16.2 76
Meats, total 60.7 52.2 86
Fish, canned fi sh 1.7 1.6 94
Milk (litres) 66.4 50.4 76
Yoghurt, kefi r, sour cream (litres) 9.9 11.6 117
Canned milk, milk powder, other 
milk derivatives, cheese, quark 4.9 5.6 114
Eggs 195 141 72
Fat, total 21.5 16.3 76
Citrus Fruit 9.1 6.4 70
Bananas .. 3.9
Apples 14.7 9.6 65
Water melons 9.2 4.9 53
Fruit, total 48.1 38.9 81
Potatoes 42.6 28.6 67
Vegetables and potatoes, total 104.6 78.8 75
Sugar 16.2 12.4 76
Fruit juices (litres) 15.8 12.1 77
Wine, grape must (litres) 7.9 5.7 72
Table 8-3. Annual per capita food consumption in Hungary (2002–2011) [kg]
Domestic food consumption has signiﬁ cantly decreased in the past ten years 
in the main product groups, with the exception of a few dairy products. This may 
partly be explained by the ageing of Hungarian society, because the number of 
young children (with similarly low consumption) has also declined. From an envi-
ronmental perspective, however, it is interesting that the per capita consumption 
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of banana and citrus fruit is equal to that of apples. Domestic beef consumption 
– the item with the largest ecological footprint – is insigniﬁ cant.
 8.7 To what end environmental pressure?
       A simplifi ed model of human satisfaction
The I=PAT formula (explained in Chapter 1-1) and the opportunity for meas-
uring subjective well-being raise questions about how any human impact is 
exerted on the environment. The claim that a neutral mathematical formula 
also makes a value judgment would be a bold statement; however, it is dif-
ﬁ cult to put aside the thought that the conventional I=PAT equation appears to 
include environmental impact as an end in itself  –  as if the very essence of its 
meaning were absent; i.e., the formula suggests that there exists a rationale for 
transforming our environment if and to the extent that it will effectively improve 
human well-being (the point is also applicable to the concept of economic 
growth, which could become economically unviable beyond a certain level; 
see Daly, 1999). However, it is possible to formulate another equation to show 
the impact of the use of material resources on human happiness:
Ihappiness = P * Amaterial * Thappiness
Here, impact (I) is measured in terms of happiness units of subjective well-
being, population (P) in the number of people, and afﬂ uence (A) in per capita 
gHa (similarly to the measurement of ecological footprints in global hectares 
(gHa), see Chapter 3). This deﬁ nes T (technology) as a unit of happiness over 
afﬂ uence (gHa). At ﬁ rst glance, this would appear to be some sort of ‘happi-
ness efﬁ ciency’ indicator, showing the amount of human happiness that can 
be associated with one global hectare of environmental pressure.
However, instead of communicating using such technical or technological 
‘efﬁ ciency indicators’ it may be more appropriate to introduce the concept of 
celestial footprint, which also better captures the imagination. This makes the 
impact of the adjusted equation even more pronounced:
Ihappiness = P * (per capita) ecological footprint * celestial footprint
Unlike with the original I=PAT formula, here the logic of ‘the more the better’ ap-
plies, which in today’s growth-oriented civilisation may be a message more readily 
received than approaches that highlight environmental limits and imply restrictions. 
One beneﬁ t of this adjusted formula is that, in taking into account the size of 
the population, it subdivides human satisfaction and happiness into ‘earthly’ and 
‘celestial’ components, which are measurable factors. Another beneﬁ t is that in-
crease or maintenance of overall happiness may be deﬁ ned as an objective that 
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is difﬁ cult to challenge. That said, the means of implementation and the issue of 
sustainability are of strategic signiﬁ cance: it indeed makes a difference what mix 
of various types of footprints are used to achieve a speciﬁ c level of satisfaction.
The incorporation of human happiness and satisfaction into the analysis adds 
new meaning to the I=PAT formula, subdividing environmental pressure into mul-
tiple factors. Although even the original formula has the ‘power of revelation’ 
and creates a treasury of analyses (York et al., 2003), the solution proposed here 
places more focus on the potential inherent in the idea that man ‘does not live 
by bread alone’ (Matthew 4:4). Pressure on the environment (including economic 
activity) should not be considered the end, but the means of human existence.
8.8 Celestial footprint, happy planet
Above a certain ‘level of development’ at which the bare necessities of human 
life are, by and large, considered to have been provided (yet the ﬁ niteness of 
the environment is also perceived with increasing clarity), it may be of strategic 
signiﬁ cance to introduce into the general discourse an indicator that can be com-
municated well and is measurable with relative ease, such as the celestial foot-
print. At an acceptable level of material development, this indicator satisﬁ es the 
requirement that ‘the more the better’. That said, for the most part the concept 
provides a theoretical framework that can be populated with data in a number of 
ways. In this case, economic performance is quantiﬁ ed by GDP, environmental 
pressure by ecological footprint, and happiness and satisfaction by subjective 
well-being. The latter represents a typical individualistic western approach, which 
nevertheless allows respondents to assess their situation based on their own 
concepts of happiness. Giving consideration to this, in addition to GDP (which 
is frequently viewed as an objective indicator of material welfare) is deﬁ nitely a 
step forward. Happiness (welfare) and environmental sustainability should be 
appraised in combination. The magnitude of the challenge is well illustrated by 
the combination of the scores for per capita ecological footprint and subjective 
well-being (happiness) in a single chart (Figure 8-7.). The ‘higher’ positions in 
the chart represent countries with greater material comfort, while countries with 
higher satisfaction/happiness scores are shown on the right. The chart suggests 
the striking fact that greater comfort is associated with greater happiness, and 
vice versa. This is not a surprise. However, the ideal is represented by the bottom 
right corner of the chart, where high happiness is associated with a level of mate-
rial comfort below the current average. Currently, some Latin-American countries 
such as Costa Rica, Brazil, etc. come closest to that ideal (In Figure 8-7., Hungary 
is mapped around the middle of the chart, in the vicinity of China, with values ap-
proximating the global average in terms of both happiness and internal control).
The problem is also excellently speciﬁ ed by another analytical tool, the Hap-
py Planet Index. This adjusts happiness according to per capita ecological 
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footprint by deriving the ratio of the two, and also considers life expectancy at 
birth, and more recently income inequality as well. The indicator enables coun-
tries to be ranked (Jeffrey et al., 2016), again with Latin-American countries 
scoring the highest. In these countries, relatively low material comfort is asso-
ciated with rather high levels of happiness. The bottom of the list is occupied 
mainly by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are sustainable in an envi-
ronmental sense, but offer living conditions that no-one wants to have  –  not 
even the residents of the countries concerned, the region being the unhappiest 
in the world. In Figure 8-7. these countries are shown in the bottom left corner.
Although by incorporating life expectancy and income inequality the Happy 
Planet Index introduces key variables into the analysis, there is still a point in 
establishing a less complex indicator that is as simple as pie to use. This is per 
capita ecological footprint according to subjective well-being. In a dull, technical 
sense, this could be referred to as happiness efﬁ ciency, or to use a more el-
evated term that is also more fortunate from the perspective of communication, 
celestial footprint. This is to say, celestial footprint is, in a sense, complementary 
to the earthly, material (ecological) footprint in terms of human well-being (com-
pleteness), but has a multiplicity of implications for natural sciences by including 
the feature human happiness that is typically addressed by the social sciences.
Figure 8-7. Per capita ecological footprint and happiness (subjective well-being) in 2012 (http://
www.footprintnetwork.org/2016/03/25/imagine-happiness-treading-lightly-earth/ accessed on 
16/04/2018; the two perpendicular red lines are the author’s completion)
One important direction for research is understanding the root causes of 
the differences in the ‘performance’ of various social entities in terms of ce-
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lestial footprint (happiness efﬁ ciency), and possible ways for ‘underperform-
ers’ to adopt any good practices. Such research may, for example, seek to 
explain how Australia and Norway can achieve the same level of happiness 
at a completely different level of internal control, or how China (or Hungary) 
and Brazil can achieve completely different levels of happiness (i.e., celestial 
footprints of rather different size and composition) at the same level of mate-
rial comfort.
8.9 Voluntary simplicity
Any inquiry that is not carried out nationwide, which is the level undoubtedly 
best covered in terms of economic and sustainability data, will ﬁ nd a number 
of good practices at the local level. One need not go as far as Latin America, 
nor the United States (see also Takács-Sánta, 2017), even though the emer-
gence and spread of the voluntary simplicity movement in the latter is a rather 
remarkable phenomenon, given that the country in question is one of the most 
developed and richest in the world, and serves as an example in many re-
spects (obviously not for its environmental sustainability). The philosophy and 
practice of the movement throws vivid light on the opportunity of exploiting the 
human potential inherent in controlling consumption, which does not amount 
to giving up but rather opening up a broader and freer form of human com-
pleteness.
For these reasons it is worthwhile examining some of the components of 
this lifestyle, which is equally characterised by a high level of subjective well-
being (happiness) and resistance to material growth and consumerism. The 
voluntary simplicity movement, which is mostly present in the United States, 
can be seen as powerful in terms of both theory and practice (Gregg, 1936; 
Elgin–Mitchell, 1977; Elgin, 1993). The movement continues to attract general 
interest (Schreurs, 2010; Gambrel–Cafaro, 2010; Jackson, 2008; Gandolﬁ –
Cherrier, 2008; Shi, 2007). For reasons of space, the ramiﬁ ed concept cannot 
be explained here in full detail; therefore, the following is a description of the 
typical characteristics of proponents of voluntary simplicity.
The theory and practice of voluntary simplicity may also be seen as institu-
tionalised resistance to consumer society. The essence of voluntary simplicity 
is a way of life which is outwardly simple, and inwardly rich (Elgin, 1993). It has 
its roots in the legendary frugality and self-reliance of the Puritans, Thoreau’s 
naturalistic visions from his time at Walden Pond, Emerson’s practical and 
spiritual espousal of simple living and high thinking, as well as the teachings 
and social philosophy of spiritual leaders with different authority such as Jesus 
and Gandhi. According to the advocates of voluntary simplicity, the current 
social and environmental crisis puts special emphasis on these ideas, urging 
people to lead a socially and environmentally responsible way of life (for more 
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detail about voluntary simplicity and a critique, see Kocsis, 2002, Chapters 3 
and 4). In their classic paper, Elgin and Mitchell (1977) distinguish between 
ﬁ ve core values of voluntary simplicity: material simplicity, human scale, self-
determination, ecological awareness, and personal growth.
But who actually are the voluntary simpliﬁ ers? Key information about this 
can be found from the questionnaires used by researchers to investigate the 
movement. Intended to identify voluntary simpliﬁ ers, the following statements, 
evaluated by Shama and Wisenblit (1984), have also been frequently used in 
more recent empirical research: (1) I believe in material simplicity, i.e., buying 
and consuming only what I need; (2) I believe that ‘small is beautiful’, e.g., I 
prefer smaller cars over large cars; (3) I believe that a product’s function is 
usually more important than its style; (4) I am interested in personal growth 
more than economic growth; (5) I am determined to have more control over my 
life as a consumer - e.g., stay away from buying on instalments; (6) I consider 
myself ecologically responsible (Shama–Wisenblit 1984, p. 233). Obviously, 
the values and commitments measured on the basis of the level of agreement 
with each of these statements are strongly correlated with life achievement 
characterised by lower material needs and stronger internal control.
Questionnaires about the practice of voluntary simplicity are often concerned 
with respondents’ daily activities. Activities that were possible a good thirty 
years ago in California, which was then and still is one of the materially most 
developed regions of the world, have now spread worldwide. Consequently, 
the questionnaire administered in California by Dorothy Leonard-Barton in 
1981 has since become more generally applicable, and continues to be used 
in a number of studies that investigate lifestyles and ecological sustainability 
in the context of voluntary simplicity. Typical proponents of voluntary simplic-
ity make gifts instead of buying them; ride a bicycle for exercise, recreation or 
transportation; recycle newspapers and bottles or take them to a bottle bank; 
learn skills to increase their self-reliance (for example, decorating); intentionally 
eat meatless main meals; buy clothing at second-hand stores; buy major items 
of furniture second-hand (over 25 USD); make furniture or clothing for the fam-
ily; exchange goods or services with others in lieu of payment in money; grow 
the vegetables the family consumes during the summer (Leonard-Barton, 
1981, pp. 250–251; a simpliﬁ ed list). With regard to the voluntary nature of the 
above activities (if these phenomena were involuntary, they would imply mate-
rial deprivation), there is good reason to assume that voluntary simpliﬁ ers are 
capable of signiﬁ cantly decelerating the material consumption of the economy.
Maslow’s (1954) thesis about basic human needs is compatible with the 
supposition that voluntary simplicity may appeal to people following the full 
satisfaction of their basic physical and physiological needs (see earlier in this 
Chapter). ‘Voluntary simplicity is thus a choice a successful corporate lawyer, 
not a homeless person, faces; Singapore, not Rwanda. Indeed, to urge the 
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poor or near poor to draw satisfaction from consuming less is to ignore the 
profound connection between the hierarchy of human needs and consump-
tion. It becomes an obsession that can be overcome only after basic creature 
comfort needs are well and securely sated’ (Etzioni, 2004, p. 415). Thus, what 
voluntary simplicity seeks to restrict is consumerism, not consumption (Etzi-
oni, 2004, p. 416).
The crucial question is therefore whether what can occasionally be accom-
plished on a small scale in smaller human communities can also be accom-
plished on a larger scale at a general level; i.e., whether it is possible for hu-
mankind to achieve happiness and sustainability at the same time.
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